






Essays on the Application of Derivatives: Evidence 











Department of Economics and Finance 









Prof. Jędrzej Białkowski 





My thesis focuses on examining the application of financial derivatives on U.S. 
market. In Chapter 1, I test whether the introduction of derivatives affects their 
underlying assets. By examining the flow of money to volatility-related exchange-
traded products, I find evidence that the trading of those derivatives affects the 
underlying assets, but that the impacts are not stronger during market downturns. In 
Chapter 2, I analyze the determinants of expected market volatility proxied by the VIX 
index. I document that the relationship between expected market volatility and its 
determinants is subject to changes over time. In Chapter 3, I investigate whether 
regulations in the post-GFC period changed banks’ attitudes towards and use of 
derivative products. The analysis of the introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act reveals that 
banks were exposed to lower systemic risk associated with derivatives usage but to 
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A considerable portion of financial innovations over recent decades has come from 
the emergence of derivatives markets. Derivatives are financial instruments whose 
value is derived from the value of underlying assets, such as equities, bonds, exchange 
rates, commodities, residential mortgages, commercial mortgages and even other 
derivatives. The most common forms of derivative products are options, forwards, 
futures and swaps. The first recorded example of a derivatives transaction dates back to 
around 600 BC, when the philosopher Thales of Miletus positioned himself to profit 
from the rising price of oil by negotiating what were effectively call options on olive 
oil.  
Financial derivatives can be used by investors as tools for hedging or speculation 
purposes. Derivatives for hedging are used to manage risks by providing offsetting 
compensation in case of an undesired event. More specifically, one party in a 
derivatives contract could transfer the risks related to the price of the underlying assets 
to its counterparty. By using financial derivatives, corporations are able to mitigate 
potential financial distress cost (e.g. Smith and Stulz, 1985; Norden, Silva Buston, and 
Wagner, 2014; Bartram, 2017) and avoid underinvestment issues (e.g. Froot, 
Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993; Deng, Elyasiani, and Mao, 2017), thereby increasing firm 
value. On the other hand, derivatives can be used for speculation purposes and acquiring 
risks. Investors can use derivatives to speculate on the value of the underlying assets, 
betting that the future value of the underlying assets will move in the expected direction 
without having prior positions in those assets. Such speculations expose those investors 
to higher risks (e.g. Choi and Elyasiani, 1997; Minton, Stulz and Willamson, 2005; Li 
and Marinč, 2014).  




arbitrage trading. Investors can get positions in different derivatives on the same 
underlying asset or derivatives markets, seeking chances to lock in a riskless profit by 
offsetting these positions. Such arbitrage trading activities will rapidly adjust the price, 
eradicate the arbitrage opportunities and therefore improve market efficiency (e.g. 
Partnoy, 1996; Figlewski, 2017). Derivatives also enable individuals to get exposure to 
hard-to-trade assets more efficiently. For instance, investors can track the performance 
of the equity market conveniently with stock index futures, rather than including all 
individual stocks listed in the index in their investment portfolio, which is laborious and 
difficult to manage.  
However, despite their benefits, derivatives have been labeled by Warren Buffet as 
“financial weapons of mass destruction”, and, particularly over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives, are criticized for causing debacles and financial crises (e.g. Bedendo and 
Bruno, 2012; Donaldson and Micheler, 2018).  
OTC derivatives are privately negotiated and traded directly between two parties 
instead of through an exchange or other intermediary. Derivatives contracts, such as 
swaps, forwards and exotic options are normally traded over the counter. The OTC 
derivatives market is the biggest market for derivatives trading and is largely 
unregulated, since the information disclosure between the involved parties is quite low. 
The main participants in the OTC derivatives market are banks and other highly 
sophisticated parties (e.g. hedge funds). A vast amount of criticism has been made about 
the role of banks’ use of OTC derivatives in fueling the 2007-2009 global financial 
crisis. 
Unlike OTC derivatives, exchange-traded derivatives are traded on specialized 




by the exchange and allow market participants to trade. The derivatives exchanges act 
as intermediaries to all transactions of exchange-traded derivatives and provide 
guarantees by taking margins from both parties involved in the derivatives contract.   
My thesis consists of three essays on derivatives markets and investigates both 
exchange-traded derivatives and OTC derivatives. The first essay contributes to the 
literature by examining to what extent the introduction of derivatives products affects 
the underlying assets. More specifically, I answer the question of the extent to which 
the extensive flow of money to the volatility-related exchange-traded products affects 
the level of the underlying VIX index.1 
The second essay in my work provides empirical evidence on the determinants of 
investors’ fear gauge – the VIX index. In particular, I empirically test the implication 
of the theoretical model posed by Pastor and Veronesi (2013) and the theoretical model 
formulated by Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009). In this essay, I also examine the role 
of representativeness bias in determining the level of the VIX. 
Finally, the third essay contributes to the debate on whether and to what extent 
regulations in the post-financial-crisis period change banks’ attitudes towards financial 
derivatives.2 In particular, I answer the question of whether the Dodd-Frank Act, as a 
response to the financial crisis, has met its objectives of restricting the effects of 
derivatives on banks’ systemic risk.  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Part II contains the three essays. 
                                                             
1 Previous studies have examined how the introduction of derivatives, such as futures and options, affects 
the volatility of the underlying assets (e.g. Bollen, 1998; Bologna and Cavallo, 2002; Shenbagaraman, 
2003; Spyrou, 2005; Drimbetas, Sariannidis and Porfiris, 2007; Kasman and Kasman, 2008) and 
document mixed findings. 
2 According to Fidrmuc (2013), differences in regulation could have influence on banks’ activities, such 




Chapter 1 examines the impacts of derivatives on the underlying asset. Chapter 2 
analyzes the determinants of expected market volatility. Chapter 3 investigates the 
effects of regulations on banks’ attitude towards derivatives in the post-crisis period. 





















Does the tail wag the dog? Evidence from fund flow to 
VIX ETFs and ETNs 
Abstract 
This study investigates if and how the fund flows to VIX exchange-traded funds 
(ETFs) and VIX exchange-traded notes (ETNs) impact the underlying volatility VIX 
index. The VIX ETFs and ETNs are divided into four groups depending on their 
investment strategy. I found that each group has a very distinctive fund flow pattern, 
reflecting the mean-reverting character of the VIX. I found that generally higher fund 
flows to VIX exchange-traded funds and notes which apply a normal tracking strategy 
tend to increase the value of the VIX, while higher fund flows to VIX exchange-traded 
funds and notes which apply an inverse tracking strategy decrease the value of the VIX. 
Moreover, I show that money flows to VIX exchange-traded products is insufficient to 
contribute to market instability during market downturns. The results of this study 
provide arguments for the discussion on the impact of exchange trade products on their 
underlying products (see SEC's File No. S7-11-15).  
 
Keywords: VIX,Exchange-traded fund, Exchange-traded note, Fund flow, VIX future 
price, VIX future price term structure  
 






After the recent global financial crisis, including variance-related instruments in 
investment portfolios has been emphasized by many academic researches (Chen, Chung 
and Ho, 2010; Santon, 2011; Whaley, 2013; DeLisle, Doran and Krieger, 2014). Market 
participants prefer to include volatility products in their portfolios to enjoy 
diversification benefits during periods of turmoil. Among those variance-related 
products, the instruments whose performance is linked to the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index (VIX) level have become most popular. The VIX is 
a measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. As a market volatility 
index, the VIX represents the market’s expectation of stock market volatility over the 
next 30-day period. In recent years, it has become a commonly accepted "fear gauge" for 
many investors. 
The VIX is not an index in which market participants are allowed to directly invest 
since its inception in 1993. However, volatility trading then was not restricted to direct 
investment in the VIX index, as there were a few available approaches on the market, 
such as combinations of static positions in the market index options with dynamic trading 
in the underlying or straddle, strangle combinations3 (Neuberger, 1990; Dupire, 1997; 
Carr and Madan, 1998). Considering the option positions need to be monitored and 
rebalanced frequently, those approaches of trading in volatility required a high level of 
engagement from investors. On top of that, volatility trading with market index options 
portfolios was much more complicated than any buy-and-hold strategy commonly used 
                                                             
3Long positions in a straddle and a strangle could benefit from a rise in volatility; while delta-hedging an 
option position provides exposure to the difference between the realized volatility and the anticipated 





in the case of exchange-traded fund (ETF) and exchange-traded note (ETN) investments. 
The CBOE Futures Exchange (CFE) responded to the growing demand for 
simplified volatility trading. On March 26, 2004, the first-ever trading in futures contract 
on the VIX started on the CFE, providing investors a straight approach to trade in 
expected market volatility. On February 24, 2006, VIX option contracts became another 
type of VIX-related products available to trade, providing investors more flexibility in 
volatility investing. VIX options and futures shortly became actively traded contracts 
on the CFE. The average daily trading volume of VIX options contracts has grown 
considerably from 0.13 million contracts in 2009 to 0.57 million contracts in 2015, 
which then takes up more than half of the total daily trading volume of all S&P 500 
index option groups4 (0.97 million contracts)5 . The average trading volume in VIX 
futures climbed from 4.5 thousand contracts in 2009 to 205 thousand contracts in 20156, 
dwarfing nearly all other futures trading on the CFE. 
Compared to those trading approaches with market index options, VIX futures and 
options contracts are more direct instruments to trade volatility for market participants. 
However, VIX futures and options contracts are still complex investments particularly 
for individual investors, in spite of their popularity. While sophisticated investors can 
trade VIX futures and options for multiple purposes such as speculation, directional 
exposure, arbitrage, diversification and hedging, it is not so easy and cost-efficient for 
unsophisticated investors to trade them to get exposure to market volatility. The need 
to provide volatility-related exchange-traded products to a wide variety of investors has 
                                                             
4 The S&P 500 option groups include SPX Options Traditional, SPX Options Non-Traditional, SPX 
Options - Mini and SPY Options, covering seven types of SPX options. 
5 The data were retrieved from CBOE Historical Options Data: 
http://www.cboe.com/data/putcallratio.aspx. 




been increasingly emphasized. Commenting on the issuance of VIX exchange-traded 
products, Coleman (2012) states that "Barring some unforeseen complication, 
individual investors and their professional advisors should soon be able to do much the 
same in a seemingly less complicated and affordable manner." 
Indeed, in February 2009, Barclays iPath launched the S&P 500 VIX Short-Term 
Futures Exchange-Traded Notes (NYSE: VXX) and S&P 500 VIX Mid-Term Futures 
Exchange-Traded Notes (NYSE: VXZ), representing the emergence of VIX futures-
based exchange-traded products. Those exchange-traded products invest in VIX futures 
indexes, thereby providing investors with exposure to market volatility. For instance, 
the VXX ETN tracks the S&P VIX Short Term Futures Index Total Return. The index 
itself is designed to follow the changes in the value of short-term VIX futures contracts. 
According to its prospectus, the VXX ETN is designed to provide investors with 
exposure to one or more maturities of futures contracts on the VIX index. These VIX 
ETNs quickly became the most popular variance-related instruments among investors 
because of their low costs, tax efficiency and stock-like features. In 2010, just one year 
after their issuance, the average daily trading volume of the VXX ETNs reached around 
19 million shares and they have been growing fast. Following the successful 
introduction of the VXX and VXZ, more and more VIX-related ETNs and ETFs have 
been launched. These instruments track different VIX futures indices and other VIX-
related indices, and thereby provide investors with a wider variety of investment 
choices. Currently, there are more than 20 VIX-related exchange-traded products, 
making it more convenient for global investors to get exposure to market volatility in a 
cost-efficient manner. For the sake of simplicity, I refer to VIX ETNs and ETFs as VIX 




The fast growing of investors’ interest in volatility-linked products has been 
accompanied by an increase in academic output on related topics. Existing literature on 
the VIX index and VIX-related products has evolved into several main streams 
including the pricing and modeling of the VIX index and VIX derivatives; the 
interaction between the VIX and VIX-related products; and the performance of VIX 
ETPs. So far, few attempts have been made to examine the flows to VIX ETPs and the 
possible impact of the fund flows on the VIX index. The literature, however, has 
documented that fund flow matters to other investment vehicles, such as mutual funds 
(Edelen and Warner, 2001; Boyer and Zheng, 2009; Ben-Rephael, Kandel and Wohl, 
2011; Christoffersen, Musto, and Wermers, 2014) and hedge funds (Brown, Goetzmann, 
Liang and Schwarz, 2008; Boyson, Stahel and Stulz, 2010; Dichev and Yu, 2011; Li, 
Zhang and Zhao, 2011; Horst and Salganik, 2014). The impacts of fund flow have also 
been examined in the context of ETFs. Kalaycıoğlu (2004) investigates the flow-return 
relationship in ETFs at individual and aggregate levels and finds significant negative 
correlation between ETF flows and market returns. Staer (2014) explores the relation 
between daily contemporaneous ETF flows and their underlying securities' returns and 
reports a positive, which is also supported by Chang and Ke (2014). Clifford, Fulkerson 
and Jordan (2014) investigate the drivers of equity ETF flows and find that higher 
volume, smaller spreads and higher price to net asset value ratios increase ETF flows.  
Taking into account the previously reported relationships between fund flow and 
performance, one may expect that the money flow to VIX ETPs can impact the 
performance of the underlying VIX index. In the aftermath of the collapse of 
VelocityShares Daily 2x VIX Short-Term ETN (TVIX),7 the Security and Exchange 
                                                             
7On February 21, 2012, Credit Suisse stopped issuing new shares in VelocityShares Daily 2x VIX Short 
Term ETN (TVIX) due to internal limits on the size of ETNs; as a result, the share price of the ETN 




Commission (SEC) decided to look into the trading of it, and the financial media started 
to ask questions about whether the extensive money flows to ETFs and ETNs may have 
an impact on the underlying itself.  
An article published in the Financial Times raises concerns that distorted messages 
about future expectations of market behavior may be sent by the VIX futures markets 
due to the popularity of ETPs.8 At the same time, the Wall Street Journal asked to what 
degree the money flow into VIX products more broadly affects the VIX itself.9 These 
concerns are shared by Alexander and Korovilas (2012) and Asensio (2013), who 
suggest that as VIX futures have become more accessible to general investors, the 
inflows can create distortions in VIX futures markets, especially for short-dated tenors, 
which are most actively used for the management of VIX ETPs.  
On June 12, 2015, SEC filed an official document No. S7-11-15, to seek public 
comment on topics related to the listing and trading of exchange-traded products on 
national securities exchanges and sales of these products by broker-dealers. In that file, 
comments were requested on the nature, extent, and potential causes of premiums and 
discounts across the wide range of ETP strategies and holdings. Furthermore, the Item 
17 in the file precisely raise the question: "To what extent, if any, does trading activity 
in ETP Securities affect price discovery, price correlation, liquidity, or volatility in the 
ETP’s underlying or reference assets?" which confirms the concerns between ETPs and 
the underlying index.10 
                                                             
after Credit Suisse reopened issuance and then dropped another 30% on the next day (see Russolillo, 
2012; Lauricella, Eagkesham and Dieterich, 2012; Dieterich and Kiernan, 2012). 
8Makan and Kaminska (2012), “ETF rush muddies the waters on volatility,” Financial Times. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2c50013a-78f6-11e1-88c5-00144feab49a.html#axzz3cqbDRjSP 
9 Lauricella (2012), "Are TVIX, Other ETNs Wagging the Tail of the VIX Dog?" Source: 
http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2012/03/29/are-tvix-other-etns-wagging-the-tail-of-the-vix-dog 




This study focuses on the examination of the fund flows to VIX ETPs and their 
effect on the VIX index. In addition, the study answers Question 17 in SEC's File No. 
S7-11-15, on how the ETP can affect the underlying using results obtained for VIX 
ETPs market. The contribution of the study is twofold. Firstly, reported results help to 
understand the dynamics of fund flow to different VIX ETP groups as a function of 
market performance. Secondly, the findings show that while the aggregated flow has 
marginal effects on the VIX index, the fund flow to a few specific groups of those VIX 
ETFs and ETNs have significant impacts on the VIX index. Moreover, I show that there 
is no extra impact of the flow on the VIX during a bear market, suggesting that the 
trading in VIX ETPs during a bearish period do not destabilize the underlying market.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses 
technical details concerning VIX, VIX futures and VIX ETPs. Section 1.3 reviews the 
related literature and Section 1.4 outlines the hypotheses. Section 1.5 presents the data 
and methodology. Section 1.6 presents the results of the empirical analysis on the fund 
flow to VIX ETPs. Section 1.7 summarises the findings and concludes. 
 
1.2 VIX, VIX futures and VIX ETPs 
1.2.1 VIX Index  
As discussed, the VIX is a trademarked ticker symbol for the CBOE Market 
volatility index and represents one measure of the market’s expectation of stock market 
                                                             
and therefore stock index futures market functions as the leading price indicator. On the other hand, 
BlackRock commented that more ETFs are becoming the true market and the underlying assets may 
eventually catch up with any gap between the two. Though it is not agreed precisely on which product is 
leading prices, the statements show the nature of derivative products has changed and they could pose 




volatility over the next 30-day period. The VIX gets more attention from investors due to 
the fact that the movement of the index provides an indication of the trend of the stock 
market. When there are concerns among investors about a potential decline in the equity 
market, hedgers buy more S&P 500 index option puts as insurance for their portfolio 
against the unfavored market move. As a consequence, more investors demand 
increases the price of index options and lead to a higher VIX level (Whaley, 2008). In 
other words, the VIX is an indicator that reflects the price of portfolio insurance. As the 
VIX is found typically to trend downwards in a bull market and upwards in a bear market, 
investors could influence their investment decisions and actions based on the level of the 
VIX index (Fleming, Ostdiek and Whaley, 1995; Whaley, 2008). In addition, the VIX has 
been frequently applied as a proxy for realized market volatility in recent research, and 
has been proved that it outperforms other risk measurements of spot volatility (e.g. 
Christiansen, Ranaldo and Soderlind, 2011; Kanniainen, Lin and Yang, 2014). 
The VIX was introduced by CBOE in 1993 and was originally designed to measure 
the market’s expectation of 30-day volatility implied by the price of at-the-money S&P 
100 Index (OEX Index) option, the most actively-traded index options in the U.S. then. 
Since its inception, the VIX soon became the most popular benchmark for U.S. stock 
market volatility and has been regularly featured in leading financial news and 
publications (e.g. the Wall Street Journal, Barron’s, Bloomberg). As the S&P 500 Index 
option market gradually became the core index option market, later in 2003, the VIX was 
updated by CBOE together with Goldman Sachs, to measure the expected volatility 
within a new way, which is based on the S&P 500 Index. Different from the old VIX 
which only estimated the implied volatility of at-the-money S&P 100 index option, the 
new way estimates expected market volatility by combining the weighted prices of S&P 





1.2.1.1 Mean-reversion and history of VIX index 
The key property of the VIX is that it is a mean-reverting time series (Whaley, 2008). 
More specifically, when the VIX is quite high (low), it tends to get pulled back down (up) 
to its long-run mean. Another important property of the VIX is its asymmetric relationship 
with the equity market index. When expected market volatility spikes, market participants 
demand a higher risk premium and consequently the prices of stocks decline, and, when 
expected market volatility decreases, investors demand a lower risk premium, so the 
prices of stocks rise. This suggests the relation between the percentage change in the 
VIX should be proportional to the percentage return of the S&P 500 index. However, 
empirical evidence has been found that the absolute rate of change in the VIX is higher 
when the equity market falls than when it rises (Whaley, 2008). This asymmetry could 
be attributed to investors’ demand for S&P 500 Index put options as portfolio insurance 
when the market is in turmoil. 
In order to gauge the behavior of the VIX, I present the time-series value of the VIX 
and S&P 500 index in Figure 1.1. The time window starts from 1993, the year when the 
VIX was officially introduced, through December 2017. There are several noteworthy 
observations. It can be found in the figure that there are periods when the VIX reaches 
quite high levels. More specifically, the VIX spiked in October 1997 following a stock 
market sell-off when the Dow fell 555 points. The October 1998 spike occurred in a 
period of general nervousness in the stock market. The recession periods of the early 
2000s is also associated with the a VIX level. The peak level of the VIX is observed 
during the recent 2007-2009 crisis, when the value of the VIX closed at 80.86 on 




debt and the spike in August 2010 is accompanied by the fears about a slowing global 
economic recovery as well as S&P’s downgrade on the U.S. In the aftermath of each 
spike, the VIX returned to more normal levels, which is consistent with the mean-
reversion of the fear gauge. 
In addition, it can be noticed in Figure 1.1 that although the closing levels of the VIX 
and the S&P 500 index appear to move in opposite directions during most of the time, 
there are periods when stock prices and the VIX run up at the same time. For example, in 
January 1999, the rising VIX was accompanied by an increasing level of the S&P 500 
index. Such patterns can also be found in the first two months of 1995, June and July of 

































































































































































































































































1.2.2 VIX futures 
Since the VIX index does not allow market participants to invest directly in it, the 
main available approaches of volatility trading were restricted to the combinations of 
dynamic and complicated positions in options until 2004. These approaches were quite 
costly to even sophisticated investors as they needed to monitor the complicated option 
positions and rebalance frequently. As the market demand grew dramatically for 
simplified and straight forward volatility trading, the CBOE Futures Exchange (CFE) 
introduced VIX futures contracts on March 26, 2004, making it possible for market 
participants to directly trade volatility. 
The prices of VIX futures could be either higher or lower than the current value of 
the underlying VIX index. The reason behind is that market participants’ expectation on 
the volatility may vary from month to month. For instance, if the VIX index is 20 in 
August, the market expectation for the VIX could be higher than 20 in October and lower 
than 20 in December. As a consequence, the October VIX futures will be trading at a 
price above 20 while the December VIX futures will be trading below 20.  
The pricing relationship between VIX futures and the underlying VIX index is 
different from that of other future contracts. In particular, VIX futures price is not given 
by a cost-of-carry model (Grunbichler and Longstaff, 1996), by which common futures 
contracts replicate the performance of the underling instrument. The cost-of-carry model 
suggests that, for an investor able to replicate the performance of the underlying 
instruments, there could be arbitrage opportunity where the investor can take advantage 
of the “mispricing” between a futures contract and the underlying asset. These arbitrage 
trading activities lead to a relatively narrow range for the trade of futures contracts, and 
therefore the price of futures contract is close to the price of the underlying instrument.   
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In contrast to the arbitrage trading discussed above, there is no arbitrage value 
relationship between VIX futures contract and the underlying VIX index. The VIX index 
is calculated using the mid-point between the bid and ask prices of the S&P 500 index 
option contracts. This mid-point pricing does not necessarily represent a real market 
trading price of a VIX futures contract. Consequently, market investors are unable to 
quickly trade S&P 500 option contracts to lock in the 30-day implied volatility versus the 
value of the VIX index. 
The term structure of VIX futures (implied volatility) is the curve of VIX futures 
prices for periods extending from the current date to different future dates up to nine near-
term serial months. Points of the curve at different terms present the expected market 
volatility for the corresponding future dates, and could be estimated from S&P 500 Index 
option prices with matching expirations. The VIX futures term structure could typically 
be either upward or downward sloping, which is referred as the market condition of 
“contango” or “backwardation”. “Contango” indicates a market condition in which the 
price of a VIX futures contract closer to expiration is lower. In a contango market, the 
price of VIX futures contract increases with the time to expiration, and the curve of VIX 
futures term structures presents an upward slope. Figure 1.2 presents the VIX futures term 
structure on March 16, 2012, when the contango of VIX futures term structure reached 
the highest level after recent global financial crisis.11 
 
 
                                                             
11 Source: VIX Central. Accordingly, the level in contango (backwardation) is calculated as the ratio of 









In most of time, VIX futures term structure is observed in contango, which suggests 
that the market expected volatility over longer periods is higher than short periods.  
On the other hand, backwardation refers a market condition in which the price of 
futures contract declines as the VIX futures contract gets further to expiration. In a 
backwardation market, the price of a VIX futures contract decreases as the time to 
expiration gets longer, and the curve of VIX futures term structures presents a downward 
slope. Periods of backwardation are not that common as contango and typically 



















A steep backwardation of VIX futures term structure suggests that market investors 
believe that the current market volatility is too high and expect it would decline in the 
future. Figure 1.3 presents VIX futures term structure on October 16, 2008, when the 
backwardation in VIX futures term structure reached its highest level during the GFC. 
 
1.2.2.2 VIX futures indices 
In order to provide market participants straight outcome of holding long and/or short 
positions in VIX futures contracts, the S&P has generated more indices comprised of 
different VIX futures contracts since 2009. There are more than ten indices in the S&P 
VIX Futures Index Series, namely the S&P 500 VIX Short-Term Futures Index, S&P 500 
VIX Mid-Term Futures Index, S&P 500 VIX 2M Futures Index, S&P 500 VIX 3M 
Futures Index, S&P 500 VIX 4M Futures Index, S&P 500 VIX 6M Futures Index, S&P 
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Index, S&P 500 VIX Mid Term Futures Daily Inverse Index, and S&P 500 VIX Front 
Month Futures Index, each of which consists of only VIX futures contracts. 
Among the S&P VIX Futures Index Series, the most popular two tracked by VIX 
exchange-traded products are the S&P 500 VIX Short-Term Futures Index and S&P 500 
VIX Mid-Term Futures Index. The S&P 500 VIX Short-Term Futures Index was 
launched on Jan 22, 2009. The index provides investors the outcome of a combined long 
position in the next two near-term VIX futures contracts. More specifically, the S&P 500 
VIX Short-Term Futures Index replicates a position that rolls the nearest month VIX 
futures to the next month on a daily basis in equal fractional amounts, and therefore 
measures the return of a constant one-month rolling long position in the first and second 
month VIX futures contracts.  
At the start of the roll period, all the weight of S&P 500 VIX Short-Term Futures 
Index is allocated to the first (shorter-term) VIX futures contract. Then on each 
subsequent business day, a fraction of the first month VIX futures holding is sold with an 
equal notional amount of the second month (longer-term) VIX futures bought. The 
fraction is proportional to the number of first month VIX futures contracts as of the 
previous index roll day, and inversely proportional to the number of days in the current 
roll period. In this approach, the initial position in the first month VIX futures contract is 
progressively rolled to the second month contract, until the beginning of next roll period. 
Then the old second month VIX futures contract becomes the new first month contract 
and is sold on each subsequent business day afterwards as the process starts again.12  
The S&P 500 VIX Mid-Term Futures Index was also introduced on Jan 22, 2009. 
                                                             
12 According to S&P, the weight of each component in the VIX futures index is also adjusted every day to 
ensure that the change in total dollar exposure for the index is only due to the price change of each contract 




The index utilizes the prices of the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh month VIX futures 
contracts and measures the return of a constant three-month rolling long position in those 
futures. 
 Similarly, at the start of the roll period, an equal weight is allocated to the fourth, 
fifth and sixth month VIX futures contracts. The initial position in the fourth month 
contract is progressively moved to the seventh month contract over the course of the 
month, until the following roll period begins when the old fifth month VIX futures 
contract becomes the new fourth month VIX futures contract and gets sold every day 
afterwards as the process begins again.  
1.2.3 VIX ETF and ETN 
Launched in 2009, VIX exchange-traded products have become one of the most 
actively traded categories of ETPs. Similar to stocks, VIX ETPs make volatility trading 
more convenient for market participants by providing exposures to relevant VIX futures 
indices. There are two types of VIX ETPs, namely VIX ETF and ETN13.  
A VIX ETF is a marketable security that tracks a VIX futures index and trades like a 
common stock on a stock exchange. VIX ETFs seek investment results that track the 
performance of relevant underlying VIX futures indices by getting relevant positions in the 
component futures of their underlying indices. The payment made on VIX ETFs is based 
on the performance of the underlying index and then less the investor fee. 
VIX ETNs are unsecured debt obligations that provide investors exposure to VIX 
futures market. In general, a VIX ETN tracks an underlying VIX futures index and seeks 
to replicate the performance of its underlying index. VIX ETNs are riskier than ordinary 
                                                             
13 Most VIX ETFs and ETNs are traded on the Bats Global Markets (BATS) exchanges. 
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unsecured debt securities, since there is no principal protection for its investors and it is 
not an obligation of or guaranteed by any third party. Owning the ETNs is not the same 
as owning interests in the components of underlying index or a security directly linked to 
the performance of the underlying index. Instead, investors receive a cash payment at 
maturity or upon early redemption based on the performance of the underlying index and 
then less the investor fee. The payment made on a VIX ETN, including any payment at 
maturity or upon redemption, depends on the ability of its issuer to satisfy the obligations 
as they come due. The significant risks involved in VIX ETNs might make them only 
suitable for those sophisticated investors with necessary knowledge on how VIX ETNs 
work.  
As discussed above, the way VIX ETFs and ETNs get the exposure could be quite 
different, even as they track the same VIX-related index. For instance, VIX ETFs which 
track the performance of the S&P 500 Short-Term VIX Futures Index own those VIX 
futures contracts comprising the underlying index. More specifically, as the S&P 500 
Short-Term VIX Futures Index comprises VIX futures expiring in first and second front 
months, those VIX ETFs need to get long or short positions in VIX future contracts 
maturing in first- and second-front months, depending on the tracking strategies. VIX 
ETNs in contrast to VIX ETFs do not necessarily have holding positions, as an 
arrangement may be made with the issuing bank or an independent swap counterparty. 
Thus, VIX ETNs become more flexible as long as they manage to provide investors the 
exposure to the underlying indices.  
In order to follow the performance of tracked VIX futures indices, VIX ETPs roll 
the relevant positions in the VIX futures market on daily basis. For instance, a VIX ETF 
which tracks the performance of the S&P 500 VIX Short-Term Futures Index, rolls the 
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first front-month VIX futures to the second front month on a daily basis in equal 
fractional amounts, which means the VIX ETF shorts the nearest-month VIX futures 
and longs the next-month VIX futures. When VIX futures term structure is in a 
contango situation, costs are accrued each time when the VIX ETFs/ETNs roll their 
positions in corresponding VIX futures. On the other hand, a VIX ETF that rolls its 
daily positions by purchasing the nearest-month VIX futures and shorting the next-
month VIX futures, benefits from a contango situation. 
 
1.3 Literature review 
The literature on the VIX index has evolved into several streams. The first stream 
focuses on the pricing and modeling of the VIX index, VIX futures and VIX options. 
Zhang and Zhu (2006) posit a stochastic variance model of the VIX evolution over time 
and develop a model for VIX futures. They find free parameters estimated from 
different periods over-price VIX future contracts on different levels. This topic has also 
been examined by Lin (2007) and Brenner, Shu and Zhang (2008). Lin (2013) applies 
the CBOE exponential and hump volatility functions with one- to three-factor models 
of the VIX evolution to examine the pricing for VIX options. He finds that hump 
volatility functions provide efficient out-of-sample valuation for most VIX put options, 
while exponential volatility functions present an effective choice as pricing models for 
VIX call options. Fernandes, Medeiros, and Scharth (2014), examine the time-series 
properties of the VIX index and find that the VIX index displays long-range dependence. 
They resort to both parametric and semiparametric heterogeneous autoregressive 
processes for modeling and forecasting purposes. They find supportive evidences that 
there is a negative relationship between the VIX index and the S&P 500 index return as 
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well as a positive contemporaneous link with the volume of the S&P 500 index. Lin, Li, 
Luo and Chern (2016) develop a new stochastic volatility model which could be used 
to consistently price equity and VIX derivatives with efficient pricing procedure. Wang, 
Huang, Li and Bao (2016) propose a new model for VIX options pricing. They include 
factors such as mean-reversion, jumps, and stochastic volatility in their model and find 
that the mean-reverting logarithmic jump and stochastic volatility model serves as the 
best model in all the required aspect.  
Second stream in the relevant literature examines the interaction between the VIX 
and VIX-related products. Shu and Zhang (2012) apply a modified Baek and Brock 
nonlinear Granger test and report evidence that both spot and futures prices react 
simultaneously to new information, supporting the information and price efficiency in 
the VIX futures market. Konstantinidi, Skiadopoulos and Tzagkaraki (2008) investigate 
whether the behavior of the implied volatility indices are predictable, and their results 
show that no models outperform the random walk model in an out-of-sample setting 
and that no economically significant profits can be attained. Nossman and Wilhelmson 
(2009) focus on testing the efficiency of the VIX futures market, and they point out that 
the risk premium adjusted futures price forecasts the movement direction for the VIX 
index well. Kanniainen, Lin and Yang (2014) use information on the VIX to improve 
the empirical performance of GARCH models for pricing options on the S&P 500 and 
find supporting evidence that non-affine models outperform affine models. Frijns, 
Tourani-Rad and Webb (2016) investigate the relation of causality between the VIX and 
its futures and find evidence of causality from VIX futures to the VIX index. Daigler, 
Dupoyet and Patterson (2014) examine the concavity adjustment for VIX futures. They 
demonstrate that the implied variance of VIX futures is strongly correlated with both 
market volatility and VIX futures time to expiration. Fu, Sandri, and Shackleton (2016) 
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examine how the VIX spot, VIX futures and their basis perform different roles in asset 
pricing. They decompose the VIX index into volatilities calculated from out-of-the-
money call options and volatility calculated from out-of-the-money put options 
separately, and find that out-of-the-money put options capture more useful information 
in predicting future stock returns. Chen and Tsai (2017) investigate the price discovery 
competition between the VIX and VIX futures and find that VIX futures prices play a 
dominant role in the overall process of price discovery. They also show that such 
dominant role of VIX futures is increased by the news announcements on macro-
economic issues in the U.S. Kao, Tsai, Wang, and Yen (2018) examine the relation 
between trading activity in VIX derivatives markets and changes in the VIX index with 
high-frequency data and find that the signed trading variables of VIX futures are 
significantly related to the contemporaneous changes in the VIX index. Their findings 
also show the net signed trading variables of VIX futures are significant predictors of 
future changes in the VIX index. 
Another stream in the VIX literature analyzes VIX ETPs. Husson and McCann 
(2011) assess the risks associated with the VXX ETNs, and show that the return to the 
VXX ETNs depends in large part on movements in the futures markets. Stanton (2011) 
and Deng, McCann and Wang (2012) investigate how effectively VIX ETPs can hedge 
a portfolio of U.S. large-cap stocks and find that VIX ETPs can hardly be applied as an 
effective hedging instrument. Alexander and Korovilas (2012) study the return of VIX 
ETNs and argue that the ETN market could lead VIX futures despite the fact that they 
are supposed to track. They document that the large-scale hedging activities of ETN 
issuers on the CBOE market could affect the prices of VIX futures. The VIX ETN 
issuers who have a short position in volatility need to hedge it with a long position in 
volatility-linked products such as VIX futures. The popularity of ETNs leads to an 
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increased need for hedging, which may result in upward pressure on VIX futures. The 
pressure may even be amplified by the fact that speculative traders can predict ETNs 
hedging activity and front-run them by taking a long position on CBOE VIX futures. A 
similar topic has been examined by Eraker and Wu (2014), who propose an equilibrium 
model to explain the negative expected return to VIX futures and ETNs. Clowers and 
Jones (2016) investigate eight VIX ETPs that include ETNs and ETFs. They compare 
the performance and returns of those VIX instruments with that of the VIX index and 
report that VIX ETPs do not correlate well with the VIX index. They further suggest 
that VIX ETPs are not suitable for a buy-and-hold investment strategy, as those ETPs 
are exposed to a declining value, due to the large degree of contango in VIX futures 
applied by these ETPs. Gehricke and Zhang (2017) develop a theoretical model which 
links the S&P500 index, VIX and VIX short-term futures ETNs to test the VXX ETN. 
They find that roll yield of VIX futures, which is mostly a negative process, drives the 
difference between the VXX and VIX returns. Bordonado, Molnár, and Samdal (2017) 
test the performance of VIX ETPs and find evidences that VIX ETPs perform poorly as 
a hedging tool. They also show that including VIX ETPs in a portfolio based on S&P 
500 will decrease the risk-adjusted performance of the portfolio. Fernandez-Perez, 
Frijns, Gafiatullina, and Tourani-Rad (2016) investigate the intraday price discovery 
between the VIX short-term futures ETNs and inverse VIX short-term ETNs. They find 
strong time variation in the price discovery contribution between these two VIX ETNs, 
and trading costs and market liquidity are the significant determinants of price discovery. 





1.4 Hypothesis  
The following section summarizes the hypothesis on the fund flows to different 
VIX ETPs and how the flows impact on the VIX index. I also elaborate on other factors, 
such as VIX futures prices and VIX futures price term structure, and discuss their 
possible effects on the VIX index. 
1.4.1 Fund flow to VIX ETPs 
As VIX ETPs are structured to generate returns when the equity volatility changes, 
investors tend to include more VIX ETPs in their portfolios to hedge against market 
volatility, especially when the stock market performs poorly. Makan and Kaminska 
(2012) argue that with the increased popularity of VIX ETPs, a greater amount of 
money flows into those volatility-related investment vehicles. In order to accommodate 
the increased money flows and provide investors with more exposure to market 
volatility, VIX ETPs tend to open more positions in the VIX futures market to track the 
performance of the underlying VIX futures indices. These trades in the VIX futures 
market by VIX ETPs are generally large; therefore, they might distort the price of VIX 
futures. The imbalance in VIX futures could then seep into the underlying S&P options 
market and affect the VIX index. On the other hand, VIX ETPs provide different 
tracking strategies (normal or inverse), 14  and thereby can generate quite different 
returns, depending on the prevailing market conditions. For instance, when equity 
market volatility increases, a VIX ETP which applies the normal tracking strategy 
generates a positive return, while a VIX ETP applying the inverse tracking strategy 
loses money. On the contrary, when stock market volatility decreases, a VIX ETP 
                                                             
14 A VIX ETP which applies a normal strategy provides exposure to the performance of its underlying 
index, while a VIX ETP which applies an inverse strategy provides exposure to the inverse performance 
of its underlying index. 
30 
 
applying the normal tracking strategy suffers a loss, whereas a VIX ETP applying the 
inverse tracking strategy gains profit. As funds could flow into VIX ETPs which employ 
different tracking strategies under different market conditions, the impacts of fund 
flows to the normal and inverse tracking strategy VIX ETPs may offset each other. Thus, 
it is not clear if the aggregated fund flows to all VIX ETPs has any statistically 
significant overall impacts on the VIX index. 
As discussed above, investors have various incentives to invest in VIX ETPs which 
employ different tracking strategies. In order to isolate the impacts of fund flows to 
different categories of VIX ETPs, I divide VIX ETPs into separate groups depending 
on their tracking strategies (normal and inverse) and the horizons of their underlying 
future indices (short-term and mid-term). This allows me to test the impacts of fund 
flows to different VIX ETP groups, namely normal-short, normal-mid and inverse-short. 
When there are increasing fund flows to VIX ETPs in normal-short and normal-mid 
groups, those VIX ETPs tend to get more long positions in relevant VIX futures, lifting 
up the prices of VIX futures. An increase in VIX futures prices will imply a higher 
expected value of the VIX index. Therefore, I hypothesize that the fund flows in VIX 
ETPs in normal-short and normal-mid groups have positive impacts on the VIX index. 
Analogously, higher fund flow to VIX ETPs in inverse groups leads those VIX ETPs 
to short more relevant VIX futures, pulling down the VIX future prices and the 
expectation for market volatility in the future. I put forward the hypothesis that fund 
flows to inverse VIX ETP groups have negative impacts on the VIX index.  
In addition, taking into account the mean-reverting property of the VIX index 
(Dueker, 1997; Whaley, 2008; Leung, Li, and Wang, 2016), it is likely that investors 
get more incentives to trade VIX ETPs during time periods when equity market 
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volatility is extreme (high or low). More specifically, investors are motivated to take 
long positions in VIX ETPs in normal (inverse) groups when the VIX index is 
extremely low (high). In such a case, investors expect the VIX will move in a mean-
reverting way and therefore speculate the future movement of the index by investing 
more money in VIX ETPs. Consequently, the higher fund flow to VIX ETPs is likely 
to put pressure on the VIX since VIX ETPs need to take more positions in VIX futures. 
On the other hand, the collapse of equity markets' value is generally accompanied by 
important market events, which might outperform investors’ perception of the mean-
reversion about the VIX. In that case, the VIX index is more likely influenced by the 
market trends. Thus, the impacts of fund flow to VIX ETPs on VIX during such periods 
might have an unclear pattern. I expect investors have more incentives and are more 
likely to take more speculative positions when the VIX is high. Therefore, I hypothesize 
that during the period when equity market volatility is extreme, the impact of fund flow 
to VIX ETPs’ inverse and normal groups on the VIX index is stronger.  
1.4.2 VIX futures price and VIX futures price term structure 
Previous literature has widely investigated the relationship between the VIX index 
and VIX futures. Some studies report the information and price efficiency in the VIX 
futures market (Konstantinidi, Skiadopoulos and Tzagkaraki, 2008; Shu and Zhang, 
2012). On the other hand, there are studies showing VIX futures prices can forecast the 
movement direction of the VIX index (Nossman and Wilhelmson, 2009; Frijns, 
Tourani-Rad and Webb, 2014). In line with the previous studies, I include lagged VIX 
futures price change in the model to account for the potential predictable effect of VIX 
futures on the VIX index and, in addition, control for the autocorrelation effects in the 
VIX index. Accordingly, the lagged VIX futures price change is expected to have a 
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positive impact on the VIX index. 
The term structure of VIX futures is typically in contango (upward sloping) and 
changes into backwardation (downward sloping) when the equity market moves into 
excessively volatile periods (Alexander and Korovilas, 2012). Recall that a contango 
(backwardation) term structure refers to a market condition where the longer-term 
futures contract is trading at a higher (lower) price than the nearer-term futures contract, 
therefore reflecting the market expectation for a future spot price (Gorton and 
Rouwenhorst, 2005). I include a measure of the VIX futures term structure in the model 
to capture the market’s expectation of the VIX index. Accordingly, a backwardation 
term structure is expected to have a negative effect on the level of the VIX index. 
 
1.5 Data and Method 
1.5.1 Data 
The sample includes 1387 daily observations of VIX ETFs and ETNs traded on 
U.S. exchanges. The sample period spans from 28 January 2009, when the first VIX 
ETP was issued, to 31 December 2015. The daily closing data for the S&P 500 index, 
VIX index, VIX futures term structure and fund flows to VIX ETPs were collected 
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Table 1.1 Characteristics of ETFs and ETNs 
Name Ticker 






Underlying Index Price 
Expense Turnover 
(in millions) Ratio (in millions) 
AccuShares Spot CBOE VIX Down Shares VXDN 3.50 Inverse ETF 5/19/2015 CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) 15.00  0.95% 0.009 
AccuShares Spot CBOE VIX Up Shares VXUP 2.77 Normal ETF 5/19/2015 CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) 12.30  0.95% 0.018 
ETRACS Daily Long-Short VIX ETN XVIX 11.96 Normal ETN 11/30/2012 S&P 500 Index VIX Term-Structure Excess Return 15.60  0.85% 0.028 
First Trust CBOE S&P 500 VIX Tail Hedge Fund VIXH 3.63 Normal ETF 8/30/2012 CBOE VIX Tail Hedge Index 21.77  0.60% 0.018 
iPath Inverse S&P 500 VIX Short-Term Futures ETN XXV 0.75 Inverse ETN 7/16/2010 S&P 500 VIX Short-Term Future Index 38.04  0.89% 0.008 
The iPath S&P 500 Dynamic VIX ETN XVZ 9.16 Normal ETN 8/17/2011 S&P 500 Dynamic VIX Futures TR Index 27.27  0.95% 0.074 
iPATH S&P 500 VIX Mid-Term Futures ETN VXZ 38.43 Normal ETN 1/29/2009 S&P 500 Mid-Term VIX Futures TR Index 13.04  0.89% 13.966 
iPath S&P 500 VIX Short-Term Futures ETN VXX 760.71 Normal ETN 1/29/2009 S&P 500 Short-Term VIX Futures TR Index 27.52  0.89% 2945.351 
ProShares Short VIX Short-Term Futures SVXY 628.10 Inverse ETF 10/4/2011 S&P 500 Short-Term VIX Futures Index 33.92  0.95% 384.764 
ProShares Ultra VIX Short-Term Futures UVXY 565.67 Twice ETF 10/2/2011 S&P 500 Short-Term VIX Futures Index 49.63  0.95% 1543.228 
ProShares VIX Mid-Term Futures ETF VIXM 27.66 Normal ETF 1/4/2011 S&P 500 Mid-Term VIX Futures Index 63.34  0.85% 1.475 
ProShares VIX Short-Term Futures ETF VIXY 105.97 Normal ETF 1/4/2011 S&P 500 Short-Term VIX Futures Index 18.24  0.85% 72.812 
VelocityShares Daily 2x VIX Medium Term ETN TVIZ 1.53 Twice ETN 11/29/2010 S&P 500 Mid-Term VIX Futures Index 18.81  1.65% 0.006 
VelocityShares Daily 2x VIX Short Term ETN TVIX 299.24 Twice ETN 11/29/2010 S&P 500 Short-Term VIX Futures Index 10.89  1.65% 431.748 
VelocityShares Daily Inverse VIX Medium Term ETN ZIV 103.81 Inverse ETN 11/29/2010 S&P 500 Mid-Term VIX Futures Index 34.53  1.35% 1.541 
VelocityShares Daily Inverse VIX Short-Term ETN XIV 1012.11 Inverse ETN 11/29/2010 S&P 500 Short-Term VIX Futures Index 17.37  1.35% 658.270 
VelocityShares VIX Medium Term ETN VIIZ 0.62 Normal ETN 11/29/2010 S&P 500 Mid-Term VIX Futures Index 17.81  0.89% 0.007 
VelocityShares VIX Short Term ETN VIIX 9.38 Normal ETN 11/29/2010 S&P 500 Short-Term VIX Futures Index 37.26  0.89% 11.148 
This table presents an overview of the prevailing VIX exchange-traded funds and VIX exchange-traded notes (sourced from Bloomberg on 31 December 2015). The 
tracking strategy indicates how exchange-traded products provide investors with a cash payment at the scheduled maturity or early redemption. For instance, a Twice 
tracking strategy indicates that the exchange-traded fund (note) will provide its investors with a cash payment at the scheduled maturity or early redemption based on 
2X the performance of its underlying index. Turnover is defined as Turnover / Traded Value according to Bloomberg, which represents the sum of all trade prices, 
multiplied by the number of shares related to each price.
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from the Bloomberg database. The sample covers close to 100% of total market 
capitalization of all VIX-related ETPs. The descriptive information for those VIX ETPs 
is presented in Table 1.1.  
As presented, there are 18 VIX ETFs and ETNs, and 13 of them track the S&P 500 
short-term or mid-term VIX futures indices. Among these 13 VIX ETPs, there are four 
VIX ETFs issued by Proshares, while the other nine are VIX ETNs. 
1.5.2. Method 
To examine the effect of VIX ETPs fund flows on the VIX index, the following 
model was estimated:  






t i t i t t i t
i
R Flow R Down Flow Down CB       

          (1.1) 
where: 
VIX
tR is the percentage change in the daily closing price of the underlying VIX index at 
the end of day t. 
, 1i tFlow  is the lagged net fund flow to group i (i=1,…, k). k indicates the number of 
VIX ETP groups examined in each model specification. 
-1t
VFR is the lagged percentage change in the daily price of VIX futures. 
17tCB  is the VIX futures term structure proxy, which is calculated as the price 
difference between the first front month and the seventh front month VIX futures, 
then divided by the first front-month VIX future price15. 
                                                             
15 The other term structure measure designed to capture the backwardation effect was considered. The 
results were robust for selection of the backwardation proxy. When I consider the proxy for 
backwardation in the VIX futures price term structure, there is a tradeoff between measure length, which 
captures the number of future months in term structure, and data availability, as there are periods when 
the price of VIX futures for longer than eight months is not available. Hence, CB17 is applied as the 
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ΔCB17t is the change in VIX futures term structure calculated as the difference between 
CB17t and CB17t-1
16. 
tDown  is the time dummy, which equals to one when the daily return of the S&P 500 
index is lower than its fifth percentile level observed during the study period. Both 
the first and fifth percentile are in line with the method to estimate Value at Risk 
(see Jorion, 2007). However, selection of the first percentile results in a low number 
of trading days.  
, 1 ti tFlow Down  is the interaction of the lagged fund flow and the time dummy, which 
captures the impact of the fund flow to VIX ETPs during market turmoil periods. 
,i t  is the error term. For the sake of completeness, I include the definitions and 
descriptive statistics of all variables employed in the chapter (see Table 1.2). 
 
1.6 Empirical Results 
1.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
In this section, I first examine the changes in net fund flows to VIX ETPs during 
the study period. The S&P 500 index returns are employed to proxy for various 
                                                             
proxy for backwardation and it measures a relatively long period (seven months) in term structure, and 
thus provides data consistency. In the robustness test, I also apply different length measures, such as 
CB15, which is the ratio calculated with the first and fifth front-month VIX future prices in term structure, 
and I get similar findings. 
 
16  ΔCB17t is defined as: 
   1, 7, 1, 1 7, 1 7, 1 7,
1,  1, 1 1, 1 1,
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      , where 
Pi,t is the price of ith front month VIX future at time t. A high positive value of ΔCB17t indicates that VIX 





Table 1.2 Summary statistics for models’ variables 
 
Variables Definition Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median 10% Percentile 90% Percentile 
ChgVIX Daily percentage change of VIX Index 1926 0.0025  0.0755  -0.2957  0.5000  -0.0063  -0.0760  0.0898  
ΔVFX Daily percentage change of generic 1st VIX future 1926 0.0012  0.0532  -0.2081  0.3098  -0.0067  -0.0539  0.0672  
netfflow Aggregated net fund flow of all VIX ETFs 1672 7.0900  72.5425  -552.2840  611.3002  0.5452  -59.5922  81.5903  
inverse_etf_flow Aggregated net fund flow of all inverse VIX ETFs 1672 0.2548  33.3681  -269.4550  449.1380  0.0000  -17.5230  17.0538  
normal_etf_flow Aggregated net fund flow of all normal VIX ETFs 1672 6.7279  70.3366  -552.2840  424.5397  1.5200  -59.7276  79.3109  
normal_short Aggregated net fund flow of all normal-short VIX ETFs 1672 6.4116  66.9742  -362.5740  418.8950  0.3515  -56.7439  74.9697  
normal_mid Aggregated net fund flow of all normal-mid VIX ETFs 1672 0.3163  18.9778  -375.0530  150.1380  0.0000  -3.4139  5.7396  
inverse_short Aggregated net fund flow of all inverse-short VIX ETFs 1388 0.2712  37.7301  -269.4550  449.1380  0.0000  -25.6501  22.9747  
inverse_mid Aggregated net fund flow of all inverse-mid VIX ETFs 960 0.0751  1.2349  -12.7828  13.6158  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
CB17 
Term structure factor calculated as the ratio of price difference 
between first front month and 7th front month VIX future over the 
first front month VIX future price (Price1-Price7)/Price1 
1913 -0.1763  0.1951  -0.8055  0.5121  -0.2055  -0.3925  0.0954  
ΔCB17 Change in term structure factor, calculated as CB17t-CB17t-1 1913 -.0001 0.0493 -0.2414 0.3501 -0.0054 -0.0492 0.0545 
Down 
Time Dummy equals to one when the return of S&P 500 index is 
lower than its fifth percentile level during the study period 
1927 0.050337 0.218697 0 1 0 0 0 
This table presents the definition and statistical summary of the variables employed in the models. The most traded VIX ETF groups are the normal-short and 







market conditions. I categorize the S&P 500 index returns into deciles and record the 
statistics of the net fund flow to each of the four examined VIX ETP groups in each 
decile. Table 1.3 presents the mean and standard deviation of net fund flows to normal-
short, normal-mid, inverse-short and inverse-mid VIX ETPs across the range of the 
S&P 500 index returns observed during the study period. 
As depicted in Panel A, on average, there are positive fund inflows to all four VIX 
ETP groups. The normal-short group received the highest daily average flow of $6.14 
million, whereas the inverse-mid group, being newly established, experienced the 
smallest daily average fund inflow of $0.07 million. The net fund flow into the normal-
short group peaked at normal market conditions, with the daily average reaching $17.8 
million when the S&P 500 index returns hovered around its fifth decile. In contrast, the 
fund flow to the inverse-short group reached its highest levels over the periods when 
the S&P 500 index experienced extreme returns, with the daily average flow of $14.4 
million recorded in the lowest decile and $12.5 million in the highest decile of the S&P 
500 index returns. 
As presented in Panel B of Table 1.3, the fund flow to the normal-short group was 
more volatile than those of other groups, as evidenced by a higher standard deviation. 
It is noteworthy that the fund flow to the inverse-short group is characterized by the 
highest variability when the S&P 500 index experienced extremely negative returns.   
Figure 1.4 features the 25th percentile, 75th percentile, mean and median of the 
fund flows for three large groups (normal-short, normal-mid, inverse-short) across the 
range of S&P 500 index returns. The observed flows for normal-short and inverse-short 
VIX ETPs follow distinct patterns, and are consistent with the statistics presented in 
Panel A of Table 1.3.  
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Table 1.3 Return of S&P 500 and net fund flow to VIX ETPs 
 
Panel A (Mean)            
Groups Mean 1-10th (Low) 11-20th 21-30th 31-40th 41-50th 51-60th 61-70th 71-80th 81-90th 91-100th (High) 
Normal Short 6.144 2.9608  -7.2581  3.3666  8.5051  17.8095  16.6448  14.6465  9.6549  -3.6180  -9.3570 
Normal Mid 0.303 -0.7874  0.7841  0.3631  1.1774  0.5076  -0.6478  1.4473  0.5959  -1.2884  0.4106 
Inverse Short 0.259 14.4328  7.0322  -0.4519  -4.2615  -6.1165  -4.1646  -0.9423  0.2431  0.6202  12.5098 
Inverse Mid 0.071 -0.3180 -0.2568  0.1122  -0.0366  0.0956  0.1454  0.2082  0.1133  0.4690  -0.2360 
            
Panel B (Std. Dev.)            
Groups Std Dev. 1-10th (Low) 11-20th 21-30th 31-40th 41-50th 51-60th 61-70th 71-80th 81-90th 91-100th (High) 
Normal Short 65.589 71.9578  63.6202  69.6233  64.9948  67.8106  67.5709  53.1456  59.1076  69.5805  77.7791 
Normal Mid 18.582 23.1616  17.2052  8.0741  6.8775  31.4368  29.4577  13.1752  7.7786  21.8894  12.1082 
Inverse Short 36.904 63.7158  40.0727  24.7741  34.5564  41.8283  29.1457  18.0659  38.0640  41.8319  34.7234 
Inverse Mid 1.205 1.3906  1.5245  0.9973  1.2775  0.8434  1.3527  1.4125  0.3725  1.7388  1.0949 
This table presents the summary statistics for net fund flows to four exchange-traded funds and notes groups: normal-short group, normal-mid group, inverse-short 
group and inverse-mid group. The net fund flows are summarized based on the different deciles of S&P 500 index returns, Panel A presents the means of net fund flows 
and Panel B presents the standard deviation of net fund flows for four VIX ETF/ETN groups. Panel A shows the net fund flow into the normal-short group peaked at 
the fifth decile of S&P 500 index returns, while the fund flow to inverse-short group achieved its highest levels over the periods when the S&P 500 index experienced 
extreme returns. In Panel B, higher standard deviation levels can be observed over the periods when the S&P 500 index experienced extreme returns for both normal 





This figure presents the 25th percentile (p25), 75th percentile (p75), mean and median of the fund 
flows at different deciles of the daily returns of the S&P 500 index. The horizontal axis indicates the 




































































































































An interesting question is how the net fund flow to VIX ETP groups changed over 
the periods of market turmoil. I define market turmoil as the periods when the S&P 500 
index returns fell below its fifth percentile level observed during the study period. 
Figure 1.5 depicts the changes in the average net flows to the four VIX ETP groups 
for 10 days prior to and after day “0”, marked as when the S&P 500 index fell below 
its fifth percentile level of -1.5%. There are 78 days with such extremely negative 




This figure presents the changes in the average net flows to the four VIX ETF/ETN groups for 10 
days before and after the days when the daily return of the S&P 500 index fell lower than -1.5%, 
which is around the fifth percentile level of the S&P 500 index daily returns observed during the 
study period. Axis X presents the event days where day "0" is the day when the S&P 500 index fell 
below -1.5%. There are 78 days with extremely negative returns as defined above. 
 
As shown in Figure 1.5, a high net fund flow to inverse-short group was 
accompanied with an outflow of money from normal-short group. The pattern suggests 
that in time when equity market experienced extremely negative returns, investors bet 






























VIX ETPs will make loss while inverse-short ETPs will generate positive returns. This 
pattern supports the argument that market participants expect the VIX index to move in 
a mean-reverse way (Whaley, 2008; Leung, Li, and Wang, 2015). 
Figure 1.6 shows the changes in the average net flows to the four ETP groups for 
10 days before and after the days when the S&P 500 index recorded a higher return than 
its 95th percentile level of 1.5%. There are 72 days with such extremely positive returns 
during the study period 
Figure 1.6 
This figure presents the changes in the net flows to the four VIX ETF/ETN groups for 10 days before 
and after the days when the daily return of the S&P 500 index was higher than 1.5 percent, which is 
around the 95th percentile level of the S&P 500 index daily returns observed during the study period. 
Axis X presents the event days where day "0" is the day when S&P 500 index rose above 1.5 percent. 
There are 72 days of extremely positive returns as defined above. 
 
 
As presented in Figure 1.6, there was a large inflow to the inverse-short group and 
a substantial outflow from the normal-short group prior to day “0”. The trading died 
down later after the boom days. That’s to say, when the market performs well the 































investors expect a higher volatility. I conjecture that investors anticipate an increase in 
the VIX as a result of a market correction following a surge of more than 1.5 percent. 
However, the patterns observed in Figure 1.6 are not as striking as those featured in 
Figure 1.5.  
As a robustness check, I use the VIX index value as an alternative proxy for market 
performance. Table 1.4 presents the summary statistics of the net fund flows to the four 
VIX ETP groups across different deciles of the VIX index values. Panel A presents the 
means of net fund flows and Panel B presents the standard deviation of net fund flows 
for the four VIX ETP groups. As seen in Panel A, the normal-short group experienced 
the largest inflow of $28.9 million when the VIX index was in its lowest decile, and 
saw the largest outflow of $15.48 million when the VIX index reached its highest decile 
level. In contrast, the net fund flow to the inverse-short group saw a deep inflow of 
$24.7 million when the VIX index recorded its highest decile level, and experienced 
the largest outflow of $10.1 million when the VIX index plunged to its lowest decile 
level. As shown in Panel B of Table 1.4, the inverse-short group has the most volatile 
net fund flow and it occurred when the VIX index peaked at its top decile. 
Overall, the above findings suggest that investors tend to take long positions in 
normal (inverse) VIX ETP groups over normal (volatile) market conditions. The 
observed patterns were more pronounced during the 10-day window surrounding the 




Table 1.4 VIX Index and net fund flow to VIX ETPs 
 
 Panel A (Mean)                       
Groups Mean 1-10th (Low) 11-20th 21-30th 31-40th 41-50th 51-60th 61-70th 71-80th 81-90th 91-100th (High) 
Normal Short 6.144 20.8711  23.8792  16.5448  -5.7747  6.4720  0.7122  7.3500  -1.4035  -3.6672  -15.4757 
Normal Mid 0.303 0.0598  0.0690  1.9308  1.4822  -0.9409  2.3011  3.0507  -2.6055  -2.7668  0.4309 
Inverse Short 0.259 -10.1255  -12.2512  -1.9216  5.0251  3.4684  8.4641  3.8806  12.3259  8.1191  24.6975 
Inverse Mid 0.071 0.2060  0.1960  0.1626  -0.1040  0.0231  -0.1390  -0.2741  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
            
Panel B (Std. Dev.)            
Groups Std Dev. 1-10th (Low) 11-20th 21-30th 31-40th 41-50th 51-60th 61-70th 71-80th 81-90th 91-100th (High) 
Normal Short 65.589 55.7746  65.5432  78.2627  56.7149  78.8435  72.5231  57.8501  48.7249  63.2013  77.3060 
Normal Mid 18.582 3.5386  5.8124  10.9495  15.3976  32.0663  11.8551  17.4937  22.9096  33.8211  6.3830 
Inverse Short 36.904 36.9685  42.4271  37.1539  31.6322  22.6499  21.7533  23.4654  46.7610  35.8846  97.0481 
Inverse Mid 1.205 1.6817  1.1825  1.3257  0.7952  0.2543  1.0269  1.7397  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
This table presents the summary statistics for net fund flows to four exchange-traded funds and notes groups: normal-short group, normal-mid group, inverse-short 
group and inverse-mid group. The net fund flows are summarized based on the different deciles of VIX index. Panel A presents the means of net fund flows and Panel 
B presents the standard deviation of net fund flows for four VIX ETF/ETN groups. Panel A indicates that the net fund flow to the normal-short group gets its highest 
positive level when the VIX index is low and the heaviest outflow appears when the VIX index is high, while the net fund flow to inverse-short group shows an opposite 
trend – deep inflow (outflow) when the VIX index value is high(low). In Panel B, standard deviation of fund flows is found to be higher at the two ends of the 




1.6.2 Estimation model 
In order to address the concern that some of the independent variables may be 
correlated, I present the matrix in Table 1.5. 
To examine the effects of the fund flows to VIX ETPs on the VIX index value, I 
run three sets of models, each with different specifications. First, I analyze the 
aggregated fund flow to all VIX ETPs; the results are presented in Table 1.6. I then 
categorize VIX ETPs into two groups based on their tracking strategies (normal or short) 
and conduct a similar analysis. The results are presented in Panel A of Table 1.7. I 
further categorize VIX ETPs into three groups based on both the tracking strategies 
(normal or short) and the horizon of their underlying indices (short-term or mid-term). 
The results are presented in Panel B of Table 1.7. In all analyses, the parameters 
estimation is reported with Newey-West standard errors. 
The results in Table 1.6 indicate that the aggregated fund flow to all VIX ETPs has 
no statistically significant impacts on the VIX index, even during market turmoil 
periods. On the other hand, the time dummy, which captures the periods with extremely 
negative returns, and the shift in VIX future price term structure, exhibits significant 
positive effect on the VIX index. A higher ΔCB17t is associated with a more pronounced 
shift in VIX futures term structure from contango to backwardation. The results suggest 
that a higher VIX index value is more likely to occur when the equity market plunges 
to its lowest 5 percent level and when the VIX futures term structure changes to 
backwardation from contango. The lagged VIX futures price change has significant 
negative impacts on the VIX index change.
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Table 1.5 Correlation matrix for model variables 
  ChgVIXt ΔVFXt-1 Downt ΔCB17t normal_shortt-1 normal_mid t-1 inverse_short t-1 inverse_mid t-1 
ChgVIXt 1.0000        
ΔVFXt-1 -0.0650** 1.0000       
Downt 0.5153*** 0.0221 1.0000      
ΔCB17t 0.7056*** -0.0254 0.3490*** 1.0000     
normal_shortt-1 0.0402 0.0390 -0.0452* 0.0125 1.0000    
normal_mid t-1 0.0312 -0.0315 0.0110 0.0290 0.0108 1.0000   
inverse_short t-1 -0.0675** 0.0455* 0.0631** -0.0137 -0.2182*** 0.0089 1.0000  
inverse_mid t-1 -0.0163 -0.0379 -0.0640** -0.0132 0.0143 0.0359 0.0227 1.0000 
  
Table 1.5 presents the correlation between the independent variables employed in the estimation models. *,**,*** corresponds to statistically 





The impact of aggregated money flow to VIX ETPs on the VIX index 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Aggr Fund Flowt-1 0.0135 0.0212 0.0014 0.0096 
 (0.43) (0.78) (0.07) (0.51) 
Downt* Aggr Fund Flow t-1  -0.0572 0.0891 -0.0006 
  (-0.23) (0.25) (-0.00) 
ΔVFXt-1 -0.0938* -0.1110*** -0.0669* -0.0816** 
 (-1.79) (-2.74) (-1.76) (-2.54) 
Downt  0.1817***  0.1082*** 
  (12.30)  (8.69) 
ΔCB17 t   1.0630*** 0.9002*** 
   (12.93) (12.33) 
Adj R-squared 0.003 0.2698 0.5827 0.5824 
Observations 1387 1387 1387 1387 
 
The dependent variable is the daily percentage change of the VIX index value. The main explanatory 
variable is aggregated fund flow of all VIX-related exchange-traded funds and notes. ΔVFXt-1 is the 
percentage change in the daily price of VIX futures with a one-day lag; CB17t is the VIX futures term 
structure item, calculated as the ratio of price difference between the first front-month and seventh front-
month VIX future over the first front-month VIX future price; ΔCB17 is defined as the change in VIX 
futures term structure item, calculated as the difference between CB17t and CB17t-1; Downt is the time 
dummy, which equals to one when the return of the S&P 500 index is lower than its fifth percentile level 
during the study period. The columns in Table 1.6 report the findings with different controls. t-statistics 







Table 1.7 Panel A 
The impact of money flow to VIX ETPs on the VIX index 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Normal Fund Flow t-1 0.0369 0.0537** 0.0400** 
 (1.17) (1.98) (2.42) 
Inverse Fund Flow t-1 -0.1134* -0.1697*** -0.1582*** 
 (-1.76) (-3.45) (-3.93) 
Down t * Normal Fund Flow t-1   -0.0731 
   (-0.26) 
Down t * Inverse Fund Flow t-1   0.3470 
   (0.80) 
ΔVFXt-1 -0.0910* -0.1064*** -0.0821*** 
 (-1.70) (-2.58) (-2.62) 
Down t  0.1840*** 0.1067*** 
  (12.19) (8.14) 
ΔCB17t   0.8932*** 
   (12.24) 
Observations 1387 1387 1387 
Adj R-squared 0.0075 0.2813 0.5907 
 
The dependent variable is the daily percentage change of the VIX index value.ΔVFXt-1is the percentage 
change in the daily price of VIX futures with a one-day lag; CB17t is the VIX futures term structure item, 
calculated as the ratio of price difference between the first front-month and seventh front-month VIX 
future over the first front-month VIX future price; ΔCB17 is defined as the change in VIX futures term 
structure item, calculated as the difference between CB17t and CB17t-1; Downt is the time dummy, which 
equals to one when the return of the S&P500 index is lower than its fifth percentile level during the study 
period. By dividing all VIX ETFs and ETNs into different groups according to their different tracking 
strategies, Column (1), (2) and (3) present the results of Newey West tests based on two VIX ETF groups: 
the normal and inverse groups t-statistics are reported in brackets.*,**,*** corresponds to statistically 





Table 1.7 Panel B 
The impact of money flow to VIX ETPs on the VIX index 
 
 (4) (5) (6) 
Normal Short Flow t-1 0.0315 0.0503* 0.0386** 
 (0.96) (1.79) (2.24) 
Normal Mid Flow t-1 0.1512* 0.1199 0.0641 
 (1.69) (1.42) (1.07 ) 
Inverse Short Flow t-1 -0.1154* -0.1721*** -0.1601*** 
 (-1.77) (-3.46) (-3.94) 
Down t * Normal Short Flow t-1   -0.0418 
   (-0.14) 
Down t * Normal Mid Flow t-1   -1.3581 
   (-1.01) 
Down t * Inverse Short Flow t-1   0.3671 
   (0.85) 
ΔVFXt-1 -0.0895* -0.1055** -0.0799*** 
 (-1.66) (-2.54) (-2.61) 
Down t  0.1839*** 0.1078*** 
  (12.17) (8.07) 
ΔCB17t   0.8927*** 
   (12.25) 
Observations 1387 1387 1387 
Adj R-squared 0.0073 0.2810 0.5910 
 
The dependent variable is the daily percentage change of the VIX index value.ΔVFXt-1is the percentage 
change in the daily price of VIX futures with a one-day lag; CB17t is the VIX futures term structure item, 
calculated as the ratio of price difference between the first front-month and seventh front-month VIX 
future over the first front-month VIX future price; ΔCB17 is defined as the change in VIX futures term 
structure item, calculated as the difference between CB17t and CB17t-1; Downt is the time dummy, which 
equals to one when the return of the S&P500 index is lower than its fifth percentile level during the study 
period. By dividing all VIX ETFs and ETNs into different groups according to their different tracking 
strategies, Column (4), (5) and (6) present the results of Newey West test based on three* VIX ETF 
groups: the normal-short, normal-mid and inverse-short groups. t-statistics are reported in 
brackets.*,**,*** corresponds to statistically significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
  
                                                             
*According to different tracking strategies, there are four VTX ETF groups: normal-short, normal-mid, 
inverse-short and inverse-mid. The inverse-mid group is not reported in Table 1.7 as there is only one 
VIX ETF in that group, which was issued much later than others and traded at a low level with a small 
size. Considering the data availability and group size affect, it is not reported in column (4), (5), (6); 
however, it is included in the "inverse group" reported in column (1), (2), (3). 
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Panel A of Table 1.7 presents the results of the models with VIX ETPs categorized into 
two groups, namely normal and inverse, which are based on their strategies. The results 
in Panel A of Table 1.7 are consistent with the hypothesis. The fund flow to the normal 
(inverse) VIX ETP group has a statistically significantly positive (negative) impact on 
the VIX index. However, the interaction terms are not significant, which is in contrast 
to the hypothesis that the effect of the fund flow to the inverse VIX ETP group is more 
pronounced during market turmoil periods. Other variables retain the same sign as in 
the aggregate model discussed above (see Table 1.6). The time dummy and the shift in 
the VIX futures term structure factor have significant positive impacts, while the lagged 
VIX futures price change imposes a significant negative effect on VIX index change. 
Panel B of Table 1.7 presents the results of the models with VIX ETPs categorized 
into three groups, namely normal-short, normal-mid and inverse-short.† In line with 
the hypothesis, the fund flow to the normal-short (inverse short) group has a statistically 
significant positive (negative) impact on the daily change of the VIX index. The fund 
flow to the normal-mid group is no longer significant when the interaction terms, the 
time dummy and the shift in the VIX futures term structure entered the model. The 
effects of other variables are consistent with the results featured in Panel A of Table 1.7.  
 
1.7 Conclusion 
This study examines the fund flows to the VIX exchange-traded products (ETPs) 
and focuses on their effects on the underlying volatility index during the period January 
2009–December 2015. The empirical findings suggest that investors have more 
                                                             
† Due to limited observations, the inverse-mid group is exempt in the sample used to run the models, 
with results featured in Panel B of Table 1.7.  
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incentives to take long positions in the VIX ETP groups which apply normal tracking 
strategies when the equity market is calm. Analogously, when the equity market is 
highly volatile, investors tend to be long in the VIX ETP groups which apply inverse 
tracking strategies. These findings provide supportive evidence that market participants 
expect the VIX index to move in a mean-reverse way (Whaley, 2008; Leung, Li and 
Wang, 2015). 
The important contribution of this chapter is the fact that it provides arguments for 
the discussion on the implication of the rapid growth of VIX-linked exchange-traded 
products. Market regulators and financial media are concerned that financial 
innovations such as VIX ETFs and ETNs may cause instability on the equity and 
derivatives market during crisis periods. In 2015, the Security and Exchange 
Commission was concerned how the ETP can affect underlying market (see SEC's File 
No. S7-11-15 including the Question 17).  The results of this study indicate that the 
fund flows into different VIX ETP groups have statistically significant impacts on the 
VIX index. More specifically, the fund flow to the normal (inverse) VIX ETP groups 
has a significant positive (negative) effect on the VIX index. However, in contrast to 
the expectations formulated by financial press, it is found that the funds flow to VIX 
ETPs do not have additional statistically significant impacts on the level of the VIX 





High policy uncertainty and low market 











Motivated by the extremely low level of the CBOE VIX accompanied by the high level 
of U.S. economic policy uncertainty in the period of late 2016 to the end of 2017, I 
examine the factors affecting the relationship between those two realities. This analysis 
shows that the quality of political/economic signals, the divergence of investors’ 
opinions, and representativeness bias influence the link between the fear gauge and 
economic policy uncertainty. Specifically, representativeness bias caused by recent low 
realized volatility weakens the positive relationship between the VIX and policy 
uncertainty consistently, while the impacts of the quality of political/economic signals 
and investors’ divergence of opinion depend on the overall level of 
economic policy uncertainty. Given the level of policy uncertainty, the results explain 
the record-low VIX level post the 2016 presidential election.    
 
Keywords: VIX, Economic Policy Uncertainty, Baker-Bloom-Davis Index, AAII 
Sentiment Survey, Representativeness Bias, Investors’ opinions 
 




The Chicago Board Options Exchange’s (CBOE) volatility index (VIX), which is 
a measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options, has been widely used as 
a proxy for the "fear gauge" of market participants.19 Empirical studies have documented 
a significant positive correlation between stock market volatility and economic policy 
uncertainty (Li, Balcilar, Gupta, and Chang, 2016; Sum and Fanta, 2012; Liu and Zhang, 
2015). Periods characterized by high economic policy uncertainty often experience 
significantly lower real stock market returns (Kang and Ratti, 2013; Brogaard and Detzel, 
2015). Uncertainty over government policy actions raises the volatility of the stochastic 
discount factor, resulting in higher risk premia and more volatile stock returns (Pastor and 
Veronesi, 2012). Economic policy uncertainty also swings investors’ views on the impact 
of the current policy and the probability of a policy change (Pastor and Veronesi, 2012), 
leading to a greater extent of disagreement among market participants. Divergence in 
investors’ opinions, in turn, intensifies stock market volatility. As the VIX is derived from 
the prices of S&P 500 index options, which tend to be more expensive in a volatile 
economic policy environment (Kelly, Pastor, and Veronesi, 2016), it is expected that a 
higher degree of economic policy uncertainty is associated with a higher VIX level.  
Since the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the VIX has hovered at extremely low 
levels, while both economic policy uncertainty, proxied by the widely used Baker-
Bloom-Davis (BBD) news-based index, and the S&P 500 index have reached high 
                                                             
19 Launched in 1993 by the CBOE, the VIX captures investors’ expectations of stock market volatility 
over the next 30-day period. The level of the VIX is important not only for market participants who 
consider it as a barometer of the equity market volatility, but also for investors of VIX-related products. 
Crisis periods are characterized by higher values of the VIX, when it is expensive for investors to close 




levels.20 The average level of the VIX in 2017 corresponds to the 2nd percentile of its 
values over the period 1997–2016, while the average of the BBD news-based index in 
2017 was equivalent to its 77th percentile measured over the same time period. On 3 
November 2017, the VIX plummeted to its lowest closing value of 9.14, whereas the 
S&P 500 index reached a historical peak of 2587.84 that same day. The substantial 
divergences between the VIX and the BBD indices have continued for an extended 
period of time. This puzzling phenomenon is unlikely to be the outcome of a short-lived 
anomaly. The observed divergences suggest that factors other than the performance of 
the U.S. equity market may have played important roles in affecting the relationship 
between the VIX and economic policy uncertainty, driving the VIX to its extremely low 
levels.  
In an effort to find an explanation for the observed puzzle of the low VIX and the 
high policy uncertainty in 2017, I look beyond the studies which link stock market 
volatility with economic policy uncertainty. An examination of relevant literature allows 
me to test three potential explanatory factors, namely, the quality of political signals, 
investors’ diverse opinions, and representativeness bias. I am not aware of any studies 
which empirically examine the contributions of those three factors to this puzzling 
phenomenon.  
The analysis on the quality of political signals of this study is guided by the 
theoretical model of Pastor and Veronesi (2013). Pastor and Veronesi formulated the 
model to examine the asset pricing implications of political uncertainty. One implication 
of their model is a relationship between the precision of political signals and stocks’ 
                                                             
20 The Baker-Bloom-Davis (BBD) news-based index and the BBD overall index are often employed as 
proxies for the extent of economic policy uncertainty and have been employed in a number of studies 
(e.g. Brogaard and Detzel, 2015, Loh and Stulz, 2018). The constructions of the BBD news-based index 
and BBD overall index will be discussed in the data section.  
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volatility. In particular, the model claims that political news sends signals which suggest 
the course of action a government may pursue. Rational investors perceive political 
signals, dissect relevant information, and update their views on prospective economic 
policies. In this learning process, investors use the continuous flow of political news to 
estimate the political cost associated with potential new polices and revise their beliefs 
about the likelihood of various future government policies. Investors then respond to 
those political signals, and their responses are seen in share prices. However, when 
political news is noisier, the learning about the political cost associated with potential 
new polices will be less efficient. As a consequence, investors tend to be skeptical about 
governments’ prospective policy actions. Investors continue to observe political signals, 
but they pay less attention than they would otherwise (Pastor and Veronesi, 2017). In 
other words, in spite of the high economic policy uncertainty, noisy political signals are 
likely to result in small updates in investors’ beliefs, which lead to lower political risk 
premia and market volatility.21 This chapter contributes to the literature by empirically 
testing this implication of Pastor and Veronesi’s model. 
Another theoretical model constructed by Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009) 
indicates that higher opinion divergence could lead to higher market volatility. In their 
model, one group of investors hold proper opinions about public signals, while the other 
investors are overconfident. The overconfident investors revise their beliefs too often 
regarding economic prospects and tend to overreact to new public signals, which leads to 
volatile stock price movements and higher market volatility. The model suggests that the 
larger the fluctuations in the sentiment of overconfident investors relative to investors 
with the proper beliefs, the higher the market volatility. In an environment inundated with 
                                                             
21 In the study of Pastor and Veronesi (2013), they discussed the impact of the precision of political signs 
in the theoretical model in section 4.1.2 Political shocks. 
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imprecise public political signals, it is more difficult for investors to interpret conflicting 
information and form accurate views on prospective policy actions. Investors are more 
likely to hold different beliefs on the probability and the potential impacts of a policy 
change (Pastor and Veronesi, 2012, 2013). Higher divergence in investors’ opinions tends 
to result in higher expected market volatility (Banerjee and Kremer, 2010). In this respect, 
noisy signals create divergences in investors’ opinions, which intensify market volatility. 
In this study, I link belief divergence with policy uncertainty and empirically test the 
implications of the model by Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009). 
The year 2017 also presented an interesting background to reflect on the low 
volatility accompanied by the strong performance of the U.S. equity market and its 
potential impacts on investors’ behaviors. According to proponents of behavioral finance, 
investors exhibit representativeness bias in their trading activities. They expect a price 
continuation based on past “trends” and perceive investment risks based on their most 
recent investment experience (De Bondt, 1993). Investors who exhibit representativeness 
bias tend to believe that the low market volatility with an ongoing bullish spell in the U.S. 
equity market will continue. Thus, in an environment characterized by continuously low 
market volatility, investors are likely to overlook political signals and underestimate the 
impact of economic policy uncertainty on investment risks. The representative bias of 
investors is likely to contribute to a lower degree of market volatility.  
By examining these factors mentioned above, I find that the quality of political 
signals plays an important role in explaining the level of the VIX. More precisely, I show 
that policy uncertainty, together with the quality of political signals, helps to explain the 
level of the VIX. I also find evidence that investors’ opinion divergence has a significant 
impact on expected market volatility and the relationship between policy uncertainty and 
the VIX. In addition, the results show that the commonly accepted positive relationship 
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between the VIX and economic policy uncertainty is weakened during a time 
characterized by recently low realized volatility. The reported results provide insights into 
the dynamics of the co-movement of the VIX and proxies of economic policy uncertainty. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
relevant literature and formulates hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and variables 
employed. Section 4 presents the methods. Section 5 discusses the results, and Section 
6 concludes with the main findings. 
 
2.2 Literature and Hypothesis  
The observed extremely low level of the VIX, albeit with a high degree of 
economic policy uncertainty, has drawn increasing attention from practitioners and 
researchers.22 The year 2017 presented this study with an interesting background to 
examine three factors, which have received little attention in empirical studies on the VIX: 
the quality of political signals, divergence of investors’ opinions and representativeness 
as one of investors’ behavioral biases.  
2.2.1 Quality of economic/ political signals 
The studies conducted by Pastor and Veronesi (2012, 2013) develop theoretical 
models and explain the relationships between stock price, market volatility and economic 
policy uncertainty. In their proposed model, the government decides the economic 
policies to be adopted, while investors are uncertain about government’s prospective 
policy actions. Changes in economic policies will lead to price reactions in the financial 
markets, and the magnitudes of the reactions depend on the extent to which the changes 
                                                             
22 See, for example, Banerji (2017), Figlewski (2017), Ciolli (2017), Moyo (2017), Pastor and Veronesi 
(2017), Watts (2017) and Weber (2018). 
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were anticipated. Pastor and Veronesi consider two types of uncertainty: the uncertainty 
regarding whether a current policy will be changed and the uncertainty regarding the 
impact of a new policy on share prices and market volatility. They find that both types of 
uncertainties significantly affect stock price and market volatility. In particular, Pastor 
and Veronesi (2013) show that stock prices are driven by three types of shocks, namely 
capital shocks, impact shocks, and political shocks. Capital shocks and impact shocks 
influence stock prices by affecting the amount of capital and causing investors to revise 
their beliefs about the impact of the prevailing government policy, respectively. Political 
shocks, the third type of shocks, are driven by investors’ learning about the political cost 
associated with potential new policies. Specifically, political shocks reflect the 
continuous flow of political news and lead investors to update their beliefs about the 
likelihood of the different potential future policy choices. In their model, Pastor and 
Veronesi document that the effect of political shocks on stock prices and market volatility 
is greater when political signals are more precise and when there is more policy 
uncertainty. In other words, the model implies that market volatility is an increasing 
function of the product of political uncertainty and the quality of political signals (Pastor 
and Veronesi, 2017). When political signals are precise on governments’ prospective 
policy actions, it is expected that market volatility and economic policy uncertainty move 
together. However, when faced with poor political signals, investors do not update their 
beliefs often and hesitate to react in the financial markets. In this situation, it is not 
unusual to observe low market volatility, albeit with a high level of economic policy 
uncertainty. This scenario is consistent with the puzzling phenomenon observed in the 
U.S. in 2017.  
In over 12 months following the 2016 presidential election, U.S. investors were 
bombarded with a large flow of political news. Most frequently heard on media were the 
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appointments and dismissals of high-ranking officials in the White House office and the 
cabinet, the announcements of economic reforms, and plans to change domestic and 
foreign policies. The year 2017 was also inundated with a large amount of fake news and 
half-truths. According to the Washington Post Fact Checker’s database, as of 2 March 
2018 President Donald J. Trump had made 2,436 false or misleading claims in the 406 
days since he took the oath of office.23 The prevalence of fake news and imprecise news 
made it difficult for investors to interpret political signals, to dissect reversals and 
contradictions, and to evaluate their potential impacts on investment risks (Pastor and 
Veronesi, 2017). As a result, investors tend to wait and see, which leads to lower market 
volatility. In light of the theoretical model proposed by Pastor and Veronesi (2013) and 
the political developments in the U.S. in 2017, I put forward the following hypothesis:  
(H2-1) Policy uncertainty is an important determinant of market volatility; however, 
the impact of policy uncertainty is weaker when the precision of political signals is low. 
 
2.2.2. Lack of consensus among investors 
Past studies show evidence that investors tend to be overconfident and often 
overreact to political signals (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985; Darrat, Zhong, and Cheng, 
2007). Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009) formulate a theoretical model to analyze the 
effects of the difference of opinions on stock price volatility. In their model, a stream of 
dividends is paid and the fundamental determinant variable of dividends is not observable. 
All investors are risk averse, allowed to short sell, and receive information in the form of 
the current dividend and a public signal. Investors have different opinions about the 
                                                             





correlation between innovations in the signals and innovations in the unobserved 
variables. Some overconfident investors believe that this correlation is positive, while, in 
fact, it equals zero. These investors therefore give too much weight to the signals, while 
the other investors know the true correlation and form “proper” beliefs. Dumas, Kurshev, 
and Uppal refer to the fluctuations in the expectations of overconfident investors relative 
to those with the proper beliefs as fluctuations in “sentiment.” Their model shows that 
the overconfident investors change their beliefs too often about economic prospects. 
Specifically, when overconfident investors receive a new public signal, they tend to 
overreact to it, which consequently generates volatile stock price movements and leads 
to higher market volatility. The model implies that the larger the fluctuations in the 
sentiment of overconfident investors relative to investors with the proper beliefs, the 
higher the market volatility.  
As Pastor and Veronesi (2012, 2013) argue, in a volatile economic policy 
environment with potentially more public political signals, investors are more likely to 
disagree on the potential impacts of policy changes, which results in a higher degree of 
opinion divergence. The lack of consensus among investors about the future direction of 
the market is confirmed by close to equally divided opinions among investors. Moreover, 
considering the large flow of imprecise news released by the U.S. government in 2017, it 
was even more difficult for investors to interpret low-quality political signals. Thus, the 
degree of opinion divergence among investors could be higher than ever observed. A 
number of studies on heterogeneous opinions present strong evidence that divergence in 
investors’ opinions significantly raises market volatility (Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; 
Buraschi and Jiltsov, 2006; Andrei, Carlin, and Hasler, 2015). In light of this discussion, 
I formulate the second hypothesis:  
(H2-2) The effect of policy uncertainty on market volatility is stronger when opinion 
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divergence more among investors. 
 
2.2.3. Bullish spell and fear gauge  
Human beings tend to judge a situation based on their most recent encounters instead 
of evaluating the situation as it is now (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), which is the so-
called representativeness bias. The fact that people have a relatively short memory further 
aggregates the implication of the representativeness bias. Similarly, investors are prone 
to perceive an investment as good or bad based on its most recent performance (De Bondt 
and Thaler, 1985; Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998), and 
expect that the recent trends in prices will persist (De Bondt, 1993). In other words, 
investors tend to expect that the recent trends in prices are representative of the future 
trends, and consequently, they are likely to buy equities that have recently gained in value 
(Shleifer, 2000; Kim and Nofsinger, 2008). Similarly, investors are likely to expect the 
recent low level of market volatility will continue and last for a longer period in the future.  
Previous studies on behavioral finance have presented supportive evidence that the 
representativeness bias influences investors’ interpretations of market signals and their 
expectations of market performance. Dhar and Kumar (2001) examined the impacts of 
price trends on the trading decisions of more than 40,000 householders in the U.S. They 
observed that investors’ buying and selling decisions are affected by short-term price 
trends. Greenwood and Nagel (2009) investigated the roles of inexperienced investors in 
the formation of asset price bubbles prior to the global financial crisis (GFC). They 
reported that inexperienced mutual fund managers exhibited representativeness bias, as 
evidenced by their investment decisions to increase technology stock holdings during the 
run-up to the GFC and to decrease these holdings during the downturn. Chernenko, 
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Hanson, and Sunderam (2016) also documented that the representativeness bias 
significantly influences inexperienced mutual fund managers in their holdings of 
securitized products. Inexperienced managers tend to view the tranquil years prior to the 
GFC as representative of future years. As a result, these managers tend to underestimate 
the risks of a disruption in financial markets and they perceive risky non-traditional 
securitized products to be more attractive. Outside the U.S., Chiang, Hirshleifer, Qian, 
and Sherman (2011) examined how the experience in IPO auctions affects investors’ 
decisions to bid in subsequent auctions in Taiwan. They observed that individual 
investors become optimistic after achieving good investment returns, which is consistent 
with the representativeness bias documented in behavioral finance literature. 
This analysis reveals that the end of December 2017 marked the 14th consecutive 
month over which the S&P 500 Total Return Index achieved positive returns 
accompanied by low levels of the VIX and realized market volatility. Since 1871, such 
persistent positive performance has only occurred six times, with each bullish streak 
lasting at least for 12 consecutive months. The longest bullish spell of 15 months was 
recorded in the late 1950s. As the continuously low market volatility and bull market 
unfolded in 2017, investors were more likely to expect this low volatility level 
accompanied by the strong performance of the stock market to persist, and therefore they 
let their guard down. They tended to underestimate potential investment risks and 
lowered their assessment of market volatility. If a negative economic political signal 
arrived at such a time, its impact on market volatility was likely to be less pronounced 
than at other times. Thus, I put forward the third hypothesis:  
(H2-3) Representativeness bias of low market volatility weakens the relationship 




2.3 Data  
This study covers a long period from 2 January 1997 to 31 December 2017. The 
sample includes 5281 daily observations of the VIX, the S&P 500 index, and the BBD 
news-based and BBD overall indices. The daily closing values of the S&P 500 index, 
the VIX, and the BBD daily index, the weekly values of the American Association of 
Individual Investors (AAII) sentiment index, and the monthly values of the BBD news-
based and BBD overall indices were collected from Bloomberg.  
2.3.1 Variables 
2.3.1.1 Economic policy uncertainty 
I employ the BBD news-based policy uncertainty index as the proxy for economic 
policy uncertainty and use the BBD overall policy uncertainty index as an alternative 
measure in the robustness test.24  
The BBD news-based policy uncertainty index (Uncertainty) quantifies the coverage 
of policy-related economic uncertainty in 10 popular newspapers, namely USA Today, 
the Miami Herald, the Chicago Tribune, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, the 
Boston Globe, the San Francisco Chronicle, the Dallas Morning News, the Houston 
Chronicle, and the Wall Street Journal. To construct the BBD news-based uncertainty 
index, the terms related to economic and policy uncertainty were searched in each 
newspaper and each month from January 1985. To meet the criteria for being counted, 
each policy uncertainty article had to include the terms in all three categories pertaining 
to uncertainty, economy, and policy.25 The monthly count of policy uncertainty articles 
in each newspaper was divided by the respective monthly total number of articles. The 
                                                             
24 Source: http://www.policyuncertainty.com/us_monthly.html 
25 The terms searched in each article include uncertainty or uncertain, economic or economy, and one or 
more of the following terms: congress, legislation, white house, regulation, federal reserve, deficit. 
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resulting monthly series for each newspaper was then normalized to have a unit standard 
deviation before being summed across newspapers to obtain a monthly multi-paper index. 
This index was then re-normalized to an average value of 100. 26 
The BBD overall index (OverallBBD) consists of three components. The first 
component is the BBD news-based policy uncertainty index, as discussed above. The 
second component reflects the number of federal tax code provisions set to expire in 
future years. The third component captures the degree of disagreement among economic 
forecasters. To construct the BBD overall index, each component was first normalized 
by its own standard deviation over the periods. The BBD news-based uncertainty index 
accounts for a half of the BBD overall index, while each of the other three measures (the 
tax expiration index, the CPI forecast disagreement measure, and the federal/ state/ local 
purchases disagreement measure) accounts for a sixth.  
Figure 2.1 depicts the time-varying relationship between the VIX, the BBD news-
based index, and the BBD overall index. Panel A of Figure 2.1 features the time-varying 
ratios of each BBD index to the VIX over the period 1997–2017. Both ratios jumped to 
the highest values shortly after the U.S. presidential election in November 2016, and 
since then they have gone up more than double.  
  
                                                             
26 Monthly BBD indices have been widely applied as the proxy for economic policy uncertainly in the 
literature (see, for example, Klößner and Sekkel, 2014, Liu and Zhang, 2015, Gulen, and Ion, 2015, 
Bonaime, Gulen, and Ion, 2018). 
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Panel A presents the ratio of economic policy uncertainty indices (news-based Baker-Bloom-Davis 
index and overall Baker-Bloom-Davis index) to the VIX from January 1997 to December 2017. 
Panel B presents the value of the VIX and economic policy uncertainty indices from January 2014 
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Panel B of Figure 2.1 shows the time series of the VIX, the BBD news-based index, 
and the BBD overall index during the period 2014–2017. A striking feature in Panel B 
is the substantial divergence between the VIX and the two BBD indices from April 
2016 onwards. The VIX has hovered at historically low levels, whereas the two BBD 
indices reached their peaks after the U.S. presidential election had concluded. 
Table 2.1 reports the average value of the VIX, the news-based BBD index, the 
overall BBD index, and the S&P 500 index based on the deciles of the VIX over the 
period 1997–2016. The co-movements between the VIX and the BBD indices were 
noticeable for the lowest and the highest deciles. For example, the deciles of high values 
of the VIX correspond to the high values of the BBD indices. The last two columns in 
Table 2.1 report the 2017 mean value of each index and the 2017 mean as the equivalent 
percentile of the 1997–2016 values. The average level of the VIX in 2017 corresponds 
to the 2nd percentile over the period 1997–2016, while the average of the BBD news-
based index in 2007 is equivalent to the 77th percentile of its values measured over 
1997–2016. The mean value of the S&P 500 index in 2017 was the highest of its values 
over the period 1997–2017. This puzzling phenomenon motivates me to conduct a 





Table 2. 1 CBOE VIX, Economic Policy Uncertainty, and S&P 500 Index 
 
VIX deciles  
(1997-2016) 
1-10th  11-20th 21-30th 31-40th 41-50th 51-60th 61-70th 71-80th 81-90th 91-100th  2017 
Means of 2017  
as percentile of 
1997-2016 
CBOE VIX 11.65 13.26 14.81 16.69 18.66 20.43 22.28 24.49 27.89 39.37 11.09024 2th  
News based BBD 79.12 105.70 106.96 112.22 112.06 105.32 110.32 116.55 128.33 170.33 142.6863 77th  
Overall BBD 78.28 96.63 103.57 115.88 112.18 101.98 105.17 110.53 114.78 148.99 111.6307 64th  
S&P500 1519.60 1668.40 1575.91 1430.03 1273.45 1214.08 1258.01 1233.58 1188.81 977.46 2449.076 Highest value  
Observations 504 504 503 501 504 503 503 503 503 503 251   
 
This table presents the means of the CBOE VIX, news-based Baker-Bloom-Davis (BBD) uncertainty index, overall BBD uncertainty index, and S&P500 index based 




2.3.1.2 The quality of political signals 
To find the proxy for the precision of political signals, Pastor and Veronesi (2017) 
suggest using the Washington Post Fact Checker data. However, the relatively short 
history of this dataset makes it unsuitable for this analysis. I propose and compute the 
three-month rolling volatility of the daily percentage changes of the BBD daily index 
(Imprecision) as a proxy for the quality of political signals.27  
A high volatility reflects the prevalence of imprecise political signals. For robustness 
tests, I compute the two-month rolling volatility of the daily percentage changes of the 
BBD daily index (Imprecision_2m) as an alternative precision measure. 
Figure 2.2 depicts the time series of the VIX and the three-month rolling volatility 
of the daily percentage changes of the BBD daily index (Imprecision). A striking feature 
in Figure 2.2 is the substantial divergence between the two series following the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election. The VIX plummeted to extremely low levels, while Imprecision 
experienced three spells of substantial high values.  
 
  
                                                             
27  Source: http://www.policyuncertainty.com/us_daily.html 
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Figure 2. 2 Precision of Political Signals and the CBOE VIX 
 
 
This figure presents the value of the VIX and the quality of policy uncertainty (Imprecision), 
measured by the volatility of the daily percentage changes of the BBD news-based daily index 






























2.3.1.3 Divergence in investors’ opinions 
To capture investors’ opinion divergence, I employ two measures calculated with the 
data of the American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) Sentiment Survey. AAII 
has conducted weekly surveys since 1987. In each survey, its members are asked a simple 
question: Do you feel the direction of the stock market over the next six months will be 
up (bullish), no change (neutral), or down (bearish)? The AAII Sentiment Survey is 
conducted each week, and is open to all AAII members.28 The results of the survey are 
automatically tabulated in the AAII database and published online early every Thursday 
morning. The survey results are circulated by various organizations and media outlets, 
including Barron’s and Bloomberg.  
The measure for investors’ opinion divergence, Dispersion, is calculated as the 
difference between the highest and lowest AAII spot sentiment percentages (bullish, 
bearish, and neutral).29 When investors’ opinions disagreement is low, expectation of 
future market movement should be aligned among market participants. In such a case, 
most investors agree on the expected direction which the market will move towards. As 
a consequence, there will be a dominant sentiment among market participants. The 
dominant sentiment could be either bullish, bearish, or neutral, whose percentage will be 
much higher than those of the subdominant sentiments, and will lead to a relatively high 
deviation between the highest and lowest sentiment percentages. Therefore, a higher 
deviation between the highest and lowest sentiment percentages (Dispersion) indicates a 
lower level of investors’ disagreement. On the other hand, when the disagreement among 
                                                             
28 AAII has more than 160,000 members. A typical AAII member is a male in his mid-60s, who has 
obtained either a bachelor or a post-graduate degree. AAII members tend to be affluent, with a median 
investment portfolio size of over US$1 million. They possess moderate investment knowledge and 
engage primarily in fundamental analysis. 
29 For example, at a time when the bullish sentiment percentage is 40, the neutral sentiment percentage 
is 25, the bearish sentiment percentage is 35, Dispersion equals to 15, which is calculated as the 
difference between the highest sentiment percentage (40 for bullish) and lowest sentiment percentage (25 
for neutral).  
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market participants is high, investors are more likely to stick with their own opinions 
about the market’s future movement and the sentiment percentages tend to be closer to 
each other. For instance, in the scenario when opinion divergence among market 
participants is extremely high, the sentiment percentages of bullish, bearish, and neutral 
would be the same, which will make the deviation between sentiment percentages 
(Dispersion) equal to zero. Therefore, a smaller difference between the highest and lowest 
sentiment percentages (Dispersion) indicates a higher level of investors’ opinion 
divergence.  
As a robustness test, I employ an alternative measure to account for the degree of 
divergence in investors’ opinions, Dispersion_SD, which is defined as the standard 
deviation of AAII sentiment percentages (bullish, bearish, and neutral).30 A high value 
of Dispersion_SD indicates that the deviation between sentiment percentages is high, and 
hence there is a dominant sentiment and consensus among market participants, 
suggesting investors’ opinion divergence is low.  
 
2.3.1.4 Representativeness bias 
To test how investors’ representativeness bias affects the relationship between policy 
uncertainty and the VIX, I applied a measure of representativeness bias constructed 
using realized and implied market volatility. In first step, we calculate the inverse of the 
absolute difference between implied volatility and realized volatility for the same 
period of one month: 
                                                             
30 For example, at a time when the bullish sentiment percentage is 40, the neutral sentiment percentage 
is 25, the bearish sentiment percentage is 35, Dispersion_SD is calculated as the standard deviation of 







where 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑦𝑡 is the one-month realized volatility of S&P 500 index 
estimated at time t; 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−22 is the VIX value one month before. The smaller is the 
difference in the denominator of the above fraction, the higher is a predictive power of 
implied volatility in one-month window. Consequently, a higher value of R_I indicating 
a higher likelihood that the investors are likely to be affected by representativeness bias. 
Because representativeness bias influences market participants during calm periods 
(when the VIX is low) and during market downturn period (when the VIX is high), the 
R_I needs an adjustment. Therefore, we multiple 𝑅_𝐼 with dummies to distinguish 
these effects for crisis and non-crisis periods. More specifically, we first create a dummy, 
VIX_low, which is set to one if the VIX is below its sample mean, and zero otherwise. 
Next, we create another dummy, VIX_high, which equals one if the VIX is above its 
sample mean, and zero otherwise. Then we multiple 𝑅_𝐼 by VIX_low and VIX_high, 
respectively, and get two variables, namely RI_low and RI_high. Hence, the 
construction of RI_low (RI_high) allows to make distinction between 
representativeness bias among investors occurring in low-VIX (high-VIX) 
environment. 31  A higher value of RI_low suggests greater probability for 
representativeness bias. If investors affected by representativeness bias are likely to 
expect the current low level of market volatility will persist for a longer period. 
Consequently, they underestimate potential investment risks associated with policy 
uncertainty and lowered their assessment of market volatility.  
                                                             
31 The approach of distinguishing the effects by high-VIX and low-VIX periods shares similar idea with that of 




As robustness tests, I consider alternative measures for low-volatility time periods 
and create a set to one if the latest one-month realized volatility is lower than the 
average monthly volatility in last 12 months.  
 
2.3.2 Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the variables employed in this study are summarized 
in Table 2.2. Over the study period 1997–2017, the VIX varied between 9.14 and 80.86, 
with a mean value of 20.48. Additional analysis (not reported) shows that the 5th 
percentile of the VIX was 11.18. Of the daily observations in the left tail (low market 
volatility), there were 31 found in 2005, 50 in 2006, 28 in 2007, 11 in 2014, and 146 in 
2017. The 95th percentile of the VIX was 35.81. Of the observations in the right tail 
(high market volatility), 8 were found in 1997, 30 in 1998, 7 in 2001, 40 in 2002, 67 in 
2008, 80 in 2009, 5 in 2010, 28 in 2011, and 2 in 2015.    
The daily returns of the S&P 500 index over the study period varied between -9% 
and 11.6%; both extreme values were observed in October 2008. The mean of daily 
returns for the main U.S. market benchmark is close to zero. The logarithm value of the 
latest annualized one-month realized volatility, Realized Volatility, has a mean of 2.68, 
and ranged between 1.24 and 4.46. 
In regard to the measures of the quality of political signals, the average of the three-
month rolling volatility of the daily percentage changes of the BBD daily index 
(Imprecision) is 0.92, while the average of the two-month rolling volatility of the daily 
percentage changes of the BBD daily index (Imprecision_2m) is 0.90. Imprecision 
ranged between 0.33 and 3.57 while Imprecision_2m ranged between 0.3 and 4.26. 
With regards to economic policy uncertainty, the monthly BBD news-based index 
73 
 
(Uncertainty) ranged between 44.87 and 283.67, with a mean value of 115.99. The 
monthly BBD overall index (OverallBBD) varied between 57.20 and 245.13, with an 
average of 108.94.  
In terms of investors’ opinion divergence, the mean of the difference between the 
highest and lowest AAII spot sentiment percentages (Dispersion) is 0.214 while the 
average value of the standard deviation of AAII spot sentiment percentages 
(Dispersion_SD) is 0.113.  Dispersion ranged between 0.008 and 0.633, and 
Dispersion_SD varied between 0.005 and 0.361. On average, about 40% of AAII 
members are bullish, 30% are bearish and 30% are neutral about the prospects of the 
financial market. The highest percentage of bullish AAII members reached 75% in 
January 2000. With regards to the dummies capturing low-volatility environments 
(representativeness bias), LV has a mean of 0.59 and LV_2m has a mean of 0.58.  
The correlation matrix for the key independent variables is presented in Table 2.3.32 
As shown in the table, except the correlation between realized volatility and LV dummy, 
the other independent variables are not highly correlated with one another. As realized 
volatility and LV are not simultaneously included in any of the regression estimate the 





                                                             
32 In Table 2.3, I only present the correlation matrix for a set of main independent variables for reasons 
of brevity. The correlation matrix for all variables used in robustness tests shows consistent results and 




Table 2. 2 Summary Statistics 




VIX 5281 20.479 8.449 9.140 80.86 
ΔS&P500 5281 0.000 0.012 -0.090 0.116 
S&P500 5281 1387.2 421.6 676.5 2690.2 
Uncertainty 5281 116.02 44.84 44.78 283.67 
Realized Volatility 5281 2.678 0.495 1.245 4.458 
OverallBBD 5281 108.94 35.62 57.20 245.13 
Imprecision 5281 0.920 0.545 0.327 3.574 
Imprecision_2m 5281 0.903 0.575 0.305 4.264 
Dispersion 5281 0.214  0.112 0.008 0.633 
Dispersion_SD 5281 0.355 0.042 0.238 0.476 
LV 5281 0.593 0.491 0.000 1.000 
RI_low 5281 0.352 3.099 0.000 131.7 
RI_high 5281 0.302 2.740 0.000 119.2 
AAII_Bullish 5281 0.398 0.100 0.165 0.750 
AAII_Bearish 5281 0.307 0.098 0.067 0.703 
AAII_Neutral 5281 0.295 0.081 0.077 0.529 
 
This table presents the summary statistics for all variables examined in the study as well as relevant 
market indices used for calculation. VIX is the value of the CBOE Volatility index. S&P500 is the value 
of equity market index. ΔS&P500 is the daily log return of the S&P 500 index. Realized Volatility is the 
log value of the annualized volatility of S&P 500 daily returns within a rolling one-month time period. 
Uncertainty is the value of the Baker, Bloom and Davis (BBD) news-based policy uncertainty index. 
OverallBBD is the value of the BBD overall policy uncertainty index. Imprecision is the measure on the 
quality of political signals, calculated as the three-month rolling volatility of the daily returns of the BBD 
daily index. Imprecision_2mt is the alternative measure on the quality of political signals, which is 
calculated as the two-month rolling volatility of the daily returns of the BBD daily index Dispersion is 
the measure of investors’ opinion divergence, defined as the difference between the highest AAII 
sentiment percentage and the lowest AAII sentiment percentage. Dispersion_SD is the alternative 
measure of investors’ opinion divergence, calculated as the adjusted standard deviation of the AAII 
bullish percentage, AAII bearish percentage, and AAII neutral percentage. LV is a dummy to capture 
representativeness bias, which is set to one if the latest one-month realized volatility is lower than the 
average monthly volatility in last 12 months. RI_low is calculated as 1/| Realized volatilityt – VIXt-22 | if 
the VIX is lower than its sample mean, otherwise zero. AAII_Bullish is the reported bullish percentage 
in the AAII index. AAII_Bearish is the reported bearish percentage in the AAII index. AAII_Neutral is 







Table 2. 3 Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables 
 
  ΔS&P500 
Realized  
Volatility 
Uncertainty Imprecision Dispersion 
Realized Volatility -0.004     
Uncertainty -0.030** 0.321***    
Imprecision -0.004 0.047*** -0.253***   
Dispersion -0.010 0.117*** -0.120*** 0.022  
RI_low 0.004 -0.022* -0.024** 0.014 -0.027** 
 
This table presents the correlation matrix for the key variables. VIX is the log value of VIX. ΔS&P500 is 
the daily log return of equity market index. Realized Volatility is the log value of the annualized volatility 
of S&P 500 daily returns within a rolling one-month time period. Uncertainty is the value of the BBD 
news-based uncertainty index. Imprecision is the measure for the quality of political signals, which is 
calculated as the three-month rolling volatility of the daily returns of the BBD daily index. RI_low is 
calculated as 1/| Realized volatilityt – VIXt-22 |. Dispersion is the measure for investors’ opinion 
divergence, calculated as the difference between the highest AAII sentiment percentage and the lowest 
AAII sentiment percentage. if the VIX is lower than its sample mean, otherwise zero. *,**,*** corresponds 




2.4 Methodology  
In order to test hypothesis (H2-1) regarding policy uncertainty and the quality of 
political signals, the following model was estimated: 
𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1𝛥𝑆&𝑃500𝑡 + 𝜆2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝜆3RealizedVolatility𝑡 + 𝜆4𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑡 
         +𝜆5Imprecision𝑡 + 𝜆6𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑡∙ Imprecision𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                   
(2.1) 
where  
VIXt is the logarithm of the VIX value at time t.  
ΔS&P500t is the daily log return of S&P 500 index at time t.  
Realized Volatilityt is the logarithm of the annualized volatility of S&P500 daily returns 
for a rolling one-month time period.  
Uncertaintyt is the measure for the degree of economic policy uncertainty at time t 
proxied by the monthly BBD news-based index.  
Imprecisiont is the measure of the quality of political signals, which is calculated as the 
three-month rolling volatility of the daily percentage changes of the BBD daily index.  
Trendt is the time trend variable which controls for potentially omitted trending 
variables. 
To test hypothesis (H2-2) about investors’ opinion divergence, the following model 
was estimated: 
𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1𝛥𝑆&𝑃500𝑡 + 𝜆2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝜆3RealizedVolatility𝑡 + 𝜆4𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑡 
  +𝜆5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝜆6𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑡 ⋅ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑡 + 𝜆7Imprecision𝑡 




where Dispersiont is the measure for disagreements among market participants, and 
defined as the difference between the highest and the lowest AAII sentiment 
percentages. Other independent variables are the same as in model (2.1). 
To test hypothesis (H2-3) about representative bias, I consider a measure which 
captures the level of the recent market volatility. If investors have representativeness 
bias, they are likely to expect the VIX would follow the recent historical pattern. 
Considering Realized Volatility applied in model (2.1) and (2.2) is already a measure of 
the past volatility, I replace Realized Volatility with a dummy which captures the 
environment of recent historical volatility. I add an interaction term between this 
dummy and policy uncertainty. By doing this, I examine how representativeness bias 
affects the relationship between policy uncertainty and the VIX by testing the effect of 
that interaction term. The following model was estimated: 
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   (2.3) 
, where RI_low is calculated as 1/| Realized volatilityt – VIXt-22 | if the VIX is lower than 
its sample mean, otherwise zero; RI_high is calculated as 1/| Realized volatilityt – VIXt-22 | 
if the VIX is higher than its sample mean, otherwise zero;. Other independent variables 
are the same as in model (2.2). 33 
 
2.5 Empirical Results 
2.5.1 Precision of political signals 
                                                             
33 I run augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for the VIX and all the independent variables (except 
the time trend). The results indicate these variables are stationary. 
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In this section, I examine the three hypotheses formulated in section 2 of the chapter. 
First, I examine the effects of policy uncertainty and political signals’ quality on the 
VIX level. Table 2.4 shows the regression estimate of model (2.1), with policy 
uncertainty proxied by the BBD news-based index (Uncertainty). I apply the three-
month rolling volatility of the daily returns of the BBD daily index as the measure on 
the quality of political signals. In all specifications, the parameter estimation is reported 
with Newey-West standard errors.  
 
Table 2. 4 
The Impact of the Quality of Political Signals and Policy Uncertainty on the VIX 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
ΔS&P500t -3.0984*** -3.1071*** -3.1034*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Realized Volatilityt 0.5411*** 0.5382*** 0.5343*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trend t -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Uncertaintyt 0.0016*** 0.0015*** 0.0011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Imprecisiont  -0.0333*** -0.1021*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Uncertaintyt * Imprecisiont   0.0005** 
   (0.014) 
Intercept 1.5752*** 1.6436*** 1.7250*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adj.R-squared 0.8154 0.8173 0.8180 
N 5281 5281 5281 
 
This table presents the results on how policy uncertainty and the quality of political signals can affect the 
VIX level. The dependent variable is the log value of the VIX at time t. ΔS&P500t is the daily log return 
of equity market index. Trend t is the time trend control variable. Realized Volatilityt is the log value of 
the annualized volatility of S&P 500 daily returns within a rolling one-month time period. Uncertaintyt 
is the value of the BBD news-based uncertainty index at time t. Imprecisiont is the measure for the quality 
of political signals, which is calculated as the three-month rolling volatility of the daily returns of the 
BBD daily index. Newey-West p-values are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** corresponds to statistically 




The results in Table 2.4 indicate that the BBD news-based index (Uncertainty) has 
statistically significant and positive impacts on the VIX, suggesting that the overall VIX 
tends to be higher in an environment where policy uncertainty is high. The analysis of 
specification (2) and (3) reveals that the three-month rolling volatility of the daily 
returns of the BBD daily index (Imprecisiont), has a significantly negative impact on 
the VIX. On the other hand, the interaction term between policy uncertainty 
(Uncertainty) and the quality of political signals (Imprecision) in specification (3) 
presents a significantly positive sign, which could weaken or even reverse the negative 
effects of Imprecision on the VIX level. This suggests that the sign of the combined 
impacts of political signals’ quality and its interaction term depends on the magnitude 
of policy uncertainty (Uncertainty). 34  These findings are in line with the model 
presented by Pastor and Veronesi (2012, 2013) that implies VIX is affected by the 
quality of political signals together with policy uncertainty.  
In terms of the fundamental variables, it can be found in Table 2.4 that the 
coefficient for the daily return of S&P 500 index (ΔS&P500) is significantly negative, 
which indicates higher returns of the equity market index reduces the log level of the 
fear gauge. The log value of realized volatility is found to be statistically significant and 
positive, which indicates that higher recent realized volatility increases the VIX.   
 
2.5.2 Investors’ opinion divergence 
To test hypothesis (H2-2), I next examine the impacts of investors’ opinion 
divergence on the relationship between the VIX and economic uncertainty. The results 
                                                             
34 Although the magnitude of the interaction term’s coefficient is much smaller, it is worth noticing that 
the mean of Uncertainty is around 116 (see in Table 2.2). The test on the sign of the combined effect of 
the quality of political signals (Imprecision) by policy uncertainty levels is in section 2.5.4.   
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are presented in Table 2.5. Specification (1) and (2) include the variable measuring 
opinion divergence, as well as an interaction term between opinion divergence measure 
and policy uncertainty. Specification (3) further adds the measure of the precision of 
political signals tested in model (2.1) discussed above (see model (2.2)). In Table 2.5, 
investors’ opinion divergence is proxied by Dispersion, which is defined as the 
difference between the highest and the lowest AAII sentiment percentages. Recall that 
a high value of Dispersion indicates a dominate market sentiment, and therefore low 
opinion divergence among investors. As shown in Table 2.5, the coefficients of 
Dispersion in specification (2) and (3) are significant and negative, indicating that a 
low level of opinion divergence among investors (proxied by high values in Dispersion) 
tends to lower the level of the VIX. On the other hand, the coefficients for the 
interaction terms between policy uncertainty (Uncertainty) and opinion divergence 
(Dispersion) in specification (3) is found to be significantly positive, which suggests 
that the sign of the combined impacts of opinions disagreement and its interaction with 
policy uncertainty on the VIX could vary with the level of policy uncertainty 
(Uncertainty).35 These findings indicate that the VIX is affected by investors’ opinion 
divergence together with policy uncertainty.  
The findings on policy uncertainty and the quality of political signals are consistent 
with those reported in Table 2.4 that the policy uncertainty (Uncertainty) overall has 
positive impacts on the VIX level, while the impacts of the quality of political signals 
(Imprecision) with its interaction depend on the level of policy uncertainty. 
  
                                                             
35 The test on the sign of the combined effect of opinions dispersion (Dispersion) by policy uncertainty 
levels is provided in section 2.5.4. 
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Table 2. 5 
The Impact of Investors’ Opinion divergence and Policy Uncertainty on the VIX  
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
ΔS&P500t -3.0968*** -3.0539*** -3.0646*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Realized Volatilityt 0.5410*** 0.5386*** 0.5322*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trend t -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Uncertaintyt 0.0016*** 0.0012*** 0.0007*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dispersiont 0.0170 -0.2019** -0.2016** 
 (0.624) (0.033) (0.000) 
Uncertaintyt * Dispersiont  0.0019** 0.0017** 
  (0.016) (0.027) 
Imprecisiont   -0.1020*** 
   (0.000) 
Uncertaintyt * Imprecisiont   0.0005** 
   (0.012) 
Intercept 1.5698*** 1.6229*** 1.7731*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adj.R-squared 0.8153 0.8159 0.8185 
N 5281 5281 5281 
 
This table presents the results of the regressions that incorporate the impacts of representativeness 
bias. The dependent variable is the log value of the VIX at time t. ΔS&P500t is the daily log return 
of equity market index. Trend t is the time trend control variable. Realized Volatilityt is the log value 
of the annualized volatility of S&P 500 daily returns within a rolling one-month time period. 
Uncertaintyt is the value of the BBD news-based uncertainty index at time t. Imprecisiont is the 
measure for the quality of political signals, which is calculated as the three-month rolling volatility 
of the daily returns of the BBD daily index. Dispersiont is the measure for investors’ opinion 
divergence, calculated as the difference between the highest AAII sentiment percentage and the 
lowest AAII sentiment percentage. Newey-West p-values are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** 





2.5.3 Representativeness bias 
To test how investors’ representativeness bias affects the relationship between policy 
uncertainty and market volatility, I applied a set measure of representativeness bias 
constructed using realized and implied market volatility, namely RI_low and RI_high. 
As discussed before, RI_low (RI_high) allows to make distinction between 
representativeness bias among investors occurring in low-VIX (high-VIX) 
environment. 36  A higher value of RI_low suggests greater probability for 
representativeness bias.  
The results of this scrutiny allow me to test hypothesis (H2-3). Different from 
previous models, in Table 2.6, I replace the log value of realized volatility with RI_low 
and RI_high. I then add their interaction with policy uncertainty (Uncertainty) in 
specification (2) and finally include the measures of the quality of political signals, and 
opinion divergence in specification (3).  
As shown in Table 2.6, RI_low and its interaction term are found statistically 
significant to influence the level of the VIX specification (2) and (3). This finding 
indicates that representativeness bias in a low-VIX environment affects the relationship 
between economic policy uncertainty and the VIX. However, when its interaction 
shows opposite sign with the RI_low, which again suggests that the sign of the 
combined impacts of representativeness bias in a low-VIX environment and its 
interaction with policy uncertainty on the VIX could vary with the level of policy 
uncertainty (Uncertainty). On the other hand, RI_high and its interaction term are 
insignificant, which suggests that representativeness bias is less likely to play a role in 
impacting the link between economic policy uncertainty and the VIX when the market 
                                                             
36 The approach of distinguishing the effects by high-VIX and low-VIX periods shares similar idea with that of 




volatility is high. The results on the quality of political signals are in line with those 
reported in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 and the findings on investors’ opinion divergence 




Table 2. 6 
The Impact of Representativeness Bias and Policy Uncertainty on the VIX 
  (1) (2) (3) 
ΔS&P500t -2.7618*** -2.7644*** -2.6310*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trend t -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Uncertaintyt 0.0044*** 0.0045*** 0.0012*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
RI_low -0.0031** 0.0072*** 0.0062*** 
 
(0.018) (0.000) (0.000) 
RI_low*Uncertainty  -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
RI_high 0.0068*** 0.0047 0.0100 
 
(0.004) (0.694) (0.436) 
RI_high*Uncertainty  0.0000 -0.0000 
  (0.853) (0.753) 
Imprecisiont   -0.3434*** 
 
  (0.000) 
Uncertaintyt * Imprecisiont   0.0022*** 
 
  (0.000) 
Dispersiont   -0.7059*** 
 
  (0.000) 
Uncertaintyt * Dispersiont   0.0063*** 
 
  (0.000) 
Intercept 3.0523*** 3.0492*** 3.5846*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adj.R-squared 0.4586 0.4593 0.4871 
N 5281 5281 5281 
This table presents the results of the regressions that incorporate the impacts of representativeness bias. 
The dependent variable is the log value of the VIX at time t. ΔS&P500t is the daily log return of equity 
market index. Trendt is the time trend control variable. Realized Volatilityt is the log value of the 
annualized volatility of S&P 500 daily returns within a rolling one-month time period. Uncertaintyt is 
the value of the BBD news-based uncertainty index at time t. Imprecisiont is the measure for the quality 
of political signals, which is calculated as the three-month rolling volatility of the daily returns of the 
BBD daily index. Dispersiont is the measure for investors’ opinion divergence, calculated as the 
difference between the highest AAII sentiment percentage and the lowest AAII sentiment percentage. 
RI_low is calculated as 1/| Realized volatilityt – VIXt-22 | if the VIX is lower than its sample mean, 
otherwise zero; RI_high is calculated as 1/| Realized volatilityt – VIXt-22 | if the VIX is higher than its 
sample mean, otherwise zero. Newey-West p-values are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** corresponds to 




2.5.4 Effect of the interaction terms 
As discussed in the previous sections, the coefficient sign for Imprecision is found 
to be different from that of its interaction term with policy uncertainty, while both of 
the coefficients are significant. This result suggests that the direction of the combined 
effects of political signals’ quality (Imprecision) could vary with the level of policy 
uncertainty (Uncertainty). In order to better understand the impact of the quality of 
political signals (Imprecision) and policy uncertainty on the VIX, I estimate the 
interacted effects of policy uncertainty conditionally on three different levels of the 
quality of political signals (Imprecision), namely the low, average, and high levels. The 
low level of Imprecision is calculated as its mean minus the standard deviation (0.38), 
while the high level is calculated as the mean plus the standard deviation (1.47). Using 
results reported in specification (3) of Table 2.6, which includes all the three examined 
factors, I prepare Figure 2.3. It presents the effects of policy uncertainty (Uncertainty) 
on dependent variable (logarithm of VIX) conditionally on the low, average, and high 
levels of Imprecision.37 I denote the median level of policy uncertainty (Uncertainty) 
over 1997–2016 as well as the median level in 2017. Uncertainty has a median value 
of 103.8 over 1997–2016, while its median in 2017 is 134.5. As shown in Figure 2.3, 
the effect of Uncertainty on the dependent variable is found to be positive for all three 
levels of Imprecision. Given the median levels of Uncertainty over 1997–2016 and in 
2017, it can be found that the VIX tends to be lower when Imprecision is high, which 
is consistent with Pastor and Veronesi (2012, 2013) suggesting that the imprecision of 
political signals decreases market volatility. However, it can also be noticed that the 
effect is reversed when the level of policy uncertainty (Uncertainty) moves beyond a 
                                                             
37 As robustness tests, I also examine the effects of interaction terms using results in other columns and 
tables with controls for all the factors. The findings on interaction effects are consistent across different 
columns of results and are available upon request. 
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certain high level (see Figure 2.3).38 Overall, these findings show that the VIX is lower 
in an environment characterized by low-quality political signals most of the time. The 
period post the 2016 U.S presidential election was characterized by a high level of 
policy uncertainty together with imprecise political signals in 2017; thus, in line with 
the results I expect to observe a low level of the VIX. 
  
                                                             
38 Based on the results presented in specification (3), Table 2.6, the break-even level of Uncertainty for 
Imprecision is found to be 156.09.   
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Figure 2. 3 




This figure presents the interaction effects of the quality of political signals and policy uncertainty on the VIX by 
showing how Uncertainty affected the predicted log value of the VIX conditionally on the low, average, and high 
levels of Imprecision. Uncertainty is the value of the BBD news-based uncertainty index. Imprecision is the measure 
for the quality of political signals, which is calculated as the three-month rolling volatility of the daily returns of the 
BBD daily index. The low level of Imprecision is calculated as its mean minus the standard deviation, while the high 
level is calculated as the mean plus the standard deviation. The red line illustrates the 97-16 median level of 
Uncertainty; the green line illustrates the 2017 median level of Uncertainty; the blue line illustrates the break-even 





I next examine the impacts of policy uncertainty and opinion divergence 
(Dispersion) on the VIX. Similarly, I test the interacted effects of policy uncertainty 
conditionally on the low, average, and high levels of Dispersion as a defined variable. 
The low level of Dispersion is calculated as its mean minus the standard deviation 
(0.10), while the high level is calculated as the mean plus the standard deviation (0.33). 
I use again the results reported in specification (3) of Table 2.6, and prepare Figure 2.4. 
It presents the effects of Uncertainty on the logarithm of the VIX conditionally on those 
three levels of Dispersion. I denote the median level of Uncertainty over 1997–2016 
(103.8) and its median level in 2017 (134.5). As shown in Figure 2.4, Uncertainty has 
a positive effect on the VIX independently for all three levels of Dispersion. Around 
the median levels of Uncertainty over 1997–2016, the VIX is found higher when 
Dispersion is lower, indicating that the VIX tends to be high in an environment 
characterized by high opinion divergence. These findings partly support the hypothesis 
(H2-2) and the literature claiming that higher opinions disagreement leads to higher 
market volatility (e.g. David, 2008, Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal, 2009, Andrei, Carlin, 
and Halser, 2015) conditionally on a relatively low level of policy uncertainty. On the 
other hand, when Uncertainty is above a certain level, such a relationship between the 
VIX and opinion divergence is reversed: the VIX tends to be lower when investors’ 
opinion disagreement is high (proxied by a low value of Dispersion).39 Given the level 
of Uncertainty in 2017, the VIX is found lower when Dispersion is low, indicating that 
the VIX tends to be low in an environment characterized by high opinion divergence.  
  
                                                             
39 Using the results presented in Column 1, Table 2.6, the break-even level of Uncertainty for Dispersion 
is found to be 112.05. 
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Figure 2. 4 
Effects of Investors’ Opinion divergence and Policy Uncertainty on the VIX 
 
   
This figure presents the interaction effects of the opinion divergence and policy uncertainty on the VIX by showing 
how Uncertainty affected the predicted log value of the VIX conditionally on the low, average, and high levels of 
Dispersion. Uncertainty is the value of the BBD news-based uncertainty index. Dispersion is the measure for investors’ 
opinion divergence, calculated as the difference between the highest AAII sentiment percentage and the lowest AAII 
sentiment percentage. The low level of Dispersion is calculated as its mean minus the standard deviation, while the 
high level is calculated as the mean plus the standard deviation. The red line illustrates the 97-16 median level of 
Uncertainty; the green line illustrates the 2017 median level of Uncertainty; the blue line illustrates the break-even 







Finally, I present the effects of policy uncertainty conditional on the values of 
RI_low in Figure 2.5. As shown, the VIX tends to be lower when the representativeness 
bias is higher in a low-volatility environment given the median level of Uncertainty 
over1997-2016 and in 2017. This suggests that the positive impact of policy uncertainty 
on the VIX is weakened when likelihood of representativeness bias is high in recent 
low-volatility period. Considering the long bullish spell and low volatility in 2017, the 
results suggest a relatively low VIX. 
This analysis of the interaction effects shows that given the level of policy 
uncertainty in 2017, the VIX tends to be low in an environment characterized by 
imprecise political signals, high opinion divergence and representativeness bias. These 
findings are consistent with the observed low level of the VIX in late 2016 and the 




Figure 2. 5 




This figure presents the interaction effects of the representativeness bias and policy uncertainty on the VIX by showing 
how Uncertainty affected the predicted log value of the VIX conditionally on the values of LV. Uncertainty is the 
value of the BBD news-based uncertainty index. LV is a dummy set to one if the latest one-month realized volatility 






2.5.5 Robustness test  
For robustness tests, I employ alternative measures for each of the key explanatory 
variables. Specifically, I apply the two-month rolling volatility of the daily percentage 
changes of the BBD daily index (Imprecision_2m) as proxy for the quality of political 
signals. As alternative proxy for investors’ opinion divergence, I consider the adjusted 
standard deviation of spot values of the AAII bullish, bearish, and neutral sentiment 
percentages (Dispersion_SD). More specifically, I adjusted AAII bullish, bearish and 
neutral sentiment by multiplying corresponding percentages by +1, -1 and 0, respectively 
to better capture the effects of bullish and bearish sentiments.40 A dummy equal to one 
if the latest one month realized market volatility is lower than the volatility in last 12 
months (LV) as proxy for representativeness bias. In addition, I apply the BBD overall 
index as a proxy for policy uncertainty. The results of robustness tests are presented in 
Table 2.7, where policy uncertainty is proxied by BBD news-based index (Uncertainty) 
in Panel A and by BBD overall index (OverallBBD) in Panel B.   
As shown, the findings on the quality of political signals and options divergence 
are consistent with those reported previously. Though the coefficient of the alternative 
low volatility dummy (LV) and its interaction term are statistically significant and 
negative. This is consistent with the main results that the effect of policy uncertainty on 
the VIX is weaker in an environment characterized by greater probability of 
representativeness bias. Overall, those results indicate the findings are robust. 
Additionally, to ensure that the empirical analysis is not subject to any potential 
multicollinearity issues, I tested the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all the 
                                                             
40 For instance, if sentiment percentages are expressed as (bullish, bearish, neutral), a case with (50, 50, 
0) is expected to indicate more dispersion than (50, 0, 50) or (0, 50, 50). The old measure of the difference 
between the highest and lowest percentages, will be 23.6 for all of these. By adjusting with (+1, -1, 0) to 
compute the standard deviation of these outcomes, the case with (50, 50, 0) would yield a standard 
deviation of 40.8, but (50, 0, 50) or (0, 50, 50) would yield a standard deviation of 23.6.  
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independent variables. I excluded the interaction terms and regressed log(VIX) on the 
three explanatory factors together with the fundamental variables. The VIFs indicated 
that the independent variables do not present severe multicollinearity. 
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Table 2. 7 Robustness test 
 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) 
ΔS&P500t -3.2077*** -3.0437*** -2.8217*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Realized Volatilityt 0.5174*** 0.53269***  
 (0.000) (0.000)  
Trend t -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Uncertaintyt 0.0002 -0.0008*** 0.0018*** 
 (0.173) (0.001) (0.000) 
Imprecision_2mt -0.1380***   
 (0.000)   
Uncertaintyt * Imprecision_2mt 0.0008***   
 (0.000)   
Dispersion_SDt  -1.1535***  
  (0.017)  
Uncertaintyt * Dispersion_SDt  0.0102***  
  (0.017)  
LVt   -0.0662** 
   (0.017) 
Uncertaintyt * LVt   -0.0011*** 
   (0.000) 
Imprecisiont  -0.1200*** -0.3381*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Uncertaintyt * Imprecisiont 
Imprecisiont 
 0.0007*** 0.0020*** 
  (0.011) (0.000) 
Dispersiont -0.3485***  -0.4750** 
 (0.000)  (0.013) 
Uncertaintyt * Dispersiont 0.0029***  0.0044*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Intercept 1.8641*** 2.1446*** 3.5963*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adj.R-squared 0.8151 0.8202 0.5508 
N 5281 5281 5281 
 
This figure presents the results of robustness tests. The dependent variable is the log value of the VIX. 
Uncertaintyt is the value of the BBD news-based policy uncertainty index. Imprecision_2mt measures of 
the quality of political signals, calculated as the two-month rolling volatility of the daily returns of the BBD 
news-based daily index. Dispersion_SDt is the measure for investors’ opinion divergence, calculated as the 
adjusted standard deviation of the AAII bullish, bearish, and neutral sentiment percentages. LVt is a dummy 
set to one if the latest one-month realized volatility is lower than the average monthly volatility in the last 
12 months. Other variables are defined as the same in previously reported results. Results are reported with 






Table 2.7 Robustness test (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B (4) (5) (6) 
ΔS&P500t -3.1299*** -3.0025*** -2.7891*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Realized Volatilityt 0.4975*** 0.4896***  
 (0.000) (0.000)  
Trend t -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OverallBBDt  0.0012*** -0.0070*** 0.0025*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Imprecision_2mt -0.0787***   
 (0.001)   
OverallBBDt * Imprecision_2mt 0.0006***   
 (0.005)   
Dispersion_SDt  -2.7025***  
 
 (0.000)  
OverallBBDt * Dispersion_SDt  0.0249***  
 
 (0.000)  
LVt   -0.0762*** 
 
  (0.010) 
OverallBBDt * LVt   -0.0010*** 
 
  (0.000) 
Imprecisiont  -0.1181*** -0.3650*** 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
OverallBBDt * Imprecisiont 
Imprecisiont 
 0.0011*** 0.0032*** 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Dispersiont -0.5913***  -0.9748*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
OverallBBDt * Dispersiont 0.0053***  0.0092*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Intercept 1.8202*** 2.7125*** 3.5219*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adj.R-squared 0.833 0.840 0.629 
N 5532 5281 5281 
 
This figure presents the results of robustness tests. The dependent variable is the log value of the VIX. 
OverallBBDt is the value of the BBD overall uncertainty index. Imprecision_2mt measures of the quality 
of political signals, calculated as the two-month rolling volatility of the daily returns of the BBD news-
based daily index. Dispersion_SDt is the measure for investors’ opinion divergence, calculated as the 
adjusted standard deviation of the AAII bullish, bearish, and neutral sentiment percentages. LVt is a 
dummy set to one if the latest one-month realized volatility is lower than the average monthly volatility 
in the last 12 months. Other variables are defined as the same in previously reported results. Results are 
reported with Newey-West p-values. *,**,*** corresponds to statistically significance at the 10%, 5%, and 




Motivated by the extremely low level of the VIX and the relatively high economic policy 
uncertainty in the 14 months post the 2016 U.S presidential election, I examined the factors 
affecting the relationship between those two situations. I found that the combination of 
investors’ representativeness bias, quality of political/economic signals, and investors’ opinion 
divergence influences the link between the fear gauge and economic policy uncertainty. A 
recent low-volatility environment as the proxy of representativeness bias weakens the positive 
correlation independently on the level of economic policy uncertainty. In the case of the other 
two factors affecting the examined relationship, their impacts depend on the overall level of 
economic policy uncertainty. These findings are consistent with the implications of the 
theoretical models of Pastor and Veronesi (2013) and Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009) 
respectively, conditionally on a low level of policy uncertainty. In light of the results, the record 
low level of implied volatility in 2017 was caused by low realized market volatility 
accompanied by one of the longest bullish spells and the stream of unprecise economic/political 
signals together with high investors’ opinion divergence.  
To sum up, I find that the commonly accepted positive relationship between the VIX and 
economic policy uncertainty is affected by these three identified factors and is subject to 















This study investigates the impacts of the introduction of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
Act (DFA) on U.S. bank holding companies. By examining 157 large U.S. bank holding 
companies, I find that in the post-DFA period, banks’ contribution to systemic risk was 
substantially reduced. Moreover, I document that in the regulatory environment defined by the 
DFA, banks’ use of interest and credit derivatives contributed less to systemic risk. On the other 
hand, the scrutiny reveals that banks experienced increased credit and overall risks following 
the commencement of the DFA. 
 
Keywords: U.S. bank holding companies; Systemic risk; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act 
(DFA); Credit derivatives; Interest derivatives; Hedging; Global financial crisis 
 






The popularity of derivatives products among financial institutions has led to a substantial 
growth in the derivatives market. The notional principal amount of financial derivatives held 
by U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) rose from less than $18 trillion in 1995 to nearly 270 
trillion by the end of 2012, which was more than 10 times the total asset value of BHCs.41 
Credit default swaps (CDSs) were used widely to transfer credit risk among financial 
institutions. The outstanding amount of CDSs grew from less than $1 trillion at the beginning 
of 2001 to over 6 trillion by the end of 2007. Empirical studies suggest that derivatives such as 
CDSs increase the correlations among banks, generate a wide net of linkages in the financial 
system, and make the financial market more vulnerable (Bedendo and Bruno, 2012). According 
to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), the significant systemic risk that fueled the 
global financial crisis (GFC) can be attributed to the size and complexity of the over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives market. Millions of derivatives contracts in such unregulated 
markets created interconnectedness among financial institutions and exposed the financial 
system to a contagion of losses and defaults via the counterparty credit risk channel.  
As the financial crisis unfolded in the U.S. in 2007, the Democratic-dominated Congress 
pushed for more restrictive regulations on Wall Street. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) was signed into U.S. federal law on 21 July 2010. Title 
VII of the DFA – Wall Street Transparency and Accountability – requires that financial 
derivatives be cleared through a derivatives clearing organization. This title aims at improving 
market transparency and lowering the counterparty risk associated with financial derivatives 
products via a central clearing channel. Unlike the previously unregulated OTC derivatives 
market, where the network of exposure is highly dispersed, derivatives clearing organizations 
centralize the network of exposure and play a key role among counterparties involved in 
derivatives contracts. Derivatives clearing organizations are able to curtail the direct 
interconnectedness among banks by setting strict requirements on margins and collateral for 
                                                             




cleared derivatives (Singh, 2010). Derivatives clearing organizations also monitor the 
creditworthiness and risk of involved banks and observe the prices of transactions. With 
relevant information, derivatives clearing organizations can provide price quotes relying on 
involved banks for marking positions, which makes a cleared market less likely to freeze in 
states of market stress (Ghamami and Glasserman, 2017). Moreover, regulators are able to 
monitor the OTC derivatives market through derivatives clearing organizations instead of a 
diffuse network of bilateral transactions. However, the central clearing channel has been 
criticized, since the central clearing organizations with concentrated risk might ultimately 
require government support in a crisis. There are also debates on the extent to which the 
intended benefits of a central clearing channel could be achieved in practice.  
Another key part of the DFA is the proprietary trading restrictions, known as the Volcker 
Rule, which prohibits government-insured banks from undertaking short-term risky trading of 
securities, derivatives, commodities futures, and options. The Volcker Rule directly requires 
reduction of banks’ holdings of derivatives for speculation purposes, thereby mitigating their 
contribution to systemic risk (Li and Marinč, 2017).  
Whether the DFA has achieved its intended objectives is a matter of controversy. On the 
one hand, the passing of the DFA paved the way to a regulatory scheme for previously 
unregulated OTC derivatives. Consumer advocates who strongly support the DFA agree that 
banks should not use federally insured deposits to gamble and take risky bets, and that banning 
proprietary trading will curtail risk-taking activities in the financial system. On the other hand, 
financial institutions have criticized the DFA for inadequately addressing the problems that 
really push the financial market into turmoil (Kane, 2012). It’s also argued that the Volcker 
Rule requires joint rulemaking from five different agencies and is too complex to execute 
(Kane, 2012). The DFA is particularly too restrictive for smaller banks, which have assets in 
the range of $50 billion and are relatively too small to threaten the soundness of the financial 
system. The DFA creates substantial compliance costs (Gorman, 2017) and fails to achieve its 
stated objectives (Calomiris, 2017). 
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In early 2017, the Financial CHOICE Act was introduced in the 115th U.S. Congress to 
repeal many parts of the DFA. The CHOICE Act passed the Republican-led House on 8 June 
2017. While the banking industry generally applauds the bill, the Democrats criticize the rolling 
back of the DFA as “a big bank-inspired wish list” (Schmidt and Dexheimer, 2017). The 
CHOICE Act would loosen the restrictions on banks’ investments in private equity and hedge 
funds, and allow smaller banks to increase lending by minimizing a rule about qualified 
mortgages. Proponents of the CHOICE Act, which would repeal the Volcker Rule completely, 
argue that distinguishing between speculation and market timing is not simple and easy. On 
the negative side, the CHOICE Act proposes “one-size-fits-all” solutions which could be too 
weak to regulate large systemic banks. It exempts all banks which have substantial tangible 
equities in relation to their assets (at least 10 percent), from many regulatory rules applied under 
the DFA. Large systemic banks are typically highly interconnected, have opaque financial 
leverage, and large complicated off-balance-sheet derivatives positions. The letter by 
Americans for Financial Reform has pointed out that the simple capital ratio requirement of 10 
percent proposed in the CHOICE Act is too low to serve as a cushion for mega banks; repealing 
the Volcker Rule would also invite more risky bets from systemically important financial 
intuitions, which is likely to fuel a more severe crisis and heighten its potential damage.  
The recent debate on deregulations in the financial system and the proposed dismantling 
of the key aspects of the DFA raises the need for an extensive study as to whether the DFA has 
been effective in mitigating banks’ risk and the degree of correlations among banks via 
derivatives use channels. Studies have investigated the impacts of derivatives, for example, 
interest rate derivatives on banks’ risk and performance (Gunther and Siems, 2002; Li and Yu, 
2010; Brewer, Deshmukh and Opiela, 2014). However, few studies on banks’ risk have 
examined the interactions between banks’ derivatives use and the passage of the DFA. Li and 
Marinč (2017) explore the impact of the mandatory clearing requirement and place emphasis 
on banks’ holdings of interest rate derivatives.  
In this study, I conduct an extensive study of 157 large BHCs in the U.S. and investigate 
two types of derivatives which have been widely used in the financial market: credit derivatives 
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and interest rate derivatives. Interest rate derivatives holding is then categorized by hedging 
and trading purposes, which allows me to test the effectiveness of the channel of restricting the 
proprietary trading in the Volcker Rule. In addition, I categorize banks’ holdings of interest 
rate derivatives by the trading approaches of OTC trading and exchange trading. By doing so, 
I test the effectiveness of the central clearing channel in Title VII of the DFA. I examine the 
effects of these derivatives holdings, the passage of the DFA, and their joint effects on three 
aspects: (i) banks’ contribution to systemic risk, (ii) banks’ risk, and (iii) banks’ performance.  
I find evidence that excessive use of interest rate derivatives for hedging, interest 
derivatives traded on exchanges, and credit derivatives (traded OTC) substantially increased 
banks’ contribution to systemic risk. I also show that, in post-DFA periods, banks’ contribution 
to systemic risk was significantly lower within two out of three proxies employed for systemic 
risk. Moreover, I document that use of credit and interest rate derivatives for hedging have 
weakened impacts on systemic risk in post-DFA periods, while the use of interest rate 
derivatives held for trading does not exhibit significant impacts on systemic risk either before 
or after the introduction of the DFA. Part of the results also shows evidence that use of 
derivatives and the DFA led to higher bank risks, and banks had a worse performance after the 
signing of the DFA.  
The research contribution is three-fold. First, I examine credit derivatives and interest rate 
holdings categorized by hedging and trading purposes and by trading approaches of OTC 
trading and exchange trading. I extend the evidence on the channels through which banks’ 
derivatives use affects their financial health and the wide net of linkages in the financial system. 
Second, by examining the effects of the DFA on systemic risk, banks’ risk, and banks’ 
performance through proprietary trading and central clearing channels, I shed light on whether 
the DFA has achieved its stated objectives in mitigating the degree of interconnectedness and 
improving the soundness of large financial institutions. Third, I use a more extensive set of 
variables than those that have been used in prior work. I capture banks’ exposure to the housing 
market in each state and the degree of competition in the banking sector in each state. This 
analysis also examines banks’ use of the discount window borrowing and four special capital 
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programs. The study contributes to the limited literature on derivatives use and risk 
management in the banking system following the coming into effect of the DFA. The findings 
provide important implications to financial institutions, regulators, and legislators on the 
effectiveness of the DFA in regulating large systemic banks. 
In the next section, I discuss the literature and develop the hypotheses. Section 3 
summarizes the methods and data, Section 4 presents empirical results, Section 5 reports 
sensitivity analyses, and Section 6 concludes.  
3.2 Literature and Hypotheses 
This chapter looks at the two main streams of the literature: first, to examine the effects of 
derivatives holdings on systemic risk and banks’ risk; and second, to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the DFA in curtailing the degree of interconnectedness among banks and improving the 
financial soundness of individual banks. The following analysis will briefly discuss the two 
relevant streams of literature.  
3.2.1 Derivatives holdings, systemic risk, and DFA 
The strong growth of derivatives holdings among banks has been a key driver of increasing 
claims within the financial system (Mayordomo, Rodriguez-Moreno, and Pena, 2014). Banks’ 
off-balance-sheet activities such as derivatives use provide diversification benefits. However, 
such diversification benefits could also provide banks more incentives to actually take more 
risk, holding less capital and granting more loans, which increases the volatility of operating 
revenues, and consequently raise banks’ contributions to undiversifiable systemic risk (Calmes 
and Theoret, 2010). The use of derivatives, as a type of non-resalable instrument, also causes 
credit chains among banks, leading to a higher degree of interdependence among banks and 
therefore increasing systemic risk (Bedendo and Bruno, 2012; Donaldson and Micheler, 2018). 
Previous studies suggest that the risk transfer via credit derivatives channels such as CDSs and 
collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) builds up a network among banks, and the flow of risk 
in such a network could lead to higher systemic risk (Nijskens and Wagner, 2011; Mayordomo 
et al, 2014; D'Errico, Battiston, Peltonen, and Scheicher, 2018).  
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Additionally, banks broadly use interest rate derivatives, particularly interest rate swaps, 
to enhance their interest rate risk exposure (Hirtle, 1997; Brewer, Minton and Moser, 2000; 
Carter and Sinkey, 1998). It’s argued that even if banks are able to anticipate the interest rate 
policy, it is likely that they cannot adjust the debt exposure; however they can restrict the cost 
of debt by adjusting the interest rate derivatives exposures (Christoffersen, Nain and Oberoi, 
2009). As a consequence, a higher cost of greater interest rate volatility during economic 
downturns is translated into systemic liquidity pressure on banks, leading to higher system risk 
(Mayordomo et al, 2014; Bakoush, Gerding, and Wolfe, Simon, 2017). Evidence has also been 
found that both use of interest rate derivatives for trading and use of interest rate derivatives 
for hedging increased banks’ systemic risk (Li and Marinc, 2014). In light of the literature, I 
put forward the following hypothesis42: 
H3-1a: Banks’ holdings of derivatives increase their contributions to systemic risk.  
The findings on the effectiveness of the DFA in mitigating systemic risk are mixed. The 
central clearing with collateral requirements under the DFA could effectively limit the lack of 
position transparency in OTC derivatives (Acharya and Bisin, 2014). By improving the 
transparency in derivatives’ trading, the central clearing under the DFA was able to restrict the 
shortfall losses, and consequently lower counterparty and systemic risks in the financial 
network built up by derivatives (Amini, Filipovic, and Minca, 2013; Loon and Zhong, 2014). 
In addition to the central clearing, the Volcker Rule, that limits bank’s proprietary trading 
activities, effectively targeted institutions that engage in risky activities and mitigated systemic 
risk (Elayan, Aktas, Brown, and Pacharn, 2018). 
On the other hand, central clearing under the DFA could increase the counterparty risk 
because of the information asymmetries between central clearing counterparties and large 
financial institutions, since central clearing counterparties have a disadvantage in evaluating 
clearing members’ risk and therefore could underestimate the risk, and thereby weaken its 
guarantee (Pirrong, 2009). It has also been argued that the central clearing required by the DFA 
                                                             
42 All the hypotheses in Chapter 3 are listed in Appendix 4.1. 
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might not be able to further lower the counterparty risk if the existing arrangements in the OTC 
derivatives market (e.g. posting of collateral by both counterparties, use of the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association, master agreements, and credit support annexes) can 
effectively deal with counterparty risk (Arora, Gandhi, and Longstaff , 2012) . Even though the 
DFA intends to reduce systemic risk via the central clearing of OTC derivatives at central 
clearing counterparties, these counterparties themselves can create, or contribute to, systemic 
risks (Duffie and Zhu, 2009; De Genaro, 2016). Cont (2017) tests the impacts of OTC 
derivatives’ central clearing under the DFA and shows that central clearing did not reduce 
systemic risk, but transformed counterparty risk into liquidity risk via margin calls, since 
negative cash flows due to the margin requirements draw out the liquid resources of market 
participants. 
In addition to the studies discussed above that examined the impacts of the DFA on 
systemic risk, there are only a few studies linking the effectiveness of the DFA in mitigating 
systemic risk with banks’ derivatives use. Li and Marinč (2017) test the effects of the 
mandatory clearing requirement under the DFA and document that following the introduction 
of the mandatory clearing requirement, there was a drop in systemic risk associated with 
interest rate derivatives. However, their findings show that banks’ use of CDSs reduced their 
contribution to systemic risk before the introduction of the mandatory clearing requirement, 
and CDSs’ use even increased systemic risk after mandatory clearing. This finding is not 
consistent with the expectation of markets and regulators, and is not explained in their study. 
In their estimation models, they do not consider the effects of terms such as loans to other 
depository institutions and balance due from other depository institutions, which are directly 
related to banks’ interconnectedness and systemic risk. The effects of an event dummy for 
mandatory clearing are also excluded. Gao, Liao, and Wang (2018) examine banks’ systemic 
risk before and after the passage of the DFA with cross-sectional data and present evidence 
that systemic risk among banks significantly decreased following the passage of the DFA. They 
also analyze the effect of credit derivatives’ use by banks on systemic risk and find insignificant 
results. However, they only examine credit derivatives written/sold by banks without 
considering credit derivatives purchased and interest rate derivatives. They also do not include 
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the terms directly related to banks’ interconnectedness and systemic risk in their regression 
models.  
I conjecture that the implementation of the DFA, specifically the Volcker Rule, leads to a 
lower degree of derivatives use, thereby reducing the interdependence among banks. I share 
the same view as Singh (2010) and Li and Marinč (2017) that implementing the mandatory 
clearing requirement improves the transparency in the derivatives markets, therefore curtailing 
the effects of banks’ derivatives holdings on systemic risk. Thus, I put forward the following 
hypothesis:  
H3-1b: The implementation of the DFA mitigates banks’ contribution to systemic risk.  
H3-1c: The implementation of the DFA reduces the impacts of derivatives holdings on banks’ 
contribution to systemic risk (in H3-1a). 
3.2.2 Derivatives holdings, banks’ risk and banks’ performance 
3.2.2.1 Derivatives holdings and bank risk 
Derivatives have been widely used by financial institutions to hedge against unfavorable 
changes in the value of their cash flows. Derivatives help mitigate cash flow volatility, lower 
external funding costs, and reduce banks’ overall risk (Koppenhaver, 1985; Froot, Scharfstein 
and Stein, 1993; Duffee and Zhou, 2001; Jaffe, 2003; Norden, Buston, and Wagner, 2014; 
Bartram, 2017; Deng, Elyasiani, and Mao, 2017; Huang, Kabir, and Zhang, 2017).  
Previous studies, however, show that banks are more likely to use financial derivatives for 
trading motives rather than for hedging purposes (Minton, Stulz and Willamson, 2005; Li and 
Marinč, 2014). This tendency makes them more vulnerable to financial distress (Li and Marinč, 
2014). Without proper oversight, derivatives traders may take a position which is substantially 
larger than their risk-absorbing capacity (Biais, Heider, and Hoerova, 2012). Derivatives used 
for regulatory arbitrage to decrease capital requirements may also lead to excessive risk taking 
(Yorulmazer, 2013). It could also be possible that banks use derivatives for hedging to mitigate 
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their exposure to tradable risk in order to take greater credit risk and earn higher economic 
rents (Deng, Elyasiani, and Mao, 2017). Supportive evidences have been found by 
Deng, Elyasiani, and Mao (2017), Ghosh (2017), Titova, Penikas, and Gomayun (2018) that 
the use of derivatives for hedging by banks could induce higher banks’ risk. In light of the 
above literature, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H3-2a: Both interest rate derivatives used for trading and hedging increase banks’ risk. 
Credit derivatives, such as CDSs and CLOs, have been widely used by financial 
institutions to transfer counterparty credit risks. Despite being powerful hedging tools, they are 
like a double-edged sword. Credit derivatives, which are similar to an insurance policy, may 
increase moral hazards as it lowers banks’ motivations to thoroughly review loan applications 
and regularly monitor bank loans (Parlour and Winton, 2013). Banks which hold CDSs to 
hedge against potential credit loss tend to make more profits by raising loan volumes while 
taking a higher degree of risk (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012; Shan, Tang, and Yan, 2014). In light 
of the literature above, I propose the following hypothesis:  
H3-2b: Credit derivatives increase banks’ risk. 
There are a few studies in the empirical literature that link banks’ individual risk to 
derivatives traded in the OTC market and on exchanges. Banks using derivatives traded in OTC 
markets are more likely to become associated with higher risks because derivatives used for 
speculating and trading purposes in the OTC market could increase banks’ risk exposure (Li 
and Marinč, 2014). The low levels of transparency, supervision, and monitoring in the OTC 
market might also allow banks to hedge very risky positions, which can hardly be allowed or 
are extremely costly to hedge in more transparent markets. On the contrary, derivatives traded 
on exchanges with a higher level of transparency are more likely to be used for hedging 
purposes by banks. Thus, I put forward the following hypothesis:  
H3-2c: Derivatives traded in OTC markets increase banks’ risk, while derivatives traded on 
exchanges decrease banks’ risk. 
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While the Volcker Rule limited banks’ proprietary trading activities, which reduced the 
size of their trading books, banks could still acquire more risk behaviors via other approaches 
such as raising the illiquid book portfolios, which are hard to control (Chung, Keppo, and Yuan, 
2016). As a result, the DFA is likely to be not effective in reducing banks’ risk-taking behavior, 
and banks could even exhibit higher volatility in asset returns after the DFA was signed (Keppo 
and Korte, 2016). Additionally, the liquidity reduction attributed to the DFA could hinder 
banks’ ability to meet short-term obligations and makes them more susceptible to financial 
distress (Mohanty, Akhigbe, Basheikh, and Khan, 2018). Thus, I propose the following 
hypothesis:     
H3-3: The implementation of the DFA increases banks’ risk. 
 
3.2.2.2 Derivatives holdings and bank performance 
Banks that use derivatives for speculation purposes tend to achieve higher returns, 
although those trading activities expose banks to a higher degree of risk (Li and Yu, 2010; Lau, 
2016). While there are a few studies reporting that the use of derivatives did not improve the 
banks’ performance (Keffala and De Peretti, 2016; Egly and Sun, 2014), the majority of 
previous  studies present evidence that derivatives use by banks are positively correlated to 
banks’ profitability and performance (e.g. Said, 2011; Chang, Ho, and Hsiao, 2018). I share a 
similar view with Said (2011), and propose the following hypothesis: 
H3-4: Derivatives holdings improve banks’ performance. 
The DFA restricts consumer credit, makes mortgages and bank transactions more 
expensive, increases banks’ compliance costs, and reduces banks’ liquidity. It also limits the 
financial sector’s ability to innovate. Previous studies suggest that the DFA decreases the 
capacity and quality of banks' market-making services (Chow and Surti, 2011; Whitehead, 
2011; Duffie, 2012), therefore lowering banks’ performance. Schäfer, Schnabel, and Weder 
(2015) present evidence that the DFA significantly reduces banks’ share returns. Similar results 
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have also been found by Chung, Keppo, and Yuan (2016), Keppo and Korte (2016), and Gao, 
Liao, and Wang (2018). Shen and Hartarska (2018) find that derivatives use by banks reduces 
the sensitivity of profitability to credit risks and improves profitability. They also argue that the 
Volcker Rule imposed high compliance costs and may have negative impacts on the profits of 
banks. In light of the literature discussed above, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H3-5: The implementation of the DFA decreases banks’ performance. 
3.3 Methodology  
In this section, I present the measures of banks’ contribution to systemic risk, banks’ risks 
and performance. I then present the models used to test the null hypothesis formulated above. 
The section is divided into two parts: the first part shows measures and models of banks’ 
contribution to systemic risk, and the second part presents those for banks’ risk and 
performance.  
3.3.1 Banks’ systemic risk  
I consider conditional value at risk as a proxy for the contribution of each bank to the 
systemic risk. Following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), I calculate the Value at Risk of the 
banking system conditional on the distress of bank i with a confidence level of 95 percent 
(CoVaR(5%)) and also the Value at Risk of the banking system with a confidence level of 50 
percent, which is conditional on the median state of the bank (CoVaR(50%)). Therefore, bank 
i’s contribution to systemic risk is estimated as the difference between those two conditional 
Value at Risks (ΔCoVaR) of the banking system.  
In order to calculate ΔCoVaR, I first estimate the growth rate of the market value of total 
assets of bank i at time t,
i
tX . The market value of total asset is calculated as the product 
between the market value of bank i’s equity and the bank’s ratio of total assets to book equity. 
i
tX  is then calculated as the percentage change of the market value of total asset.
43 The next 
                                                             
43 I calculate 𝑋𝑡









𝑖 , where ME 
109 
 
step is to calculate the time-variant Value at Risk (VaR) for a bank and the CoVaR of the banking 
system conditional on the distress of that bank. I follow Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and 
Mayordomo, Rodriguez-Moreno and Peña (2014), and employ the means of quantile 




= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑀𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡
𝑡                                                             (3.1a) 
𝑋𝑡
𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚
= 𝛼𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖 + 𝛽𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖𝑋𝑡
𝑖 + 𝛾𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖
,     (3.1b) 
where Mt-1 is a set of state variables describing the current market situation, including the VIX, 
which is the index of implied volatility of the stock market tracked by the Chicago Board 
Options Exchanges; Liquidity Spread, which captures the difference between the three-month 
repo rate and the three-month bill rate; Changes in Three-Month Treasury Bill Rate; Changes 
in the Slope of the Yield Curve, measured by the yield spread between the 10-year Treasury 
rate and the three-month bill rate; Changes in the Credit Spread, measured by the credit spread 
between 10-year BAA-rated bonds and the 10-year treasury rate; Return of the S&P 500 Index 
and Real Estate Sector Return in Excess of the Market Return. Specifically, bank i’s VaR(5%) 
is estimated through the quantile regression with a 95 confidence level by using the coefficient 
(?̂?i, 𝛾i) estimated in Equation (3.1a). Then the CoVaR of the banking system conditional on 
bank i’s distress is calculated with the estimated VaR(5%) of bank i, together with coefficient 
(?̂?system|i, ?̂?system|i, 𝛾system|i) estimated through the quantile regression in Equation (3.1b). The 













𝑀𝑡−1.    (3.2) 
where q is the quantile confidence level. Similarly, I apply the quantile regression with a 
                                                             
is the market value of equity and LEV is the ratio of book value of total asset to book equity value. 
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confidence level of 50 percent to calculated bank i’s VaR(50%) and the CoVaR of banking 
system conditional on bank i’s VaR(50%). Finally, the ΔCoVaR of bank i is calculated as the 
difference between the banking system’s Value at Risk conditional on the distress of the bank i 




𝑖(50%)                       




𝑖(50%))            (3.3) 
A lower value (negative) in ΔCoVaR indicates a higher contribution to systemic risk.44 
The above constructed proxy of banks’ systemic risk is a dependent variable in the panel 
regression designed to examine the effect of derivatives use and the introduction of the DFA 
on banks’ contribution to systemic risk, the following model is estimated:  
, 0 , , 1 , , 1 , 1*i t n i p t ik i p t m i tSR Y PostDFA PostDFA Y C                , (3.4) 
where SRi,t is the measure on banks’ contribution to systemic risk initially measured by the 
change in conditional value at risk (ΔCoVaR); Yi,t is the notional value of credit derivatives and 
interest rate derivatives, categorized either by holding purpose (trading or hedging) or by 
trading approach (OTC or exchange); the event dummy, PostDFA, which is set to one after the 
introduction of the DFA and zero otherwise; and Ci,t-1 is the set of firm characteristics variables 
including banks’ exposure to the housing market, HHI index, and government bailout programs 
dummy. According to the statement of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), as 
financial derivatives expose the financial system to a contagion of spreading losses and defaults, 
I expect negative signs for variables measuring the use of derivatives, Yi,t, which suggests that 
derivative use by banks increases banks’ contribution to systemic risk. If the DFA effectively 
                                                             
44  The potential disadvantage of CoVaR is that under certain distributional assumptions about firm’s 
returns, CoVaR treats two firms identically in terms of systemic risk if the firms have the same return correlation 
with the aggregate market, even though they might have very different sizes with different return volatilities 
(Acharya, Engle, and Richardson, 2012). It is caused by regressing the banking sector’s return on that of individual 
bank, rather than the other way around. More specifically, a big bank and a small bank could have the same return 
correlation with the market, and therefore same ΔCoVaR, suggesting that these two banks have same contribution 
to systemic risk. This is apparently wrong, since the big bank contributed more to the systemic risk. To deal with 
this, I applied a subsample of big banks to test my research question; the results are discussed later in Section 3.5.  
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controls the impact of financial derivatives on systemic risk, I then expect positive signs for 
the interactions between the DFA dummy and the derivative variables. I control for the 
clustering and heteroskedasticity in standard errors at both the bank and time level in all 
regression estimates. 
In order to address the potential critique that the results related to the DFA are driven by 
the selection of the proxy of banks’ contribution to systemic risk, I consider two alterative 
measures as dependent variables in panel regression (3.4), namely marginal expected shortfall 
(MES) and banking industry beta. Marginal expected shortfall is defined as the average return 
of bank i on days when the banking industry (S&P Banks Selected Industry Index) return, Rm, 
is among its lowest 5 percent level in a one-quarter period: 
[ | ]i i mt t tMES E R R q  ,                            (3.5) 
where q stands for the quantile of S&P Banks Selected Industry Index return, which is set as 5 
percent. Accordingly, a lower negative value in MES indicates a higher marginal contribution 
to systemic risk.  
In addition, I apply banking industry beta as a third measure of systemic risk. Accordingly, 
a bank’s industry beta is calculated as the sensitivity of stock return to the return of S&P Banks 
Selected Industry Index in a one-year time window. Higher industry beta could imply higher 
systemic risk (Nijskens and Wagner, 2011).  
3.3.2 Banks’ risk and performance  
In order to test the impact of the DFA on the risk of individual U.S. BHCs, I consider 
different types of risks and their measures. As proxies of credit risk of U.S. banks, I use Z-score 
and distance to default. The Z-score is defined as the sum of the mean return on assets and the 
mean ratios of equity to assets, divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets:   
  /






                          (3.6) 
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Z-score indicates the number of standard deviations that a bank’s rate of return on assets 
can have in a single period before the bank becomes insolvent. I calculate Z-score using a time 
window of 16 quarters. A higher Z-score signals a lower probability of bank insolvency.  
The other proxy of credit risk is distance to default, which measures the number of standard 
deviations the asset value is away from the default point. Consistent with Moody’s KMV model, 







 ,            (3.7) 
where V is the market value of total assets; K is the default boundary, calculated as short-term 
debt plus half of the long-term debt; and σv is the standard deviation in the market value of 
assets over 16 quarters.45 Higher distance to default indicates less chance for default.46 
In addition to credit risk, I employ other measures of banks’ risks, namely the level of 
overall risk. Specifically, I calculate bank i’s volatility of its daily stock return within a six-
month rolling window (Volatility) to capture overall risk . A higher Volatility indicates a higher 
risk. 
In order to evaluate the impacts of derivatives use in the pre and post DFA regulatory 
environments on the banks’ credit and overall risk, I consider the following model: 
, 0 , , 1 , , 1 , 1*i t n i p t ik i p t m i tIR Y PostDFA PostDFA Y C                ,  (3.8) 
where IRi,t is the bank’s risk measures, which could either be Z-score, Distance to Default, or 
stock volatility for BHC i and time t. Yi,t is the notional value of credit derivatives and interest 
                                                             
45 As the market value of a bank’s debt is not available, the market value of its total asset is derived as the book 
value of its total liability and the market value of its equity. This approach is similar to the approach underlying 
Moody’s KMV model. The book value of a bank’s total liability, including deposits, is collected from SNL 
database. 
46 I also test by using the Distance to Default with RoA as the drift component: (V-K+RoA)/ σv; the results still 
hold and are available upon request. 
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rate derivatives, categorized either by holding purpose (trading or hedging) or by trading 
approach (OTC or exchange). PostDFA is a dummy variable, which is equal to one after the 
DFA has been signed in the law and zero otherwise. Ci,t-1 is the set of bank-specific variables 
and can differ across regressions, as some variables are used to calculate the dependent variable 
and therefore cannot be included as explanatory variables. 
Next, I analyze of the impacts of the DFA and derivatives use on the performance of U.S. 
banks. As proxies for banks’ performance, I consider Tobin’s Q, returns on assets (ROA), and 
cost-to-income ratio. Higher values in banks’ Tobin’s Q and returns on assets (ROA) indicate 
better performance, while higher cost to income suggests a lower operating efficiency and 
therefore a worse performance. The following model is used for the examination of bank 
performance:  




i t n i p t ik i p t m i t
p p
PF Y PostDFA PostDFA Y C       
 
       
,    (3.9) 
where PFi,t is the bank’s performance measures, which could be either Tobin’s Q, ROA, or cost 
to income. The definitions of other variables are the same as in Equation (3.8). 
3.4 Data  
3.4.1 Sample and data 
This study examines large and publicly listed BHCs in the U.S. from the first quarter of 
2007 to the last quarter of 2014. The study covers the subprime crisis 2007–2009, and roughly 
equal pre-DFA and post-DFA sub-periods. I focus on BHCs because these large financial 
institutions are more likely to use derivatives for both hedging and trading purposes. The main 
sample is restricted to banks which have at least $1 billion in assets at the end of 2006, and 
have derivatives holdings reported in the Y9 call report as well as stock prices reported in 
CRSP. The main sample consists of 157 BHCs, which captures more than 70 percent of the 
total market capitalization of U.S. publicly traded BHCs at the end of 2006.  
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Bank-specific data were collected from the SNL Financial database (SNL). The volatility 
of equity returns, which is based on six months of daily data, was calculated using stock prices 
data from CRSP. The banking industry index (S&P Banks Selected Industry Index) returns and 
macro-economic variables used to calculate △CoVaR were downloaded from Datastream. 
3.4.2 Independent variables 
I focus on two types of derivatives, namely interest rate derivatives (IRDs) and credit 
derivatives (CDs), which have been widely used by banks and subject to heightened regulations 
following the GFC (Li and Marinč, 2017). According to Accounting Standards SFAS133, 
banks must classify derivatives into two sub-categories: for hedging and for trading purposes.47 
I therefore examine separately banks’ interest derivatives holdings for trading (IRDs trading) 
and interest derivatives holdings for hedging (IRDs hedging); each is measured as the notional 
amount of the relevant off-balance-sheet contracts reported in the Y9 call report, and then 
scaled by banks’ assets.  
In contrast to interest rate derivatives, credit derivatives holdings are not categorized based 
on the purposes. Thus, I follow a similar approach as in Li and Marinč (2014) and examine the 
net notional amount of credit derivatives scaled by banks’ assets (Net CDs). By categorizing 
derivatives for trading or hedging purposes, I test the effectiveness of the proprietary trading 
channel through which the Volcker Rule under the DFA aims to mitigate the systemic risk 
associated with derivatives. Additionally, I calculate the total net notional amounts of interest 
rate derivatives categorized by whether they are traded OTC or on exchanges. More 
specifically, interest rate derivatives traded OTC (IRDs OTC) are calculated as the sum of the 
notional amount of interest rate forwards, swaps, and the net long positions in OTC interest 
rate options, while interest rate derivatives traded on exchanges (IRDs exchange) are calculated 
as the sum of the notional amount of interest rate futures and net long positions in exchange 
interest rate options. Given the credit derivatives reported in SNL are all traded in the OTC 
market, I get three derivative categories, namely interest rate derivatives traded OTC (IRDs 
                                                             
47 Contracts held for trading purposes include those used in dealing and other trading activities accounted for at 
market value (or at lower of cost or market value) with gains and losses recognized in earnings. 
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OTC), interest rate derivatives traded on exchanges (IRDs exchange), and net credit derivatives 
(Net CDs). By doing this, I can examine the effectiveness of the central clearing channel in 
Title VII of the DFA on mitigating the systemic risk associated with OTC derivatives.  
In addition to derivatives holdings, I employ two additional variables which capture the 
extent of interconnectedness among financial institutions: Loan to depository institutions and 
Balance due from depository institutions (scaled by gross loans and leases).48 Mayordomo, 
Rodriguez-Moreno, and Pena (2014) found that Balance due from depository institutions 
increased banks’ systemic risk, while the impacts of Loan to depository institutions were 
insignificant.  
I create a dummy variable, PostDFA, for bank-quarter observations in the period following 
the signing of the DFA (July 21, 2010). To explore the joint effects between derivatives and the 
DFA, I first construct three interaction terms between interest rate derivatives held for hedging, 
interest rate derivatives held for trading, net credit derivatives, and the dummy, PostDFA, to 
test the effectiveness of the proprietary trading channel. I then construct the interaction terms 
between interest rate derivatives traded OTC (IRDs OTC), interest rate derivatives traded on 
exchanges (IRDs exchange), net credit derivatives (traded OTC), and PostDFA to test the 
central clearing channel of the DFA. 
In terms of the other variables, I control for banks’ size, return on average assets (ROA) to 
account for profitability, and short-term borrowings (scaled by assets). I also add book-to-
market and idiosyncratic risk captured by stock return volatility in the models to capture banks’ 
health and uncertainty. 
Mayordomo et al. (2014) present evidence that Non-performing loans and Leverage ratio 
have greater impacts on systemic risk than derivatives holdings. In light of their findings, I 
incorporate Loan loss provisions and Tier 1 risk ratio in the models. I use Loan loss provisions 
as this measure is an allowance for potential loan losses, whereas Non-performing loan only 
                                                             
48 Accordingly, interconnectedness measures the extent to which a bank is connected with other institutions in 
such a way that its stress could easily be transmitted to other institutions.  
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accounts for uncollected loans in the past. Tier 1 risk ratio is also a better measure than 
Leverage ratio. The latter simply sets the same risk weight across all assets, while Tier 1 risk 
ratio is derived based on risk-weighted assets, that is, it captures the quality of a bank’s asset 
portfolio.49 
The study period witnessed several failures and a number of mergers among financial 
institutions. I include merged banks in the sample as long as SNL reports its balance sheet and 
income items. For an acquirer, taking over near-failed firms will substantially raise its leverage 
and loan loss provisions. To capture this effect, I create a dummy variable for banks that made 
an acquisition in the quarter examined.  
During the subprime crisis, many banks experienced financial distress due to their 
exposure to the housing bust and their substantial losses on real estate–related investments 
(Cole and White, 2012). I account for a bank’s exposure to the downturn in the real estate 
market in each state where it operates. I calculate a weighted average housing return index for 
each bank-quarter. Housing returns are derived from the Fannie Mae house price index for each 
state. The weighted average is derived by using the proportion of deposits a bank has in each 
state, which is available from branch deposit and branch location data in SNL. 
To capture the degree of market concentration in the banking sector, I follow Berger and 
Roman (2015) and construct a weighted average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for each 
bank-year in a similar manner. The weighted average HHI for each bank-year is derived by 
using the proportion of deposits a bank has in each state. 
I also consider banks’ use of the discount window borrowing and four special capital 
programs, namely the troubled asset relief program (TARP), term securities lending facility, 
term auction facility, and primary dealer credit facility. The data on special capital programs 
and discount window borrowing were collected from the Federal Reserve System.50  
                                                             
49 In a robustness analysis, I employ Non-performing loans and Leverage ratio as in Mayordomo et al. (2014). 
The key results are discussed in the robustness analysis section. 
 
50 Data source: https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/discount-window.htm 
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3.4.3 Statistics  
Figure 3.1 features the average derivatives holdings (scaled by total assets) across quarters 
for the main sample of 157 banks (Panel A, B, C) and the alternative sample of 18 stress-tested 
banks (Panel D, E, F).51 Panel A and Panel D feature the average interest rate derivatives 
holdings for trading and for hedging purposes, while Panel B and Panel E show the average 
                                                             
51 A bank stress test is an analysis designed to test whether a bank has enough capital to withstand the impact of 
adverse economic developments. In the U.S., big banks are required to undergo stress tests conducted by 
the Federal Reserve. There were more than 18 banks that underwent stress tests in 2015. I get the sample of 18 
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interest rate derivatives traded in the OTC market and in exchanges. Panel C and Panel 
F depict the average net credit derivatives holdings. 
As presented in Figure 3.1, banks use a greater proportion of interest rate 
derivatives for trading than for hedging, and most of the interest rate derivatives were 
traded in the OTC market. From mid-to-end 2011 onwards, interest rate derivatives 
held for trading and interest rate derivatives traded in the OTC market declined, while 
interest rate derivatives in the exchanges increased, particularly for the main sample. 
Credit derivatives holdings increased substantially during 2007–2008 but were 
markedly lower as of 2009; the trend is more pronounced for stress-tested banks.  
On average, a stress-tested bank holds substantially larger derivatives positions 
than a typical bank in the main sample. Stress-tested banks’ interest rate derivatives 
held for trading and derivatives traded in the OTC increased sharply in the last two 
quarters of 2008 and leveled off afterwards.  
The statistics of the dependent variables and key independent variables are 
presented in Panel A and Panel B of Table 3.1, respectively.  
Due to the data availability of 157 banks in the main sample, the sample used for 
systemic risk analysis includes 3591 quarter-bank observations, while the sample used 
for bank-risk and bank-performance analysis includes 3905 quarter-bank observations. 
As presented in Panel A of Table 3.1, on average, a bank in the main sample has a 
△CoVaR of -2.8 percent, marginal expected shortfall (MES) of -3.5 percent, and an 
industry beta of 0.8 (benchmarked against S&P Banks Selected Industry Index). 
△CoVaR varies between -19.4 and 7.3 percent, while MES spreads over a wider range 




Table 3. 1 Summary Statistics 
Panel A       
Dependent Variables Obs Mean Median SD Min Max 
△CoVaR  3591 -0.0277 -0.0228 0.0214 -0.1942 0.0726 
MES 3591 -0.0346 -0.0262 0.0332 -0.2626 0.2407 
Banking industry beta 3591 0.7834 0.8172 0.3065 0.0016 1.9287 
Z-score 3905 3.4515 2.0772 4.3089 -1.0847 32.5934 
Distance to default  3905 2.9638 2.7284 1.6649 0.0485 14.6817 
Volatility 3905 0.0274 0.0213 0.0182 0.0052 0.2364 
Tobin’s Q 3905 1.0418 1.0094 0.2546 0.4371 4.1912 
ROA 3905 0.0064 0.0087 0.0147 -0.1511 0.1779 
Cost to income  3905 0.6749 0.6468 0.2293 0.2500 3.9750 
 
This table presents the statistics of the variables calculated from the 157 banks in the sample using 
quarterly data from 2007Q1 to 2014Q4. Statistics of the dependent variables are presented in Panel A. 
△CoVaR is the difference between Value at Risk of the banking system conditional on the distress of a 
bank and Value at Risk of the banking system conditional on the median state of the bank. MES is a 
bank’s marginal expected shortfall calculated as the average return of a bank on days when the S&P 
Banks Selected Industry Index return is among its lowest 5 percent level. Banking industry beta is 
calculated as the sensitivity of stock return to the return of the banking industry index in a one-year time 
window. The Z-score is the sum of the mean return on assets and the mean ratios of equity to assets, 
divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets. Distance to default is defined as the market 
value of total assets minus the sum of short-term debt and half of the long-term debt, then divided by the 
volatility of the market value of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of a bank’s assets over 
the book value of assets. ROA is the return on assets defined as the ratio of net income to book value of 
total assets. Cost to Income is the ratio of operating cost to net interest income, which measures banks’ 





Table 3.1 Summary Statistics (Cont’d)  
 
Panel B       
Key Independent Variables Obs Mean Median SD Min Max 
IRDs trading 3905 0.4623 0.0000 3.2666 0.0000 51.1553 
IRDs hedging 3905 0.0457 0.0105 0.1039 0.0000 1.5314 
Net CDs 3905 0.0002 0.0000 0.0057 -0.0640 0.1217 
IRDs OTC 3905 0.4125 0.0112 2.7447 -0.0329 42.3556 
IRDs Exchange 3905 0.0184 0.0000 0.1028 -0.0359 1.4426 
Loan to depository institutions 3591 0.1594 0.0000 1.0737 0.0000 20.6614 
Balance due from depository institutions 3591 0.0096 0.0000 0.0521 -0.0208 1.0346 
Size 3905 8.7597 8.3724 1.4868 6.5965 14.7603 
Loan loss provision 3905 0.1991 0.0900 0.3382 -0.6409 4.9213 
Tier 1 ratio 3905 0.0929 0.0914 0.0193 0.0313 0.1937 
Exposure to housing price change 3905 -0.0016 -0.0017 0.0238 -0.0989 0.0849 
HHI index 3905 6.5697 6.6127 0.5251 3.4417 8.0995 
 
Statistics of the key explanatory variables are presented in Panel B. IRDs trading is defined as the 
notional amount of interest rate derivatives held for trading purposes scaled by asset. IRDs hedging is 
defined as the notional amount of interest rate derivatives held not for trading purposes scaled by asset. 
Net CDs is defined as the credit derivatives bought minus credits derivatives sold OTC, then scaled by 
asset. IRDs OTC is the notional amount of net long positions in interest rate derivatives traded OTC 
scaled by asset. IRDs exchange is the notional amount of net long positions in interest rate derivatives 
traded on exchanges scaled by asset. Size is calculated as the logarithm of total assets. Loan to 
depository institutions is the ratio of Loan to depository institutions to total loans and leases in percentage. 
Balance due from depository institutions is the ratio of Balance due from depository institutions to total 
loans and leases in percentage. Loan loss provision is the ratio of loan loss provision to net interest 
income. Tier 1 ratio is tier 1 capital as a percentage of total risk-weighted assets. Exposure to housing 
price change is calculated as average weighted housing price changes derived by using the proportion of 
deposits a bank has in each state. HHI index is the logarithm value of the average weighted Herfindahl-












Table 3.1 Panel C presents the mean and median of all dependent variables in Pre-DFA and Post-DFA periods 
respectively. Panel D presents the mean and median of derivatives use in Pre-DFA and Post-DFA periods. 
△CoVaR is the difference between Value at Risk of the banking system conditional on the distress of a bank and 
Value at Risk of the banking system conditional on the median state of the bank. MES is a bank’s marginal 
expected shortfall calculated as the average return of a bank on days when the S&P Banks Selected Industry 
Index return is among its lowest 5 percent level. Banking industry beta is calculated as the sensitivity of stock 
return to the return of the banking industry index in a one-year time window. The Z-score is the sum of the mean 
return on assets and the mean ratios of equity to assets, divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets. 
Distance to default is defined as the market value of total assets minus the sum of short-term debt and half of the 
long-term debt, then divided by the volatility of the market value of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as the market 
value of a bank’s assets over the book value of assets. ROA is the return on assets defined as the ratio of net 
income to book value of total assets. Cost to Income is the ratio of operating cost to net interest income, which 
measures banks’ operating efficiency. IRDs trading is defined as the notional amount of interest rate derivatives 
held for trading purposes scaled by asset. IRDs hedging is defined as the notional amount of interest rate 
derivatives held not for trading purposes scaled by asset. Net CDs is defined as the credit derivatives bought 
minus credits derivatives sold OTC, then scaled by asset. IRDs OTC is the notional amount of net long positions 
in interest rate derivatives traded OTC scaled by asset. IRDs exchange is the notional amount of net long positions 
in interest rate derivatives traded on exchanges scaled by asset.  
Dependent variables 











△CoVaR  -0.0339 -0.0226 0.0113***  -0.0291 -0.0192 0.0099*** 
MES -0.0455 -0.0258 0.0197***  -0.0366 -0.0230 0.0136*** 
Banking industry beta 0.7595 0.8028 0.0433***  0.7548 0.8459 0.0911*** 
Z-score 3.9934 3.0566 -0.9368***  2.6408 1.6154 -1.0253*** 
Distance to default  2.0864 3.6032 1.5169***  1.8610 3.6381 1.7771*** 
Volatility 0.0374 0.0201 -0.0173***  0.0318 0.0163 -0.0155*** 
Tobin’s Q 1.0033 1.0698 0.0664 ***  0.9862 1.0284 0.0422*** 
ROA 0.0035 0.0084 0.0050***  0.0071 0.0093 0.0022*** 
Cost to income  0.6846 0.6678 -0.0169**   0.6385 0.6544 0.0159*** 
Derivatives use  
by banks 











IRDs trading 0.6216 0.3463 -0.2753***  0.0000 0.0121 0.0121 
IRDs hedging 0.0477 0.0443 -0.0034  0.0077 0.0000 -0.0077*** 
Net CDs 0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0007***  0.0000 0.0146 0.0146 
IRDs OTC 0.5393 0.3201 -0.2192***  0.0062 0.0000 -0.0062*** 
IRDs Exchange 0.0218 0.0160 -0.0059**  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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In terms of banks’ risk and bank performance, a typical bank, on average, has a Z-
score of 3.5, Distance to Default of 2.96, Volatility of 2.74 percent, return on assets of 
0.64 percent, cost to income of 0.67, and Tobin’s Q of 1.04. These measures also vary 
widely. For example, Z-score ranges between -1.08 and 32.6, Distance to Default varies 
between 0.05 to 14.68, and Tobin’s Q spreads over a larger range between 0.44 and 
4.19. As shown in Table 3.1, Panel C, the means and medians of all dependent variables 
are statistically different in pre-DFA period and post-DFA period.  
With regard to banks’ derivatives use, it can be found in Panel B of Table 3.1 that 
the average interest rate derivatives holding for hedging and for trading (scaled by a 
bank’s assets) are 4.6 percent and 46 percent, respectively. Derivatives held for trading 
vary markedly between 0 and 51.2 percent, while net credit derivatives spread between 
-6.4 and 12.2 percent. Panel D of Table 3.1 presents the mean and median of derivatives 
use by banks in pre- and post-DFA periods. It can be found that, overall, the average 
use of both interest rate derivatives and credit derivatives by banks declined after the 
signing of the DFA.  
On average, a bank has an average size, calculated as the logarithm of its total asset, 
of 8.76, a tier 1 risk capital ratio of 9.29 percent, and loan loss provision of 19.9 percent. 
The average loan to depository institutions (scaled by gross loans and leases) is 0.16 
percent, and the average balance due from depository institutions (scaled by gross loans 
and leases) is 0.01 percent. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Derivatives, DFA, and systemic risk 
I investigate (H3-1a), (H3-1b), and (H3-1c) with three measures of systemic risk: 
(1)△CoVaR, (2) Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), and (3) industry beta. △CoVaR is 
the difference between the financial system’s VaR conditional on bank i’s being in 
distress and the financial system’s VaR in the median state of bank i. Bank i’s MES is 
its mean return on days when the S&P Banks Selected Industry Index return reaches its 
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lowest 5 percent level over a quarter period. Bank i’s industry beta captures the 
sensitivity of its stock returns to the returns of the S&P Banks Selected Industry Index 
over a one-year period. Recall that △CoVaR and MES have negative mean and median 
values (see Panel A Table 3.1). A lower value (negative) of △CoVaR and MES and a 
higher industry beta indicate a higher marginal contribution by bank i to systemic risk. 
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 report the systemic regression results for Equation (3.4). 
Bank-quarter observations have both a time series and a cross-sectional dimension. I 
estimate Equation (3.4) as a panel regression and control for firm and time fixed effects. 
In each regression in Table 3.2, three measures of derivatives categorized by holding 
purposes (then scaled by a bank’s assets) are employed, while each regression in Table 
3.3 reports regressions with measures of derivatives categorized by trading approaches 
(then scaled by a bank’s assets). In both Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, Columns (1), (2), and 
(3), respectively, show the effects of derivatives holdings, without considering the DFA, 
on △CoVaR, MES, and industry beta. Columns (4), (5), and (6), respectively, extend 
columns (1), (2), and (3); each features the dummy, PostDFA, and three interaction 
terms between derivative categories and PostDFA.  
As shown in Table 3.2, interest rate derivatives holdings for hedging (IRDs hedging) 
is significant in every estimated model. Its negative (positive) coefficients in columns 
(1), (2), (and (3)), when △CoVaR and MES (industry beta) were used to capture 
systemic risk indicate that its use results in a larger contribution to systemic risk. This 
finding is consistent with hypothesis (H3-1a) that banks’ holdings of derivatives 
increased their contribution to systemic risk.  
IRDs trading is marginally significant when △CoVaR is the dependent variable 
(column (1)), suggesting that interest rate derivatives for trading by banks also increases 
systemic risk. However, its effect is much smaller compared with the effect of IRDs 
hedging. IRDs trading becomes insignificant when PostDFA is added to the models.   
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Table 3. 2 Effects of Derivatives Use and DFA on Systemic Risk 
 
The dependent variables in the regressions are change in conditional Value at Risk at 95 percent (△CoVaR), 
marginal expected shortfall at 95 percent (MES) and banking industry beta (Bank beta) calculated using one year 
of daily stock price. IRDs trading is the notional amount of interest rate derivatives held for trading purposes 
scaled by asset. IRDs hedging is defined as the notional amount of interest rate derivatives held not for trading 
purposes scaled by asset. Net CDs is defined as the credit derivatives bought minus credits derivatives sold, then 
scaled by asset. Loan to depository institutions is the ratio of Loan to depository institutions to total loans and leases. 
Balance due from depository institutions is the ratio of Balance due from depository institutions to total loans and 
leases. PostDFA is a dummy set to one after the Dodd-Frank Act is singed and zero otherwise. Size is calculated 
as the logarithm of total assets. Exposure to housing price change is a weighted average of the returns on the 
state-specific Fannie Mae real estate index where the weights are the fraction of bank deposits in the various 
states. HHI index is a weighted average of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index where the weights are the fraction of 
bank deposits in the various states. Special capital is a dummy set to one if the bank uses any of the government 
bailout special capital programs. Acquisition is a dummy set to one if the bank acquires other banks in that quarter. 
For brevity reasons, time fixed effects and firm fixed effects are not reported. Standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity-consistent. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 △CoVaR MES Bank beta △CoVaR MES Bank beta 
IRDs trading -0.0003* -0.0001 0.0045 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0042 
IRDs hedging -0.0112* -0.0108* 0.2138*** -0.0148*** -0.0188** 0.2201*** 
Net CDs -0.0638 -0.1220* 0.6413 -0.2040*** -0.2476*** 1.5666* 
Loan to depository institutions 0.1178 0.2701 0.5246 0.0920 0.2145 0.3651 
Balance due from depository institutions 0.6975** -1.1726* 2.3435 0.7721*** -1.1318** 1.4668 
Post DFA dummy    0.0075*** -0.0136*** -0.2212*** 
IRDs trading* PostDFA    -0.0001 -0.0004* 0.0038 
IRDs hedging * PostDFA    0.0117*** 0.0307*** -0.0823 
Net CDs * PostDFA    0.4789*** 0.3290*** -2.6399 
Size 0.0004 -0.0060** 0.2099*** 0.0003 -0.0061** 0.2099*** 
Tier 1 ratio -0.0187 -0.0469 1.6703*** -0.0200 -0.0504 1.6812*** 
Loan Loss Provision -0.0021*** -0.0060*** 0.0132 -0.0019*** -0.0057*** 0.0129 
Book-to-market ratio -0.0001 0.0022** -0.0338*** -0.0001 0.0021** -0.0338*** 
Return on average assets -0.0162 -0.0027 0.2777 -0.0145 0.0006 0.2750 
Short-term borrowing -0.0849*** -0.0758** -0.1397 -0.0815*** -0.0667** -0.1382 
Stock volatility -0.1338*** -0.3969*** 8.8313*** -0.1227*** -0.3787*** 8.7930*** 
Acquisition 0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0425*** 0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0421*** 
Special capital users dummy -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0014 
Exposure to housing price change 0.0076 0.0719** -0.1422 0.0062 0.0698** -0.1354 
HHI index 0.0015 0.0041 0.0022 0.0011 0.0039 0.0011 
Intercept -0.0352 0.0242 -1.0321** -0.0318 0.0275 -1.0256** 
Adj.R-squared 0.626 0.610 0.405 0.630 0.612 0.406 
N 3591 3591 3591 3591 3591 3591 
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Without considering the DFA, Net CDs is marginally significant in column (2) 
when MES is employed to capture systemic risk. However, it is significant in columns 
(4), (5) and (6) which feature PostDFA and the interaction terms. Consistent with 
hypothesis (H3-1a), these results indicate that the use of credit derivatives raises banks’ 
contribution to systemic risk without considering the effects of the DFA. It can be also 
noticed that the effects of credit derivatives (Net CDs) on banks’ contribution to 
systemic risk are stronger than those of interest rate derivatives (IRDs trading and IRDs 
hedging) without considering the effects of the DFA. 
Overall, interest rate derivatives held for hedging are the only category which is 
significant in every estimated model. Net credit derivatives (Net CDs) exhibit the 
significant effect when the DFA and interaction terms are included. Interest rate 
derivatives held for trading show the weakest impact on systemic risk. The effects of 
significant derivatives variables are consistent with hypothesis (H3-1a) that derivatives 
use raises banks’ contribution to systemic risk without considering the effects of the 
DFA and in line with the findings of Calmes and Theoret (2010) and Nijskens and 
Wagner (2010) that banks’ use of derivatives led to higher systemic risk. 
PostDFA represents the period after the DFA came into effect. It is significant in 
all three columns (4), (5), and (6). However, the coefficient of PostDFA flips sign when 
MES is the dependent variable (column (5)). None of columns (4), (5), and (6) features 
all three significant interaction terms between derivatives holdings and PostDFA. The 
two interaction terms between Net CDs, IRDs hedging, and PostDFA are significant 
when △CoVaR and MES are used to capture systemic risk. The positive coefficient 
signs in columns (4) and (5) support hypothesis (H3-1c) that the implementation of the 
DFA reduces, even reversed, the exacerbating effects of these derivatives on systemic 
risk, although the interaction terms between IRDs trading and PostDFA feature no 
significant coefficients in column (4). The results on interest rate derivatives for 
hedging are consistent with Li and Marinč (2017), while the findings on credit 
derivatives and the DFA show contrary results. Then I employ all the estimated 
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coefficients and means of all independent variables to predict the level of systemic risk 
measures in pre- and post-DFA periods. I document that the estimated △CoVaR 
increased from -0.033 to -0.019, estimated MES increased from -0.036 to -0.024, and 
Bank beta decreased from 0.988 to 0.841. These findings are consistent with hypothesis 
(H3-1b) that the implementation of the DFA lowers banks’ contribution to systemic risk 
caused by derivatives.  
Overall, the results in Table 3.2 confirm hypotheses (H3-1a) and (H3-1c) for two 
out of the three derivatives categories examined (credit derivatives and interest rate 
derivatives for hedging) and partly support hypothesis (H3-1b). However, the 
insignificant results on IRDs trading as well as the interaction terms between IRDs 
trading and PostDFA did not provide supportive evidence for the effectiveness of the 
proprietary trading approach by the Volcker Rule of the DFA.  
In addition to the three derivatives variables discussed above, loan to depositary 
institutions and balances due from depository institutions also capture the extent of 
interconnectedness among banks. Loan to depositary institutions is not significant in 
any of the models, which is consistent with Mayordomo, Rodriguez-Moreno, and Pena 
(2014), while balances due from depository institutions is significant in four out of six 
columns (columns (1), (2), (4), and (5)). However, the coefficient sign in columns (1) 
and (4) is not consistent with the coefficient sign in columns (2) and (5). If MES is a 
more relevant measure than △CoVaR to capture systemic risk, then its negative sign in 
columns (2) and (5) suggests a higher degree of systemic risk.  
Adding PostDFA and the interaction terms in columns (4), (5), and (6) in Table 3.2 
does not change the significance of any control variables (compared with columns (1), 
(2), and (3)). The volatility of stock returns is the only variable which is significant in 
every model in Table 3.2. Short-term borrowing and loan loss provision are significant 
in four out of six models (columns (1), (2), (4), and (5)). As expected, the negative sign 
of the coefficients of these three variables, when significant, indicates that a higher 
degree of uncertainty, insufficient liquid assets, and poor asset quality increase systemic 
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risk. Bank size is significant in four out of six models (columns (2), (3), (5), and (6)). 
Book-to-market ratio, Tier 1 risk ratio, and the dummy acquisition are significant in 
columns (3) and (6). The results suggest that large banks, healthier banks (higher Tier 
1 risk ratio), or those with a small book-to-market ratio are more likely to do business 
with a number of financial institutions and thereby raise systemic risk. The coefficient 
of exposure to housing price change is significant and positive in columns (2) and (5). 
Considering that both the mean and median of exposure to housing price change are 
negative, its positive coefficient suggests, on average, high exposure to the real estate 
market increases systemic risk. In contrast, acquisitions is found to diminish banks’ 
systemic risk, but only when Bank Beta is employed in columns (3) and (6).  
Table 3.3 presents the results with derivatives categorized by trading approaches 
of OTC or on exchanges. As shown in Table 3.3, without considering the DFA, interest 
rate derivatives traded on exchanges (IRDs exchange) is significant when industry beta 
is used to capture systemic risk (model 3). It is significant in columns (4) and (6) when 
PostDFA and the interaction terms were added. Its negative (positive) coefficients when 
△CoVaR (industry beta) were used to capture systemic risk indicate that derivatives 
traded on exchanges result in a larger contribution to systemic risk. This finding is 
consistent with hypothesis (H3-1a) that derivatives use by banks increase their 
contribution to systemic risk. On the other hand, none of the models in Table 3.3 
features significance for the coefficient of IRDs OTC. 
Net CDs is significant in columns (4), (5) and (6) in Table 3.3, where the PostDFA 
dummy and interaction terms are added. In addition, Net CDs shows marginal 
significance in column (2). Its negative coefficient sign in columns (4), (5) and positive 
coefficient sign in column (6) suggests that the use of OTC-traded credit derivatives 
raises banks’ contribution to systemic risk without considering the effects of the DFA, 
which is consistent with the findings in Table 3.2 and hypothesis (H3-1a) about the 
positive effect of derivatives use on banks’ contribution to systemic risk. 
Overall, in the presence of PostDFA and the respective interaction terms, interest 
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rate derivatives traded on exchanges (IRDs exchange) significantly increase banks’ 
contribution to systemic risk without considering the effects of the DFA, while interest 
rate derivatives traded OTC (IRDs OTC) presents insignificant effects. Credit 
derivatives traded OTC (Net CDs) are found to raise systemic risk without considering 
the effects of the DFA, and such effects are reversed in post-DFA period. 
As shown in Table 3.3, the interaction term between IRDs OTC and PostDFA is 
marginally significant only when industry beta is used to capture systemic risk (column 
(6)). The positive coefficient sign, however, suggests that after the implementation of 
the DFA, IRDs OTC marginally increases systemic risk, which is contrary to hypothesis 
(H3-1c) that the DFA limited the impacts of derivatives on banks’ contribution to 
systemic risk. The interaction term between IRDs exchange and PostDFA is also 
marginally significant in column (6) but with a negative sign, which suggests that the 
implementation of the DFA marginally mitigated the exacerbating effect of interest rate 
derivatives traded on exchanges on systemic risk. The two interaction terms between 
Net CDs and PostDFA are significant when △CoVaR and MES are used to capture 
systemic risk. The positive signs in columns (4) and (5) together with relatively greater 
coefficient magnitudes suggest that the DFA reversed the negative effects of credit 
derivatives on banks’ systemic risk, which support hypothesis (H3-1c) that the 
implementation of the DFA reduces the exacerbating effects of credit derivatives traded 




Table 3. 3 Effects of Derivatives Use and DFA on Systemic Risk  
 
The dependent variables in the regressions are change in conditional Value at Risk at 95 percent (△CoVaR), marginal 
expected shortfall at 95 percent (MES), and banking industry beta (Bank beta) calculated using one year of daily stock 
price. IRDs OTC is the notional amount of net long positions in interest rate derivatives traded OTC scaled by asset. 
IRDs exchange is the notional amount of net long positions in interest rate derivatives traded on exchange scaled by 
asset. Net CDs is defined as the credit derivatives bought minus credits derivative sold, then scaled by asset. Loan to 
depository institutions is the ratio of Loan to depository institutions to total loans and leases. Balance due from depository 
institutions is the ratio of Balance due from depository institutions to total loans and leases. PostDFA is a dummy set to 
one after the Dodd-Frank Act is issued and zero otherwise. Size is calculated as the logarithm of total assets. Exposure 
to housing price change is a weighted average of the returns on the state-specific Fannie Mae real estate index where 
the weights are the fraction of bank deposits in the various states. HHI index is a weighted average of the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index where the weights are the fraction of bank deposits in the various states. Special capital is a dummy 
set to one if the bank uses any of the government bailout special capital programs. Acquisition is a dummy set to one 
if the bank acquires other banks in that quarter. For brevity reasons, time fixed effects and firm fixed effects are not 
reported. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 △CoVaR MES Bank beta △CoVaR MES Bank beta 
IRDs OTC -0.0003 0.0001 0.0036 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0075 
IRDs exchange -0.0140 -0.0123 0.1994** -0.0223** -0.0187 0.2757** 
Net CDs  -0.0671 -0.1340* 0.7402 -0.1803*** -0.2152*** 1.1545** 
Loan to depository institutions 0.1353 0.2853 0.2150 0.1224 0.2738 -0.0052 
Balance due from depository institutions 0.7257* -1.1374* 1.7687 0.8241** -1.0674 0.6571 
Post DFA dummy    0.0078*** -0.0124*** -0.2223*** 
IRDs OTC * PostDFA    -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0133* 
IRDs exchange * PostDFA    0.0091 0.0070 -0.1783* 
Net CDs * PostDFA    0.4456*** 0.3231*** -1.6348 
Size 0.0003 -0.0060** 0.2101*** 0.0003 -0.0060** 0.2081*** 
Tier 1 ratio -0.0184 -0.0468 1.6582*** -0.0191 -0.0473 1.6671*** 
Loan Loss Provision -0.0021*** -0.0060*** 0.0133 -0.0020*** -0.0059*** 0.0141 
Book-to-market ratio -0.0000 0.0022** -0.0343*** -0.0001 0.0022** -0.0346*** 
Return on average assets -0.0153 -0.0019 0.2607 -0.0147 -0.0015 0.2719 
Short-term borrowing -0.0869*** -0.0774** -0.1029 -0.0875*** -0.0777** -0.0603 
Stock volatility -0.1364*** -0.3996*** 8.8784*** -0.1304*** -0.3951*** 8.8677*** 
Acquisition 0.0009 -0.0000 -0.0463*** 0.0010 0.0000 -0.0461*** 
Special capital users dummy -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0007 
Exposure to housing price change 0.0065 0.0708** -0.1241 0.0058 0.0703** -0.1312 
HHI index 0.0017 0.0043 -0.0007 0.0013 0.0039 -0.0022 
Intercept -0.0362 0.0234 -1.0075** -0.0332 0.0257 -0.9841** 
Adj.R-squared 0.625 0.610 0.402 0.628 0.610 0.404 
N 3591 3591 3591 3591 3591 3591 
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Overall, the results on interest rate derivatives traded on exchanges, credit 
derivatives (traded OTC), and their interaction terms in Table 3.3 confirm hypothesis 
(H3-1a), and (H3-1c), while the results on interest rate derivatives traded OTC show 
they have insignificant impacts on systemic risk without considering the effects of the 
DFA. However, the interaction term between IRDs OTC and PostDFA indicates that 
after the signing of the DFA, interest rate derivatives traded OTC (IRDs OTC) 
marginally increased systemic risk when industry beta in used to capture systemic risk. 
The findings on Net CDs provide supportive evidence that the central clearing channel 
of the DFA effectively lowered banks’ systemic risk associated with credit derivatives 
traded OTC. On the other hand, the findings on IRDs OTC suggest that the central 
clearing channel of the DFA did not work out appropriately for interest rate derivatives 
traded OTC. All the other control variables in Table 3.3 present consistent significance 
and signs as in Table 3.2. 
As previously discussed in Section 3.3.1, to deal with potential bias caused by 
using the CoVaR as the measure of contribution to systemic risk, I also run regressions 
within a subsample of big banks. By doing this, it allows to eliminate the bias caused 
by same banks that have similar return correlation to the banking sector like big banks. 
I document consistent results that banks’ use of interest rate derivatives for hedging 
(IRDs hedging), traded on exchanged (IRDs exchange), and credit derivatives (Net CDs) 
increased their contribution to systemic risk without considering the effects of the DFA; 
the DFA effectively mitigated, even reversed, the impacts of these derivatives on banks’ 
systemic risk.52  
3.5.2 Derivatives, DFA, and banks’ risk 
I investigate (H3-2a), (H3-2b), (H3-2c), and (H3-3) with three measures of bank 
risk: (1) Z-score, as calculated by Laeven and Levine (2009); (2) distance to default; (3) 
stock volatility. Z-score, calculated by using the data of the past 16 quarters, and 
                                                             
52 The result table for big banks is presented in Appendix 3.3, Panel A. Details of the results are discussed 
in Section 3.6.1. 
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distance to default capture banks’ credit risk. Volatility of stock return captures banks’ 
overall risk and is calculated by using six-month daily stock return data.  
Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 report the regression results for Equation (3.8). Columns 
(1), (2), and (3) respectively, show the effects of derivatives categories, without 
considering the DFA, on Z-score, distance to default, and stock volatility. Columns (4), 
(5), and (6), respectively, extend columns (1), (2), (3) by adding PostDFA and three 
interaction terms between three derivatives categories and PostDFA.  
As shown in Table 3.4, without considering the DFA, Net CDs is significant in 
column (1) and column (3). The negative sign of the Net CDs’ coefficient in column (1) 
suggests that the use of credit derivatives lowers banks’ Z-score and raises banks’ credit 
risk. Consistently, the positive sign of the Net CDs’ coefficient in column (3) suggests 
the use of credit derivatives increases banks’ overall risk. These findings are consistent 
with hypothesis (H3-2b) that credit derivatives increase banks’ risk and in line with 
Keppo and Korte (2016). IRDs trading is significant in columns (3) and (6) with a 
negative sign. Considering the insignificant coefficient of its interaction with PostDFA 
in column (6), this finding suggests that the use of interest rate derivatives for trading 
lowers banks’ stock volatility and does not support hypothesis (H3-2a) that both IRDs 





Table 3. 4 Effects of Derivatives Use and DFA on Banks’ Risk 
 
The dependent variables in the regressions are Z-score, distance to default, and six-month stock price 
volatility. For brevity reasons, time fixed effects and firm fixed effects are not reported. IRDs trading 
is the notional amount of interest rate derivatives held for trading purposes scaled by asset. IRDs 
hedging is defined as the notional amount of interest rate derivatives held not for trading purposes 
scaled by asset. Net CDs is defined as the credit derivatives bought minus credits derivative sold, then 
scaled by asset. PostDFA is a dummy set to one after the Dodd-Frank Act is issued and zero otherwise. 
Size is calculated as the logarithm of total assets. Exposure to housing price change is a weighted 
average of the returns on the state-specific Fannie Mae real estate index where the weights are the 
fraction of bank deposits in the various states. HHI index is a weighted average of the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index where the weights are the fraction of bank deposits in the various states. Special 
capital is a dummy set to one if the bank uses any of the government bailout special capital programs. 
Acquisition is a dummy set to one if the bank acquires other banks in that quarter. For brevity reasons, 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







IRDs trading -0.0534 0.0018 -0.0002* -0.0563 0.0048 -0.0004*** 
IRDs hedging -0.9677 -0.2788 0.0029 -0.9115 -0.1977 0.0069** 
Net CDs -16.7251** -7.8770 0.0937*** -12.6877 -16.1080*** 0.1527*** 
PostDFA     -6.3159*** -3.2599*** 0.0191*** 
IRDs trading * PostDFA    0.0145 -0.0346*** -0.0000 
IRDs hedging * PostDFA    -0.4083 0.2864 -0.0121** 
Net CDs * PostDFA    -11.9843 24.7365*** -0.2108*** 
Size 0.7190 0.6475*** -0.0039** 0.7195 0.6501*** -0.0037** 
Tier 1 ratio -12.4058* 5.3142** -0.1281*** -12.3644* 5.2740** -0.1259*** 
Loan Loss Provision -0.0815 -0.1855*** 0.0046*** -0.0830 -0.1889*** 0.0044*** 
Book-to-market ratio 0.0445 0.0927* 0.0065*** 0.0442 0.0950* 0.0065*** 
Return on assets   -0.0270*   -0.0292** 
Short-term borrowing 9.7799** -3.6256** 0.0303*** 9.7641** -3.8473** 0.0255** 
Stock volatility 6ms -9.0371 -20.0225***  -9.2334 -19.8870***  
Acquisition -0.3102 -0.0289 -0.0003 -0.3086 -0.0274 -0.0002 
Special capital users dummy -0.0008 -0.0176 0.0010** -0.0038 -0.0170 0.0008* 
Exposure to housing price change -6.0749 -1.3222 -0.0195 -6.0373 -1.3522 -0.0180 
HHI index 0.3232 -0.1134 0.0003 0.3228 -0.0983 0.0006 
Intercept 0.9926 0.8133 0.0517*** 0.9879 0.6907 0.0476*** 
Adj.R-squared 0.388 0.589 0.824 0.388 0.590 0.826 
N 3905 3905 3905 3905 3905 3905 
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As PostDFA and the three interaction terms are added in column (4), (5), and (6) 
in Table 3.4, Net CDs is significantly negative (positive) in column (5) (column (6)), 
suggesting the use of credit derivatives lowers (increases) banks’ distance to default 
(stock volatility) and therefore increase banks’ credit risk (overall risk) without 
considering the effects of the DFA. IRDs hedging is only significant in column (6). The 
positive coefficient sign of IRDs hedging in column (6) suggests that holdings of 
interest rate derivatives for hedging lead to higher banks’ overall risk, as measured by 
stock volatility without considering the effects of the DFA. This result is in line with 
Deng, Elyasiani, and Mao (2017), Ghosh (2017), Titova, Penikas, and Gomayun (2018) 
and can be explained by the fact that banks are likely to hedge risk just in order to take 
more risks and earn higher economic rents. 
In Table 3.4, the interaction term between IRDs hedging and PostDFA is significant 
in column (6). Its negative coefficient sign with a greater magnitude indicates that the 
signing of the DFA reversed the exacerbating effects of interest rate derivatives for 
hedging on banks’ volatility. The interaction term between IRDs trading and PostDFA 
is significant in column (5), and the negative coefficient sign suggests that after the 
implementation of the DFA, banks’ use of interest rate derivatives for trading induced 
higher credit risk, as measured by distance to default. The interaction term between Net 
CDs and PostDFA is significant in columns (5) and (6), and the magnitudes of the 
coefficients for credit derivatives and its interaction term with PostDFA are found to be 
much larger than those of the coefficients of Net CDs. These findings indicate that 
implementation of the DFA reversed the effects of credit derivatives on banks’ risk.  
PostDFA is significant in all three models in Table 3.4 (columns (4), (5) and (6)). 
It shows significantly negative coefficient in columns (4) and (5) and significantly 
positive coefficient in column (6). In order to test hypothesis (H3-3), again, I predict 
the mean level of banks’ risks in the pre- and post-DFA periods by using estimated 
coefficients of all independent variables together with their means. I found that lower 
estimated Z-score, with higher Distance to Default and lower Volatility after the 
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commencement of the DFA. These mixed results cannot confirm hypothesis (H3-3) that 
the DFA increased banks’ risks; only the findings with Z-score is in line with Chung, 
Keppo, and Yuan (2016). Overall, the empirical evidence in Table 3.4 is consistent with 
hypothesis (H3-2b). The results on IRDs trading do not support hypothesis (H3-2a).  
Adding PostDFA and the interaction terms in columns (4), (5), and (6) in Table 3.4 
does not change the significance of any control variables (compared with columns (1), 
(2), and (3)). Table 3.4 features only two significant control variables in all models, 
namely, tier 1 ratio and short-term borrowing. However, for both variables, the 
coefficient sign in columns (1) and (4) is not consistent with the findings in other 
models. Results in columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) suggest that short-term borrowing 
increased banks’ credit risk and overall risk as measured by distance to default and stock 
volatility, respectively. The coefficient of tier 1 ratio in columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) 
suggest that banks with higher tier 1 ratio are likely to experience lower credit and 
overall risk. Loan loss provisions is significant in columns (2), (3), (5), and (6). Its 
negative coefficient sign in columns (2) and (5) and positive sign in columns (3) and 
(6) suggests that banks with poor asset quality (loan loss provisions) tend to experience 
higher credit risk, and overall risk. Book-to-market ratio is found statistically 
significant and positive in column (2), (3), (5) and (6), which indicates that banks with 
higher book-to-market ratio are likely to have lower credit risk (distance to default) but 
higher overall risk (stock volatility). The significantly negative coefficient sign of stock 
volatility in columns (2) and (5) indicates that banks with higher stock returns volatility 
are likely to get higher credit risk. Return on assets and the special capital program 
dummy are significant only in columns (3) and (6) when stock volatility is used to 
capture banks’ risk. Banks which achieve lower profitability (return on assets) and 
those which use one of the special capital programs or the discount window borrowing 
show more volatility and higher overall risk. Total assets (size) is significant in (2), (3), 
(5) and (6). Large banks exhibit lower credit risk measured by distance to default, and 
show a lower degree of volatility in their stock returns. Exposures to real estate market 
is not significant in any model.  
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Table 3.5 presents the results on banks’ risk with derivatives categorized by trading 
approach of OTC and exchanges. Without considering the DFA, IRDs OTC is 
significant in column (3) with a negative coefficient sign, which suggests banks with 
more IRDs OTC exhibit lower stock volatility and overall risk. IRDs exchange is 
significant in column (2), and its negative coefficient sign indicates that the use of 
exchange-traded interest rate derivatives increases banks’ credit risk (proxied by lower 
distance to default). The findings on interest rate derivatives provide evidence against 
hypothesis (H3-2c) that OTC derivatives increased banks’ risk. Net CDs is significantly 
negative in columns (1), (2) and significantly positive in column (3), suggesting that 
banks’ use of credit derivatives traded OTC raises credit risk (lower Z-score and 
distance to default) and overall risk (higher volatility). These findings on credit 
derivatives support hypothesis (H3-2c) that derivatives trade OTC raised banks’ risk.  
Adding PostDFA and the three interaction terms in Table 3.5 does not change the 
significance and sign for IRDs OTC and Net CDs, while IRDs exchange becomes 
significant in column (6). The positive sign in column (6) show that the use of interest 
rate derivatives traded on exchanges increases banks’ overall risk taking into account 
that its interaction term is insignificant in column (6). The PostDFA dummy is 
significant in all three models in Table 3.5 (columns (4), (5), and (6)). These predicted 
results for pre- and post-DFA periods with estimated coefficients of all independent 
variables, again, do not entirely support hypothesis (H3-3) that the implementation of 
the DFA increased banks’ risk.  
137 
 
 Table 3. 5 Effects of Derivatives Use and DFA on Banks’ Risk 
 
The dependent variables in the regressions are Z-score, distance to default, and six-month stock price volatility. 
IRDs OTC is the notional amount of net long positions in interest rate derivatives traded OTC scaled by asset. IRDs 
exchange is the notional amount of net long positions in interest rate derivatives traded on exchange scaled by asset. 
Net CDs is defined as the credit derivatives bought minus credits derivative sold, then scaled by asset. PostDFA is 
a dummy set to one after the Dodd-Frank Act is issued and zero otherwise. Size is calculated as the logarithm of 
total assets. Exposure to housing price change is a weighted average of the returns on the state-specific Fannie Mae 
real estate index where the weights are the fraction of bank deposits in the various states. HHI index is a weighted 
average of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index where the weights are the fraction of bank deposits in the various states. 
Special capital is a dummy set to one if the bank uses any of the government bailout special capital programs. 
Acquisition is a dummy set to one if the bank acquires other banks in that quarter. For brevity reasons, time fixed 
effects and firm fixed effects are not reported. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent. 
 
  








IRDs OTC  -0.0122 0.0104 -0.0003** -0.0504 0.0275 -0.0004*** 
IRDs exchange -0.4084 -0.7197** 0.0013 -1.1612 -0.3656 0.0074* 
Net CDs  -20.4831** -8.0379* 0.0951*** -13.7031 -17.6023*** 0.1294*** 
Post DFA dummy    -6.3530*** -3.2405*** 0.0187*** 
IRDs OTC * PostDFA    -0.0724 -0.0046 0.0001 
IRDs exchange * PostDFA    1.4775 -0.4775 -0.0055 
Net CDs * PostDFA    -19.6428 29.6189*** -0.1878*** 
Size 0.7281 0.6409*** -0.0039** 0.7355 0.6402*** -0.0037** 
Tier 1 ratio -12.3608* 5.3009** -0.1285*** -12.3524* 5.2716** -0.1279*** 
Loan Loss Provision -0.0898 -0.1855*** 0.0046*** -0.0902 -0.1892*** 0.0045*** 
Book-to-market ratio 0.0492 0.0932* 0.0065*** 0.0492 0.0947* 0.0065*** 
Return on average assets   -0.0271*   -0.0283* 
Short-term borrowing 9.6578** -3.7033** 0.0309*** 9.6502** -3.9309** 0.0299*** 
Stock volatility -9.2273 -20.1708***  -9.1606 -20.1036***  
Acquisition -0.2977 -0.0225 -0.0004 -0.2995 -0.0207 -0.0004 
Special capital users dummy -0.0011 -0.0199 0.0010** -0.0010 -0.0199 0.0009* 
Exposure to housing price change -6.0831 -1.3452 -0.0195 -6.0387 -1.3665 -0.0190 
HHI index 0.3382 -0.1086 0.0002 0.3307 -0.0980 0.0006 
Intercept 0.7551 0.8416 0.0522*** 0.7749 0.7654 0.0482*** 
Adj.R-squared 0.388 0.589 0.824 0.388 0.590 0.825 
N 3905 3905 3905 3905 3905 3905 
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As shown in Table 3.5, the interaction term between IRDs OTC and PostDFA and 
that between IRDs exchange and PostDFA are not significant. The interaction term 
between Net CDs and PostDFA is significant in columns (5), and (6). Its positive 
coefficient sign in (5) and negative coefficient sign in (6) with relatively higher 
magnitudes suggest that the signing of the DFA reversed the exacerbating effects of 
credit derivatives traded OTC on banks’ risk. 
Overall, the empirical evidence from credit derivatives (traded OTC) in Table 3.5 
are consistent with hypothesis (H3-2c). On the other hand, the findings on the 
interaction term between interest rate derivatives traded OTC and PostDFA, and the 
interaction between interest rate derivatives traded on exchange and PostDFA do not 
support (H3-2c). Other control variables are found with consistent significance and 
signs as in Table 3.4. 
3.5.3 Derivatives, DFA, and banks’ performance 
I investigate (H3-4), and (H3-5) with Tobin’s Q, return on asset, and cost-to-
income ratio. Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 report the regression results for Equation (3.9). 
Similarly, columns (1), (2), and (3) report the effects of derivatives holdings, without 
considering the DFA, and columns (4), (5), and (6) extend this by adding PostDFA and 




 Table 3. 6 Effects of Derivatives Use and DFA on Bank Performance 
 
The dependent variables in the regressions are Tobin’s Q, return on assets (ROA), and cost to income. IRDs 
trading is the notional amount of interest rate derivatives held for trading purposes scaled by asset. IRDs 
hedging is defined as the notional amount of interest rate derivatives held not for trading purposes scaled 
by asset. Net CDs is defined as the credit derivatives bought minus credits derivative sold, then scaled by 
asset. PostDFA is a dummy set to one after the Dodd-Frank Act is issued and zero otherwise. Size is 
calculated as the logarithm of total asset. Exposure to housing price change is a weighted average of the 
returns on the state-specific Fannie Mae real estate index where the weights are the fraction of bank 
deposits in the various states. HHI index is a weighted average of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index where 
the weights are the fraction of bank deposits in the various states. Special capital is a dummy set to one if 
the bank uses any of the government bailout special capital programs. Acquisition is a dummy set to one 
if the bank acquires other banks in that quarter. For brevity reasons, time fixed effects and firm fixed effects 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Tobin's Q ROA 
Cost to 
Income 
Tobin's Q ROA 
Cost to 
Income 
IRDs trading 0.0061 0.0000 -0.0013 0.0038 -0.0000 0.0006 
IRDs hedging 0.1633* -0.0076 0.0760 0.1945*** -0.0067 0.0352 
Net CDs 0.1004 0.0194 0.3066 0.0925 0.0111 0.4935 
Post DFA  
 
  0.0068 0.0036 0.0174 
IRDs trading * PostDFA 
 
  -0.0063** -0.0001 0.0060*** 
IRDs hedging * PostDFA 
 
  0.0100 -0.0007 0.0271 
Net CDs * PostDFA 
 
  -1.2917 0.0083 0.4277 
Size 0.0092 -0.0084*** -0.0447** 0.0112 -0.0083*** -0.0466** 
Tier 1 ratio -0.8435 -0.0141 -0.1301 -0.8477 -0.0141 -0.1322 






Return on average assets 0.2835  -0.8055 0.2558  -0.7755 
Short-term borrowing 0.1375 0.0150 -0.3609 0.0848 0.0136 -0.2977 
Stock volatility -1.6565*** -0.0890* 1.9464*** -1.6923*** -0.0902* 2.0139*** 
Acquisition 0.0153 -0.0004 -0.0018 0.0150 -0.0004 -0.0019 
Special capital users dummy 0.0098 -0.0002 -0.0140 0.0080 -0.0002 -0.0122 
Exposure to housing price change 0.8195* 0.0992*** -0.9409** 0.8263** 0.0993*** -0.9508** 
HHI index -0.0016 0.0015 0.0113 0.0063 0.0016 0.0038 
Intercept 1.2231* 0.0770*** 0.9147*** 1.1569* 0.0757*** 0.9794*** 
Adj.R-squared 0.417 0.182 0.046 0.419 0.182 0.047 
N 3905 3905 3905 3905 3905 3905 
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As shown in Table 3.6, without considering the DFA and interaction terms, only 
IRDs hedging is significant in column (1) when Tobin’s Q is used to capture banks’ 
performance. The positive coefficient sign suggests that the use of IRDs hedging 
improves banks’ performance. As the PostDFA dummy and interaction terms were 
added in columns (4), (5), and (6), IRDs hedging still exhibits positive significance 
when Tobin’s Q is used to capture banks’ performance (column (4)) and confirms 
hypothesis (H3-4) that derivatives holdings improve banks’ performance. Net CDs and 
IRDs trading are not found to be significant in any models in Table 3.6. 
As noted in column (4) in Table 3.6, of the three interaction terms included in 
columns (4), (5), and (6), the interaction term between IRDs trading and PostDFA is 
the only one that presents significance. The negative sign of this interaction term 
coefficient in columns (4) and the positive sign in column (6) suggest that after the 
signing of the DFA, the use of interest derivatives held for trading lowers banks’ 
valuation (Tobin’s Q) and operating efficiency (cost to income). 
The results of other control variables suggest that large banks with poor asset 
quality (loan loss provisions), high book-to-market ratio, stock volatility, and low short-
term borrowings tend to exhibit worse performance. The coefficient of exposures to 
housing price change is significantly positive in columns (2) and (5), and negative in 
columns (3) and (6). Considering its mean and median are both negative, these findings 
suggest that, on average, banks with higher exposures to housing price change tend to 
perform worse (lower ROA and higher cost to income) during the study period. 
Table 3.7 presents results on banks’ performance with derivatives categorized by 
trading approach of OTC and exchanges. Without considering the DFA, none of the 
derivative measures are significant. As shown in in Table 3.7, the interaction term 
between IRDs OTC and PostDFA is significant in columns (5) and (6), and the negative 
sign in column (5) with the positive sign in column (6) indicate that after the DFA came 
into effect, banks’ use of interest rate derivatives traded OTC diminishes banks’ 
performance (ROA) and operation efficiency (cost-to-income ratio). The interaction 
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term between IRDs exchanges and PostDFA is significant in columns (4) and (6), and 
the negative sign suggests that the use of exchanged-traded interest rate derivatives in 
the post-DFA period improves banks’ operational efficiency (proxied by lower cost-to-
income ratio), but lowers banks’ valuation (measured by lower Tobin’s Q). Other 
control variables are consistent as in Table 3.6 in terms of significance and signs.  
However, the predicted levels of banks’ performance and efficiency, with estimated 
coefficients and means of independent variables in the pre- and post-DFA periods, show 
that banks’ performance and efficiency were improved after the signing of the 
DFA(proxied by higher Tobin’s Q and RoA; lower Cost to Income). These findings are 




 Table 3. 7 Effects of Derivatives Use and DFA on Bank Performance 
 
The dependent variables in the regressions are Tobin’s Q, return on assets (ROA), and cost to income. IRDs OTC 
is the notional amount of net long positions in interest rate derivatives traded OTC scaled by asset. IRDs exchange 
is the notional amount of net long positions in interest rate derivatives traded on exchange scaled by asset. Net 
CDs is defined as the credit derivatives bought minus credits derivative sold, then scaled by asset. PostDFA is a 
dummy set to one after the Dodd-Frank Act is issued and zero otherwise. Size is calculated as the logarithm of 
total assets. Exposure to housing price change is a weighted average of the returns on the state-specific Fannie 
Mae real estate index where the weights are the fraction of bank deposits in the various states. HHI index is a 
weighted average of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index where the weights are the fraction of bank deposits in the 
various states. Special capital is a dummy set to one if the bank uses any of the government bailout special capital 
programs. Acquisition is a dummy set to one if the bank acquires other banks in that quarter. For brevity reasons, 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Tobin's Q ROA 
Cost to 
Income 
Tobin's Q ROA 
Cost to 
Income 
IRDs OTC  0.0027 0.0001 -0.0024 0.0031 0.0001 0.0042 
IRDs exchange 0.1392 -0.0045 0.0538 0.3052 -0.0032 0.0564 
Net CDs 0.3642 0.0122 0.3335 0.0454 -0.0002 0.1225 
Post DFA dummy 
 
  0.0104 0.0035 0.0202 
IRDs OTC * PostDFA 
 
  0.0036 -0.0003** 0.0145*** 
IRDs exchange * PostDFA 
 
  -0.1830** 0.0010 -0.1435*** 
Net CDs * PostDFA 
 
  -0.5897 0.0143 1.5835 
Size 0.0087 -0.0083*** -0.0448** 0.0108 -0.0083*** -0.0482** 
Tier 1 ratio -0.8515 -0.0133 -0.1381 -0.8533 -0.0134 -0.1377 






Return on average assets 0.2794  -0.8085 0.2483  -0.7769 
Short-term borrowing 0.1717 0.0134 -0.3435 0.1344 0.0118 -0.2870 
Stock volatility -1.6398*** -0.0908* 1.9651*** -1.6866*** -0.0915* 1.9995*** 
Acquisition 0.0126 -0.0002 -0.0032 0.0116 -0.0003 -0.0023 
Special capital users dummy 0.0101 -0.0002 -0.0139 0.0082 -0.0003 -0.0124 
Exposure to housing price change 0.8237* 0.0992*** -0.9403** 0.8304** 0.0994*** -0.9550** 
HHI index -0.0047 0.0016 0.0097 0.0038 0.0018 0.0033 
Intercept 1.2549* 0.0754*** 0.9291*** 1.1784* 0.0737*** 0.9948*** 
Adj.R-squared 0.415 0.181 0.046 0.418 0.181 0.048 
N 3905 3905 3905 3905 3905 3905 
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3.6 Sensitivity Analysis  
3.6.1 Sample of bigger banks 
The main sample includes the BHCs with at least $1 billion in total assets as of 
year-end 2006. By doing so, I examined the effects of derivatives use by those banks 
that might become defunct during and after the GFC. In the first robustness test, 
following Mayordomo, Rodriguez-Moreno, and Pena (2014), I employ another sample 
with banks whose total assets were above $5 billion in the first quarter of 2006 and the 
first quarter of 2009. The subsample consists of 52 BHCs and allows to avoid potential 
bias, as it incorporates both pre-crisis and ongoing crisis-period time spots.  
The robustness results are presented in Appendix 3.3 (Panel A to Panel I). For those 
52 BHCs, the results presented in Appendix 3.3 Panel A show that banks’ use of interest 
rate derivatives for hedging (IRDs hedging), traded on exchanged (IRDs exchange), and 
credit derivatives (Net CDs) increased their contribution to systemic risk without 
considering the effects of the DFA. The coefficient of PostDFA is significantly positive 
in columns (1) and (4) and negative in columns (3) and (6). The coefficients of the 
interaction terms (IRDs hedging*PostDFA in column (2), IRDs exchange*PostDFA in 
column (6) and Net CDs*PostDFA in columns (1) and (4)) suggest that the DFA 
effectively mitigated, even reversed, the impacts of these derivatives on banks’ systemic 
risk. Interestingly, the coefficient of the interaction between IRDs OTC and PostDFA is 
found positive in column (6), indicating that interest rate derivatives traded OTC 
increased big banks’ contribution to systemic risk after the signing of the DFA, although 
the coefficient is marginally significant. 
 As shown in Appendix 3.3 Panel B, the results of robustness tests on banks’ risks 
also remain consistent with the main results presented previously in section 3.5. Big 
banks’ use of interest rate derivatives for hedging (IRDs hedging in column (3)), interest 
rate derivatives traded on exchanged (IRDs exchange in column (6)) and credit 
derivatives (Net CDs in columns (2), (3), (5) and (6)) exposed them to higher risks 
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without considering the effects of the DFA. Interest rate derivatives for trading (IRDs 
trading in columns (2) and (3)) and traded OTC (IRDs OTC in columns (5) and (6)) 
somehow lowered big bank’s risks without considering the effects of the DFA. The 
coefficients of the interaction terms suggest that the signing of the DFA lessened the 
effects of IRDs trading (in column (2)), IRDs hedging (in column (3)) and IRDs 
exchange (in column (6)), and reversed the impact of IRDs OTC (in column (5)) and 
Net CDs (in columns (2), (3), (5) and (6)) on banks’ risk. Regarding to the performance 
of big banks, the results in Appendix 3.3 Panel C indicate that the use of interest rate 
derivatives for trading (IRDs trading and IRDs trading* PostDFA in column (3)), traded 
OTC (IRDs OTC and IRDs OTC*PostDFA in column (6)) and credit derivatives (Net 
CDs in columns (1) and (4)) by big banks lowered their valuation. 
3.6.2 Stress-tested banks 
The second robustness test includes 18 banks that underwent stress tests during the 
study period, since these large banks were heavy users of derivatives prior to and during 
the GFC, and subject to heightened regulations from 2010 onwards (see Panels D, E, 
and F of Figure 3.1). This subsample includes the banks that are required to report the 
stress test results at year-end 2015.  
The regression estimation for the stress-tested banks in Appendix 3.3 Panel D 
shows that credit derivatives use (Net CDs) in columns (1) and (4)) and interest rate 
derivatives held for hedging (IRDs hedging) in column (3)) by the stress-tested banks 
increased those banks’ contribution to systemic risk without considering the effects of 
the DFA. However, the credit derivatives is found to decrease those banks’ contribution 
to systemic risk after the signing of the DFA in columns (1) and (4)), when both the 
coefficients of Net CDs and Net CDs*PostDFA are considered.  
As shown in Appendix 3.3 Panel E, consistent results are found for stress-tested 
banks that credit derivatives (Net CDs) in columns (2) and (5)) increased banks’ risks 
without considering the effects of the DFA, while interest rate derivatives for trading 
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(IRDs trading) in column (2)) and traded OTC (IRDs OTC) in column (5)) decreased 
bank’s risks without considering the effects of the DFA. The effect of interest rate 
derivatives for trading (IRDs trading*PostDFA) in column (2)) was effectively 
mitigated after the commencement of the DFA. The credit derivatives are found 
lowering stress-tested banks’ valuation in the post-DFA period, as evidenced by the 
coefficients of Net CDs together with its interaction terms (Net CDs*PostDFA) in 
columns (2) and (5)). 
However, the results in Appendix 3.3 Panel F about bank’s performance are mixed 
across different measures, which suggests the impact of the DFA on mega banks’ 
performance is likely to be more complicated relative to those on other banks and needs 
further investigation.  
3.6.3 Alternative measurements 
I applied another commonly used measure of systemic risk, namely capital shortfall 
(SRISK). SRISK is specified by Engle (2017) as a function of bank size (market value 
of equity), book value of liabilities, and long-run marginal expected shortfall (MES), 
namely the expected bank equity return conditional on the systemic event such as a 
stock market downturn. The formula used to compute SRISK is presented as below: 
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 =  (𝑘 ∗ 𝐷𝑡 − (1 − 𝑘) ∗ 𝑒 ∗ (1  +  𝑀𝐸𝑆)) , 
where k is the minimum capital ratio determined by regulation, Dt is the book value of 
a bank’s total liabilities; e is the market value of a bank’s equity. Following Laeven, 
Ratnovski, and Tong (2014) (2016), k is set at 8%. MES is the marginal expected 
shortfall as defined in Section 3.3.1. A high value of SRISK suggests high systemic risk. 
The results with SRISK as the measure of systemic risk is presented in Table 3.8. As 
shown in the table, the use of financial derivatives by banks increased their systemic 
risk without considering the effects of the DFA. Consistent with the results reported in 
Section 3.5, these effects are found mitigated, or even reversed, after the 
commencement of the DFA. 
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I also employ alternative measures for banks’ characteristic variables in the 
regression models. For instance, both leverage ratio and tier 1 ratio measure banks’ 
capital adequacy, while non-performing loans and loan loss provision are proxies for 
banks’ loan loss risk. I employ leverage ratio and non-performing loans, which are 
found to have stronger impacts on systemic risk than derivatives holdings (Mayordomo, 
Rodriguez-Moreno, and Pena, 2014), as alternative measures for tier 1 ratio and loan 
loss provision, respectively in the model regression. Similarly, return on equity is 
applied as a substitute variable for return on assets, as the proxy for banks’ performance. 
Additionally, I apply variables calculated with different confidence levels (△CoVaR, 
and MES) and time windows (Z-score and Volatility).  
As shown in Appendix 3.3 Panel G, H, and I, I find mixed results on the effects of 





Table 3.8 Results with alternative systemic risk measure (SRISK) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IRDs trading 0.0015** 0.0011** 
  








Net CDs 0.1405 0.3871** 0.1394 0.3132*** 
Loan to depository institutions -0.3490* -0.2568* -0.3977 -0.3577 
Balance due from depository institutions -1.4526 -1.5320* -1.5151 -1.6789 













IRDs OTC * PostDFA 
   
0.0012* 
IRDs exchange * PostDFA 
   
-0.0243*** 





Size -0.0035 -0.0032* -0.0036 -0.0036 
Tier 1 ratio -0.0065 -0.0039 -0.0104 -0.0090 
Loan Loss Provision 0.0006 0.0002 0.0006 0.0005 
Book-to-market ratio -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0002 
Return on average assets 0.0105 0.0059 0.0078 0.0064 
Short-term borrowing 0.0119 0.0011 0.0184 0.0191 
Stock volatility 0.0694** 0.0421 0.0751** 0.0621** 
Acquisition 0.0009 0.0010 0.0003 0.0002 
Special capital users dummy 0.0011** 0.0006 0.0010** 0.0008** 
Exposure to housing price change -0.0051 -0.0022 -0.0030 -0.0021 
HHI index -0.0064* -0.0054* -0.0069* -0.0061* 
Intercept 0.0647* 0.0556* 0.0702 0.0646 
Adj.R-squared 0.230 0.316 0.171 0.236 
N 3563 3563 3563 3563 
The dependent variable is the capital shortfall, SRISK, as an alternative systemic risk measure. IRDs trading is the 
notional amount of interest rate derivatives held for trading purposes scaled by asset. IRDs hedging is defined as the 
notional amount of interest rate derivatives held not for trading purposes scaled by asset. . IRDs OTC is the notional 
amount of net long positions in interest rate derivatives traded OTC scaled by asset. IRDs exchange is the notional 
amount of net long positions in interest rate derivatives traded on exchange scaled by asset.  Net CDs is defined as the 
credit derivatives bought minus credits derivatives sold, then scaled by asset. Loan to depository institutions is the ratio 
of Loan to depository institutions to total loans and leases. Balance due from depository institutions is the ratio of 
Balance due from depository institutions to total loans and leases. PostDFA is a dummy set to one after the Dodd-Frank 
Act is issued and zero otherwise. Size is calculated as the logarithm of total assets. Exposure to housing price change 
is a weighted average of the returns on the state-specific Fannie Mae real estate index where the weights are the fraction 
of bank deposits in the various states. HHI index is a weighted average of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index where the 
weights are the fraction of bank deposits in the various states. Special capital is a dummy set to one if the bank uses 
any of the government bailout special capital programs. Acquisition is a dummy set to one if the bank acquires other 
banks in that quarter. All the estimated coefficients have been scaled by 106.For brevity reasons, time fixed effects and 




3.7 Conclusions  
This study provides a comprehensive examination of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) and how it impacted the use of derivatives 
products by U.S. banks. With a sample of 157 large U.S. bank holding companies, I 
examined the impacts of the use of derivatives and the DFA on banks’ systemic risk 
through the central clearing channel (Title VII of the DFA) and the proprietary trading 
channel (the Volcker Rule of the DFA). In line with past studies prior to the DFA, I find 
that the excessive use of interest rate derivatives held for hedging, exchange-traded 
interest rate derivatives, and credit derivatives (traded OTC) substantially increased 
banks’ contribution to systemic risk. More importantly, I show that in post-DFA periods, 
banks’ contribution to systemic risk was substantially reduced, and the use of credit 
derivatives (traded OTC) and interest rate derivatives held for hedging have weakened 
impacts on bank’s systemic risk in post-DFA periods. These findings provide 
supportive evidence on the effectiveness of the central clearing channel, showing that 
the implementation of the DFA mitigated the systemic risk associated with credit 
derivatives (traded OTC). However, by investigating banks’ interest rate derivatives 
held for trading, I did not find any supportive evidence for the effectiveness of the 
proprietary trading channel under the DFA. 
This study also investigates if the DFA induced higher risks in the banking sector 
at the individual bank level. However, the results are mixed regarding banks’ credit risk 
and overall risk in post-DFA periods. In order to shed light on the risk-return profile of 
the U.S. banking sector, I also examined the impact of the DFA on banks’ performance. 
Interestingly, I document evidence that the post-crisis period combined with the DFA 
regulatory environment resulted in a better performance for banks.   
Given the debate on the repealing of the DFA proposed by Financial CHOICE Act, 
the results of this study provide tangible and important implications to banking 
regulators. Overall, the DFA achieved one of its objectives, namely, mitigating the 
impact of derivatives use on systemic risk. Post-DFA periods show less 
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interconnectedness between banks caused by derivatives. Hence, the rolling back of the 
DFA could refuel the interconnectedness and systemic risk issues in the banking sector. 
On the other hand, the introduction of the DFA seems to be a great illustration of the 
well-known statement that the “risks do not disappear”, as it is found that banks’ 




Hypotheses  Findings 
H3-1a Banks’ holdings of derivatives increase their contributions to systemic risk.  Support 
H3-1b 
 
The implementation of the DFA mitigates banks’ contribution to systemic risk.  Partly Support 
H3-1c The implementation of the DFA reduces the impacts of derivatives holdings on banks’ contribution to systemic risk. Partly Support 
H3-2a Both interest rate derivatives used for trading and hedging increase banks’ risk. Reject 
H3-2b 
 
Credit derivatives increase banks’ risk. Support 
H3-2c Derivatives traded in OTC markets increase banks’ risk, while derivatives traded on exchanges decrease banks’ risk. Reject 
H3-3 The implementation of the DFA increases banks’ risk. Support 
H3-4 Derivatives holdings improve banks’ performance. Mixed 





Dependent Variables  Description Relevant Literature 
△CoVaR The difference between the financial system’s Value at Risk (VaR) conditional on bank i’s 
being in distress and the financial system’s VaR in the median state of bank i. Bank i’s 
industry beta captures the sensitivity of its stock returns to the returns of the S&P Banks 
Selected Industry Index over a one-year period. 
Trapp and Weiß (2016);  
Li and Marinč (2016);  
Mayordomo, Rodriguez-Moreno and Peña (2014); 
MES Marginal expected shortfall is defined as bank i’s mean return on days when the S&P Banks 
Selected Industry Index return reaches its lowest 5 percent level over a quarter period. 
Li and Marinč (2016); Mayordomo, Rodriguez-Moreno 
and Peña (2014); Acharya, Pederseb, Philippon and 
Richardson (2017) 
Banking industry beta Sensitivity of stock daily return to the return of the S&P Banks Selected Industry Index 
based one-year time window 
Nijskens and Wagner( 2010) 
Z-score Sum of the mean return on assets and the mean ratios of equity to assets, divided by the 
standard deviation of the return on assets 
Mohsni and Otchere (2014); Keppo and Korte (2016); 
Bolhat, Bolton and Lu (2015) 
Distance to Default Calculated as the market value of assets minus the default boundary (short term debt plus 
half long term debt), then scaled by the standard deviation of the market value of assets. 
Eichler and Sobanski (2016); Jessen and Lando (2015) 
Hoque, Andriosopoulos and Douday (2015) 
Value at Risk The worst return that a bank expects to suffer at a confidence interval of 95 percent in a 
quarter.  
Li and Marinč (2016); Williams (2016) 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2014);  
Stock volatility Volatility of daily stock return in last 6 months Trapp and Weiß (2016);  Dang and Helwege (2017) 
Chiang, Chung and Louis (2017);  
Tobin’s Q The ratio of market value to book value of total assets Chen, Li, Luo and Zhang (2017); Bhandari and 
Javakhadze (2017) Zeidan and Shapir (2017) 
Cost-to-income ratio Operating expense as a percentage of operating income Borio, Gambacorta, and Hofmann (2017); 
Almazari (2014); Pelletier (2018) 
Bitar, Pukthuanthong, and Walker (2017);   
Return on Asset Net income as a percentage of assets Berger, Black, Bouwman and Dlugosz (2014); Beck, 
Chen, Lin and Song (2016); Dang and Helwege (2017) 
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Independent Variables Description Relevant Literature 
IRDs trading The notional amount or par value of all off-balance-sheet interest rate 
derivative contracts held for trading purposes reported in Y9 call report, and 
then scaled by the bank’s total asset.  
Li and Marinč (2016); Li and Marinč (2014);  
Mayordomo, Rodriguez-Moreno and Peña (2014) 
IRDs hedging The notional value or par value of interest rate off-balance-sheet derivative 
contracts held for purposes other than trading reported in Y9 call report, and 
then scaled by the bank’s total asset 
Li and Marinč (2016); Li and Marinč (2014);  
Mayordomo, Rodriguez-Moreno and Peña (2014) 
Net CDs (traded OTC) The net notional amount is calculated as the notional amount of all credit 
derivatives for which the bank has obtained a guarantee against credit losses 
from other parties, minus the notional amount of all credit derivatives for 
which the bank has extended credit protection to others, then scaled by the 
bank’s total asset. According to SNL database, credit derivatives reported 
are all traded in OTC market. 
Li and Marinč (2014);  
Hirtle (2009);  
Minton, Stulz and Williamson (2009) 
IRDs OTC Sum of the notional amount of interest rate forwards, interest rate swaps and 
the net long positions in OTC interest rate options scaled by the bank’s total 
asset 
- 
IRDs exchanges Sum of the notional amount of interest rate futures and net long positions in 
exchange-traded interest rate options scaled by the bank’s total asset.  
- 
Loan to depository institutions Loans to all depository institutions as a percentage of gross loans and leases   Mayordomo, Rodriguez-Moreno and Peña (2014) 
Balance due from depository institutions Balance due from depository institutions as a percentage of gross loans and 
leases  
Mayordomo, Rodriguez-Moreno and Peña (2014) 
Loan loss provision Loan loss provisions as a percentage of net interest income Dang and Helwege (2017); Li and Marinč (2014);  
Li and Marinč (2016) 
Tier 1 ratio Tier 1 capital as a percentage of total risk-weighted assets Berger, Black,Bouwman and Dlugosz (2014);  
Li and Marinč (2016); Dang and Helwege (2017) 
   





PostDFA Dummy equals to one after the DFA was singed into the federal law on July 
21, 2010 
Cumming, Dai and Johan (2017); 
Keppo and Korte (2016); 
Sorokina and Thornton (2016) 
Size Logarithm of total asset  Mayordomo, Rodriguez-Moreno and Peña (2014); 
Berger and Roman (2015); Li and Marinč (2017) 
Special capital users dummy Dummy equals to one if a bank disclosed to use the discount window 
borrowing or any of the four special capital programs namely troubled asset 
relief program (TARP), term securities lending facility, term auction facility 
and primary dealer credit facility. 
Dang and Helwege (2017); 
Berger and Roman (2015); 
Berger, Black, Bouwman and Dlugosz (2014) 
Exposure to housing price change The average weighted housing return derived by using the proportion of 
deposits a bank has in each state.  
Dang and Helwege (2017) 
HHI index The average weighted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index derived by using the 
proportion of deposits a bank has in each state, 
Berger and Roman (2015) 
Book-to-market ratio Book value of total equity as a percentage of market capitalization Dang and Helwege (2017); Bhandari and Javakhadze (2017); 
Weiß, Bostandzic and Neumann (2014) 
Short-term borrowing Borrowings with a maturity of one year or less as a percentage of asset Mayordomo, Rodriguez-Moreno and Peña (2014); 
Acquisition Dummy equals to one if a bank acquired another bank in that quarter Dang and Helwege (2017); 
Liquid The sum of cash and cash equivalents as a percentage of asset Li and Marinč (2017); Li and Marinč (2014); 
Dang and Helwege (2017); 
Beta  Sensitivity of stock daily return to the return of the S&P 500 Index based on 
one-year time window 
Li and Marinč (2017); Dang and Helwege (2017); 




Robustness test results Panel A  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  △CoVaR MES Bank beta △CoVaR MES Bank beta 
IRDs trading -0.0001 0.0000 0.0046    
IRDs hedging -0.0124** -0.0117* 0.2054***    
IRDs OTC    -0.0002 0.0002 0.0074 
IRDs exchange    -0.0178* -0.0175** 0.2493*** 
Net CDs -0.1324*** -0.1088 0.8797 -0.1128*** -0.0941 0.5323 
Loan to depository institutions 0.0526 0.1580 2.0091** 0.0891 0.2094* 1.4573 
Balance due from depository institutions 1.4685** -0.2547 4.2416 1.5795** -0.1147 2.5296 
Post DFA dummy 0.0137*** -0.0016 -0.2377*** 0.0144*** 0.0005 -0.2446*** 
IRDs trading* PostDFA -0.0000 -0.0003 0.0018    
IRDs hedging * PostDFA 0.0062 0.0196*** -0.0633    
IRDs OTC * PostDFA    -0.0005 -0.0003 0.0112* 
IRDs exchange * PostDFA    0.0086 0.0048 -0.1674** 
Net CDs * PostDFA 0.3473*** 0.1731 -1.2080 0.3086*** 0.1796 -0.2572 
Size -0.0020 -0.0081** 0.0260 -0.0017 -0.0077** 0.0198 
Tier 1 ratio -0.0362 -0.0419 0.1525 -0.0328 -0.0354 0.0959 
Loan Loss Provision -0.0025 -0.0064** 0.0175 -0.0025 -0.0067** 0.0191 
Book-to-market ratio -0.0009 -0.0024 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0021 -0.0022 
Return on average assets -0.0240 -0.1016 0.5723 -0.0242 -0.1027 0.5816 
Short-term borrowing -0.0592** -0.0033 -0.2758 -0.0623** -0.0071 -0.2224 
Stock volatility -0.0440 -0.4235*** 9.4489*** -0.0541 -0.4542*** 9.5501*** 
Acquisition 0.0016 -0.0002 -0.0353* 0.0022 0.0005 -0.0444** 
Special capital users dummy -0.0014 -0.0015 0.0020 -0.0015 -0.0018 0.0042 
Exposure to housing price change -0.0215 0.0322 0.0996 -0.0238 0.0332 0.1372 
HHI index -0.0034 0.0032 -0.0241 -0.0034 0.0029 -0.0252 
Intercept 0.0130 0.0609 0.7195 0.0096 0.0570 0.8005 
Adj.R-squared 0.604 0.745 0.454 0.597 0.757 0.463 
N 1210 1210 1210 1210 1210 1210 
This table represents the results of the robustness test on systemic risk within a subsample of big banks (see 
Section 3.6.1). The dependent variables in the regressions are change in conditional Value at Risk at 95 percent 
(△CoVaR), marginal expected shortfall at 95 percent (MES) and banking industry beta (Bank beta) calculated 
using one year of daily stock price. The definitions of other independent variables are the same as in Section 3.4. 





Robustness test results Panel B 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







IRDs trading 0.0260 0.0332** -0.0004***    
IRDs hedging 2.1363 -0.0463 0.0059*    
IRDs OTC    0.0866 0.0457** -0.0006*** 
IRDs exchange    -0.5683 -0.4308 0.0097** 
Net CDs -21.4410 -23.6737*** 0.1796* -28.3312 -23.8568*** 0.1736** 
Post DFA dummy -5.7504*** -3.3745*** -0.0007 -5.9294*** -3.3696*** -0.0016 
IRDs trading* PostDFA 0.0061 -0.0310*** -0.0001    
IRDs hedging * PostDFA -1.0792 0.1530 -0.0121***    
IRDs OTC * PostDFA    -0.0491 -0.0523** 0.0001 
IRDs exchange * PostDFA    1.5162 0.4798 -0.0077* 
Net CDs * PostDFA -15.5108 35.7201*** -0.2616** -11.9097 35.3344*** -0.2636*** 
Size 1.1128 0.4849 0.0020 1.2923 0.4754* 0.0025 
Tier 1 ratio 2.4201 0.5959 -0.0445* 1.7216 0.4489 -0.0445* 
Loan Loss Provision -0.0540 -0.1036 0.0032* -0.0624 -0.1070 0.0034* 
Book-to-market ratio 0.0126 0.0676 0.0084*** -0.0013 0.0688 0.0084*** 
Return on average assets   -0.0261   -0.0256 
Short-term borrowing 11.9333** -2.9851 0.0143 12.1386** -3.0048 0.0156 
Stock volatility 0.3398 -16.7025***  2.3173 -16.7817***  
Acquisition -0.5556 -0.2284 -0.0011 -0.5855 -0.2223 -0.0013** 
Special capital users dummy -0.0270 -0.1346 0.0017** -0.0182 -0.1351 0.0018** 
Exposure to housing price change -24.3314** -6.7183* 0.0036 -23.5133** -6.7648* 0.0052 
HHI index -1.7732 0.2659 -0.0005 -1.6222 0.2750 -0.0003 
Intercept 8.6308 0.7982 -0.0082 6.0464 0.8604 -0.0151 
Adj.R-squared 0.443 0.589 0.883 0.442 0.579 0. 886 
N 1173 1173 1173 1173 1173 1173 
This table represents the results of the robustness test on banks’ credit risk and overall risk within a subsample of 
big banks (see Section 3.6.1). The dependent variables in the regressions are Z-score, distance to default, and six-
month stock price volatility. IRDs trading is the notional amount of interest rate derivatives held for trading 
purposes scaled by asset. The definitions of other independent variables are the same as in Section 3.4. For brevity 






Robustness test results Panel C  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Tobin's Q ROA 
Cost to 
Income 
Tobin's Q ROA 
Cost to 
Income 
IRDs trading 0.0019 -0.0001 0.0073* 
 
  





  0.0012 0.0002 0.0076* 
IRDs exchange 
 
  0.2460 -0.0075 0.0743 
Net CDs 0.1455 0.0962 -1.1119 -0.0508 0.0802 -0.9642 
Post DFA dummy 0.0694 -0.0014 0.0453 0.0715 -0.0017 0.0594* 
IRDs trading* PostDFA -0.0040** -0.0002 0.0060*** 
 
  
IRDs hedging * PostDFA -0.0308 0.0002 0.1212* 
 
  
IRDs OTC * PostDFA 
 
  0.0019 0.0002 0.0075* 
IRDs exchange * PostDFA 
 
  -0.1365* -0.0041 -0.0345 
Net CDs * PostDFA -1.1009 -0.1600 2.0663 -0.5143 -0.1023 2.0735 
Size -0.1405* -0.0041 -0.0503 -0.1383* -0.0034 -0.0620 
Tier 1 ratio -1.5397* 0.1283** -0.8502 -1.5441* 0.1256** -0.8075 






Return on average assets 0.1970  -2.3607*** 0.2007  -2.4041*** 
Short-term borrowing -0.0410 0.0154 -0.1971 -0.0178 0.0161 -0.2001 
Stock volatility -0.6138 -0.2535** 1.6359 -0.5796 -0.2579** 1.4947 
Acquisition 0.0123 -0.0012 -0.0086 0.0075 -0.0013 -0.0074 
Special capital users dummy 0.0119 0.0004 -0.0236 0.0125 0.0003 -0.0243 
Exposure to housing price change 1.6221*** 0.0655 -0.4742 1.6370*** 0.0678 -0.5030 
HHI index -0.0435 0.0012 -0.0081 -0.0397 0.0013 -0.0136 
Intercept 3.0097*** 0.0423 1.1504** 2.9556*** 0.0364 1.2869*** 
Adj.R-squared 0.512 0.176 0.108 0.518 0.168 0.107 
N 1173 1126 1113 1173 1126 1113 
This table represents the results of the robustness test on banks’ performance within a subsample of big banks 
(see Section 3.6.1). The dependent variables in the regressions are Tobin’s Q, return on assets (ROA), and cost to 
income. IRDs trading is the notional amount of interest rate derivatives held for trading purposes scaled by asset. 
The definitions of other independent variables are the same as in Section 3.4. For brevity reasons, time fixed 





Robustness test results Panel D 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  △CoVaR MES Bank beta △CoVaR MES Bank beta 
IRDs trading -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0015    
IRDs hedging -0.0091 -0.0006 0.1035*    
IRDs OTC    -0.0006 -0.0000 0.0020 
IRDs exchange    -0.0065 -0.0071 0.0593 
Net CDs -0.0913* 0.0439 0.4512 -0.0744* 0.0283 0.5848 
Loan to depository institutions 0.0824 0.1842*** 2.9373*** 0.1137 0.1893*** 2.7017*** 
Balance due from depository institutions 1.6350 1.4421* 1.1414 1.8107 1.4043* 0.3599 
Post DFA dummy 0.0059 -0.0003 0.0904 0.0052 0.0004 0.1104 
IRDs trading* PostDFA -0.0002 -0.0004** 0.0015    
IRDs hedging * PostDFA 0.0078 0.0003 0.0642    
IRDs OTC * PostDFA    -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0057 
IRDs exchange * PostDFA    0.0040 -0.0030 -0.0411 
Net CDs * PostDFA 0.2300** -0.1058 0.0611 0.1962* -0.0667 0.4348 
Size -0.0032 -0.0137*** -0.1425** -0.0004 -0.0139*** -0.1616** 
Tier 1 ratio 0.1613 0.1920* -2.1979* 0.1813 0.1972* -2.1786* 
Loan Loss Provision -0.0092 -0.0127*** 0.0438 -0.0095 -0.0123*** 0.0445 
Book-to-market ratio 0.0019 -0.0068** 0.0460** 0.0024 -0.0071** 0.0438* 
Return on average assets -0.0630 -0.2862** 0.9000** -0.0632 -0.2861** 0.8400** 
Short-term borrowing -0.0373 0.0318 -1.2739*** -0.0371 0.0326 -1.2818*** 
Stock volatility -0.0912 -0.2753 7.1140*** -0.1117 -0.2743 7.1517*** 
Acquisition 0.0002 -0.0016 -0.0462 0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0557 
Special capital users dummy 0.0008 -0.0030 0.0131 0.0009 -0.0031 0.0117 
Exposure to housing price change 0.1589 0.0535 0.4562 0.1889 0.0440 0.2873 
HHI index 0.0086 0.0096 -0.0587 0.0089 0.0088 -0.0655 
Intercept -0.0635 0.0843 3.0720*** -0.1025 0.0929 3.3645*** 
Adj.R-squared 0.667 0.681 0.436 0.642 0. 678 0.417 
N 354 354 354 354 354 354 
This table represents the results of the robustness test on systemic risk within a subsample of stress-tested banks 
(see Section 3.6.2). The dependent variables in the regressions are change in conditional Value at Risk at 95 
percent (△CoVaR), marginal expected shortfall at 95 percent (MES) and banking industry beta (Bank beta) 
calculated using one year of daily stock price. The definitions of other independent variables are the same as in 





Robustness test results Panel E 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







IRDs trading -0.0463 0.0403* -0.0002    
IRDs hedging 3.7055 0.0342 0.0016    
IRDs OTC    0.0074 0.0552** -0.0003 
IRDs exchange    -0.2684 0.1122 0.0048 
Net CDs -15.4775 -26.6015*** 0.0543 -21.7875 -27.3061*** 0.0531 
Post DFA dummy -8.7746*** -3.1323*** -0.0003 -9.3154*** -3.1238*** -0.0007 
IRDs trading* PostDFA -0.0362 -0.0364*** -0.0000    
IRDs hedging * PostDFA -1.5360 -0.0179 -0.0039    
IRDs OTC * PostDFA    0.0263 -0.0287 0.0000 
IRDs exchange * PostDFA    -0.4350 -0.2100 -0.0018 
Net CDs * PostDFA -23.2705 33.8473*** -0.0855 -11.8846 35.2222*** -0.0913 
Size 4.5881 0.7742 0.0010 5.2487* 0.7476 0.0010 
Tier 1 ratio 9.3786 3.1528 -0.0891* 9.7120 3.1559 -0.0938* 
Loan Loss Provision -1.1829 -0.3662 0.0078** -1.2137 -0.3622 0.0077** 
Book-to-market ratio 0.3703 0.2207** 0.0099*** 0.2874 0.2215* 0.0099*** 
Return on average assets   0.0388   0.0410 
Short-term borrowing 3.6673 -0.9701 0.0162 2.4950 -0.8087 0.0144 
Stock volatility 30.4012 -7.1975  33.7784 -7.3461  
Acquisition 0.6941 -0.0064 0.0002 0.5745 -0.0128 0.0001 
Special capital users dummy 0.5033 0.0778 0.0021 0.4685 0.0760 0.0022 
Exposure to housing price change -18.4696 2.4122 0.0376 -18.1029 2.1973 0.0398 
HHI index -2.1963* 0.5322 -0.0006 -2.2696* 0.5165 -0.0003 
Intercept -33.4750 -5.4068 0.0009 -40.3959 -5.0320 -0.0017 
Adj.R-squared 0.263 0.733 0.893 0.373 0.760 0.827 
N 382 382 382 382 382 382 
This table represents the results of the robustness test on banks’ credit risk and overall risk within a subsample of 
stress-tested banks (see Section 3.6.2). The dependent variables in the regressions are Z-score, distance to default, 
and six-month stock price volatility. IRDs trading is the notional amount of interest rate derivatives held for 
trading purposes scaled by asset. The definitions of other independent variables are the same as in Section 3.4. 






Robustness test results Panel F  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Tobin's Q ROA 
Cost to 
Income 
Tobin's Q ROA 
Cost to 
Income 
IRDs trading -0.0001 -0.0007* 0.0136** 
 
  





  -0.0003 -0.0007 0.0161** 
IRDs exchange 
 
  0.1932 -0.0064 0.1247 
Net CDs 0.8284 0.2244* -2.0341 0.5834 0.2265* -2.0426 
Post DFA dummy -0.1187* 0.0106* 0.0178 -0.1066* 0.0097 0.0315 
IRDs trading* PostDFA -0.0014 -0.0004** 0.0072*** 
 
  
IRDs hedging * PostDFA 0.0128 -0.0042 0.0832 
 
  
IRDs OTC * PostDFA 
 
  0.0030 0.0001 0.0116* 
IRDs exchange * PostDFA 
 
  -0.1113 -0.0088 -0.0974 
Net CDs * PostDFA -2.1983 -0.3546** 3.3511** -1.6072 -0.3190** 3.7231** 
Size -0.0693 0.0026 0.0881 -0.0541 0.0043 0.0725 
Tier 1 ratio 0.4014 0.1339* -0.0766 0.4102 0.1297 0.0365 






Return on average assets 0.8311*  -7.5142 0.7829*  -7.7978 
Short-term borrowing -0.2498 -0.0923 0.3034 -0.2447 -0.0963 0.3408 
Stock volatility 0.3516 -0.7323** 5.8412 0.1180 -0.7318** 5.6726 
Acquisition -0.0030 -0.0079 0.0654* -0.0041 -0.0079 0.0614 
Special capital users dummy -0.0267* -0.0030 0.0695* -0.0233 -0.0033 0.0704* 
Exposure to housing price change -1.0288 0.1383 -2.6511 -0.8254 0.1266 -2.5243 
HHI index -0.1377*** -0.0058 -0.0164 -0.1279** -0.0073 -0.0168 
Intercept 2.9551** 0.0303 -0.3594 2.6711*** 0.0217 -0.2017 
Adj.R-squared 0.559 0.384 0.149 0.576 0.387 0.149 
N 315 290 280 315 290 280 
This table represents the results of the robustness test on banks’ performance within a subsample of stress-tested 
banks (see Section 3.6.2). The dependent variables in the regressions are Tobin’s Q, return on assets (ROA), and 
cost to income. IRDs trading is the notional amount of interest rate derivatives held for trading purposes scaled 
by asset. The definitions of other independent variables are the same as in Section 3.4. For brevity reasons, time 





Robustness test results Panel G 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  △CoVaR MES Bank beta △CoVaR MES Bank beta 
IRDs trading -0.0003** -0.0002 0.0078    
IRDs hedging -0.0155*** -0.0183** 0.1871***    
IRDs OTC    -0.0005* 0.0000 0.0126 
IRDs exchange    -0.0192* -0.0159 0.2619** 
Net CDs -0.2196*** -0.3485*** 2.1107* -0.1844*** -0.3350*** 1.4349* 
Loan to depository institutions 0.0674 0.2313 0.4247 0.0984 0.2921 0.2164 
Balance due from depository institutions 0.7808*** -1.0442 3.3336 0.7969** -1.0148 3.2723 
Post DFA dummy 0.0117*** -0.0027 -0.3996*** 0.0119*** -0.0017 -0.3969*** 
IRDs trading* PostDFA -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0030    
IRDs hedging * PostDFA 0.0118*** 0.0284*** -0.0361    
IRDs OTC * PostDFA    -0.0005 -0.0000 0.0129** 
IRDs exchange * PostDFA    0.0091 0.0029 -0.1741** 
Net CDs * PostDFA 0.4878*** 0.4292*** -3.3087 0.4414*** 0.4527*** -2.0571 
Size -0.0011 -0.0077*** 0.1740*** -0.0010 -0.0077** 0.1714*** 
Leverage -0.0140* -0.0026 0.0528 -0.0179** -0.0087 0.0899 
Non-performing loans -0.0618*** 0.0051 -1.0476 -0.0541** 0.0166 -1.1214* 
Book-to-market ratio -0.0001 0.0018* -0.0321*** -0.0001 0.0018* -0.0325*** 
Return on average equity -0.0005 0.0044* 0.0172 -0.0004 0.0045* 0.0151 
Short-term borrowing -0.0715*** -0.0657* -0.1560 -0.0761*** -0.0729** -0.1108 
Stock volatility -0.1027*** -0.3692*** 8.9064*** -0.1142*** -0.3913*** 8.9808*** 
Acquisition 0.0007 -0.0000 -0.0483*** 0.0010 0.0004 -0.0515*** 
Special capital users dummy -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0008 
Exposure to housing price change 0.0140 0.0829** -0.1286 0.0126 0.0820** -0.1098 
HHI index 0.0008 0.0038 0.0203 0.0010 0.0037 0.0173 
Intercept -0.0181 0.0370 -0.7003* -0.0196 0.0374 -0.6615* 
Adj.R-squared 0.632 0.610 0.405 0.630 0.608 0.405 
N 3485 3485 3485 3485 3485 3485 
This table represents the results of the robustness test on systemic risk with alternative measures (see Section 
3.6.3). The dependent variables in the regressions are change in conditional Value at Risk at 95 percent (△
CoVaR), marginal expected shortfall at 95 percent (MES) and banking industry beta (Bank beta) calculated using 
one year of daily stock price. The definitions of other independent variables are the same as in Section 3.4. For 





Robustness test results Panel H 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







IRDs trading -0.0327 -0.0002 -0.0003***    
IRDs hedging -0.9056 -0.4515 0.0105***    
IRDs OTC    -0.0174 0.0262 -0.0004*** 
IRDs exchange    -0.1307 -0.3067 0.0089 
Net CDs -20.9091 -20.4498*** 0.2053** -22.9773 -23.4245*** 0.1864** 
Post DFA dummy -6.2682*** -2.8807*** 0.0136*** -6.3107*** -2.8641*** 0.0133*** 
IRDs trading* PostDFA 0.0293 -0.0315*** -0.0001    
IRDs hedging * PostDFA -0.3495 0.5177 -0.0156***    
IRDs OTC * PostDFA    -0.0134 0.0039 -0.0000 
IRDs exchange * PostDFA    0.5367 -0.5483 -0.0045 
Net CDs * PostDFA -6.6205 29.3624*** -0.2604*** -8.8848 36.0161*** -0.2563** 
Size 0.8186 0.4091*** 0.0010 0.8309 0.4033*** 0.0010 
Leverage 3.8144 0.7167 -0.0020 3.5684 0.5639 0.0017 
Non-performing loans -3.5652 -8.5372*** 0.1056*** -3.4773 -8.3053*** 0.1015** 
Book-to-market ratio 0.0479 0.1270*** 0.0062*** 0.0533 0.1272*** 0.0062*** 
Return on average equity   -0.0061***   -0.0062*** 
Short-term borrowing 8.7837* -4.9857** 0.0254** 8.7668* -5.0986** 0.0299** 
Stock volatility -7.3517 -18.8178***  -7.4991 -19.2707***  
Acquisition -0.1759 -0.0428 0.0001 -0.1677 -0.0301 -0.0002 
Special capital users dummy -0.0061 -0.0214 0.0008* -0.0039 -0.0256 0.0009* 
Exposure to housing price change -6.9451 0.0112 -0.0288* -6.9771 -0.0077 -0.0293* 
HHI index 0.0946 -0.0486 -0.0006 0.1182 -0.0465 -0.0007 
Intercept 0.1654 2.7854 0.0049 -0.1055 2.8208 0.0060 
Adj.R-squared 0.401 0.588 0.819 0.401 0.588 0.817 
N 3826 3826 3826 3826 3826 3826 
This table represents the results of the robustness test on banks’ credit risk and overall risk within alternative 
measures (see Section 3.6.3). The dependent variables in the regressions are Z-score, distance to default, and six-
month stock price volatility. IRDs trading is the notional amount of interest rate derivatives held for trading 
purposes scaled by asset. The definitions of other independent variables are the same as in Section 3.4. For brevity 






Robustness test results Panel I 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Tobin's Q ROA 
Cost to 
Income 
Tobin's Q ROA 
Cost to 
Income 
IRDs trading 0.0030 0.0001 -0.0011 
 
  





  0.0054 0.0003 0.0027 
IRDs exchange 
 
  0.1899** -0.0028 0.0481 
Net CDs -0.0570 0.0050 0.6707 -0.3588 -0.0208 0.0400 
Post DFA dummy 0.0416 0.0086*** -0.0236 0.0488 0.0084*** -0.0206 
IRDs trading* PostDFA -0.0056* -0.0000 0.0057** 
 
  
IRDs hedging * PostDFA 0.0466 0.0037 0.0008 
 
  
IRDs OTC * PostDFA 
 
  0.0029 -0.0000 0.0148*** 
IRDs exchange * PostDFA 
 
  -0.1349*** -0.0008 -0.1498** 
Net CDs * PostDFA -0.8438 0.0227 0.3546 -0.0717 0.0577 1.7035 
Size -0.0145 -0.0132*** -0.0267 -0.0171 -0.0132*** -0.0290 
Leverage 0.0186 0.0021 0.0048 0.0467 -0.0015 0.0209 






Return on average equity 0.0138  -0.0474 0.0122  -0.0480 
Short-term borrowing 0.0881 0.0143 -0.3320 0.1103 0.0122 -0.3121 
Stock volatility -0.7623* -0.0571 1.5981** -0.7513* -0.0632 1.6073** 
Acquisition 0.0124 -0.0003 0.0021 0.0104 -0.0001 0.0016 
Special capital users dummy 0.0041 -0.0003 -0.0098 0.0040 -0.0003 -0.0100 
Exposure to housing price change 1.1303*** 0.1287*** -1.1376** 1.1458*** 0.1284*** -1.1398** 
HHI index 0.0309 0.0022 -0.0045 0.0273 0.0024 -0.0066 
Intercept 1.1315* 0.1123*** 0.8494*** 1.1754* 0.1102*** 0.8806*** 
Adj.R-squared 0.434 0.177 0.053 0.433 0.175 0.053 
N 3826 3826 3826 3826 3826 3826 
This table represents the results of the robustness test on banks’ performance within alternative measures (see Section 
3.6.3).  The dependent variables in the regressions are Tobin’s Q, return on assets (ROA), and cost to income. 
IRDs trading is the notional amount of interest rate derivatives held for trading purposes scaled by asset. The 
definitions of other independent variables are the same as in Section 3.4. For brevity reasons, time fixed effects 

















My thesis examines three different research questions in the area of derivatives. 
The obtained answers allow academics, industry practitioners, and regulators to better 
understand the complexity of derivatives markets.  
The first essay examines the impacts of fund flows to VIX ETPs on the level of the 
underlying VIX index. I find that the fund flows into different VIX ETP groups 
significantly impact the VIX index. However, no evidence shows that there are 
additional impacts of the fund flows to VIX ETPs on the underlying VIX index during 
high-volatility times. These findings are an important voice in the debate that money 
flows into VIX ETPs could create distortions and broadly affect the underlying VIX, 
especially during volatile periods (Alexander and Korovilas, 2012; Asensio, 2013). The 
results also provide valuable implications to the market regulator, the Security and 
Exchange Commission, which raised concerns between ETPs and underlying assets. An 
interesting area for future research would be to test the difference in fund flows from 
institutional investors and individual investors to VIX ETPs, particularly when the 
market is volatile  
In the second essay, I analyze the relationship between the VIX and economic 
policy uncertainty by empirically testing the implication of the theoretical models of 
Pastor and Veronesi (2013) and Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009). I find that the 
relationship is affected by factors such as the quality of political signals, investors’ 
opinion divergence and representativeness bias. These results show that the relationship 
between expected market volatility and its determinants is subject to changes over time 
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and is not as simple as past studies assumed. Future research should focus on the 
development of a theoretical model that could explain the complex relationship between 
market volatility, policy uncertainty and those factors discussed.   
My third essay examines the effects of the Dodd-Frank Act on the use of derivatives 
products by U.S. bank holding companies. The findings show that the implementation 
of the Dodd-Frank Act mitigated the systemic risk associated with derivatives; however, 
it increased banks’ individual risks at the same time. These results indicate that 
regulations in the post-crisis period changed banks’ attitudes towards derivatives. An 
interesting extension of this work would be to examine the channels via which banks’ 
systemic risks affect and interact with their overall risks and credit risks.  
Overall, the findings of my thesis suggest that financial derivatives are a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, derivatives used for risk management purposes benefit 
investors by hedging risks associated with their investment portfolios. On the other 
hand, derivatives could pose higher risks for investors and even jeopardize the stability 
of the whole financial market. Derivatives also require deeper understanding on how 
they impact the environments in which they are traded. My work provides evidence to 
academics, practitioners and regulators that derivatives trading could affect the 
underlying, but such an effect is not stronger during market downturns; that changes in 
margin requirements can be an effective tool for exchanges to influence the trading 
patterns of derivatives; that derivatives regulations might face a trade-off between 
mitigating one type of risk and increasing other risks. The latter is a good reminder that 
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